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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the amnesty process in France between 1962 and 2012, 
following the Algerian War of Independence. The research focuses on two questions. 
First, what was the role of the amnesties in the context of the Algerian war?  Second 
how do amnesties affect the prospect of post-transitional justice? 
This thesis contends that the impact of amnesty legislations is both integral and 
reactive to political dynamics of post-conflict transformation. Through the use of 
historical archives as well as semi-structured interviews, this thesis reaches the 
following conclusions. Firstly it suggests that understanding the role of amnesty laws 
during political transformations requires looking beyond traditional approaches of 
accountability in post-conflict settings. Second, the symbolical dimensions of the 
French amnesty and their evolution over time emphasises the interactive dynamics 
between transitional justice mechanisms and aspirations of political transformation. In 
the case of France, these interactions are enters in competition with ideas and 
representations of the past held by social and political actors. The amnesty process 
has been an important feature of the political reconstruction of France and notably of 
restoration of national cohesion. It is also a nexus for contentious politics. Since the 
1990s the emergence of a social movement rallying victims, human rights activists 
and researchers challenge the official narrative on the conflict endorsed by the 
amnesty. It focuses on two major actions: disclosing the past of those responsible for 
the crimes, but who were never prosecuted nor disqualified from playing a role in the 
colonial repression, and the official recognition of forgotten episodes of the conflict 
through the creation of alternative initiatives of commemoration. 
Beyond the French case, this thesis addresses issue of contemporary demands for 
accountability and the role of legal institutions in managing conflicting interpretations 
of the past. Examining this role helps reach a better understanding of how amnesty 
legislation evolves overtime and how they affect the outcomes of post-transitional 
justice. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Using France’s evolutionary response to the Algerian War (1954–1962) as a 
contemporary case study, this thesis examines the impact of amnesty laws on the politics 
of memory of conflict.  
‘Peace of memories rests on the knowledge and disclosure of the past,’ said French 
President François Hollande in his presidential address to the Algerian Parliament on 20 
December 2012.1 With these words, President Hollande inaugurated the commemoration 
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the end of the war on the independence of Algeria (1954-
1962) under the sign of appeasement. For decades France and Algeria had disputed the 
legacy of the conflict; social and political tensions exacerbated a sentiment of unfinished 
business. The significance of this political address is that it marks a distinct break from 
the previous attitude towards one of the most violent conflicts in France’s history. The 
Algerian War, as it is commonly called, was the theatre of a brutal confrontation 
between the French army and a nationalist Algerian movement over the independence of 
Algeria from France’s colonial dominion. Unlike traditional conflict, the Algerian war 
opposed the French army against a people fighting for the recognition of their right of 
self-determination and the end of the colonial rule. The means used by France to qualm 
the Algerian insurrection extended beyond the traditional borders of legality. However, 
at the time France was not ‘at war’ with Algeria. Officially, the army had been sent to 
reinforce police operations to restore order and qualm an insurrectional terrorist 
movement. The French army, granted police powers, developed a counterinsurgency 
strategy based on torture, rape and assassination of opponents. After the war, the grant 
of amnesties sought to close the Algerian chapter. Indeed, the grant of amnesties, both to 
the Algerian fighters and the French who fought to maintain Algeria as French, 
facilitated the peace negotiations and helped French society to move on from the trauma 
of the war. Decades later, the absence of legal proceedings and the political silence 
                                                 
1 Allocution Devant les Deux Chambres Réunies du Parlement Algérien ‘Devoir de Vérité sur la Violence, 
les Injustices, les Massacres, la Torture’ available at: 
http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-devant-les-deux-chambres-reunies-du-parlement-
algerien/ [last accessed 13 December 2013] 
‘Il est nécessaire que les historiens aient accès aux archives ‘, ‘la paix des mémoires repose sur la 
connaissance et la divulgation de l'histoire’ [author’s translation]. 
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around the use of torture by the French army gave the impression that the war was to 
remain a denied event, and its darkest episodes better-off forgotten.  
For decades the acts perpetrated by the French army and the French colons during the 
War on the Independence of Algeria were not discussed publicly. It took the interest of 
historians and journalist to open this dark period of French history. The silence was 
often attributed to a political willingness to turn the page. Yet the Algerian War has had 
an important impact on the political transformation of France and came to affect the 
sacrosanct republican ideal of the unity of the French Nation. It split French opinion 
over the question of the legitimacy of the French operations and led to the termination of 
the Fourth Republic in 1958. The issue of torture itself has deeply divided French 
society.  
Since the 1990s, dealing with the Algerian past has undergone a quiet but significant 
transformation. This has been the outcome of a combination of two important factors. 
First, the official recognition of the Algerian war on October 18, 1999, by the National 
Assembly2 and the liberalisation of the archives Consequently, the wider public and 
historian were getting more interested in this period of French history that was until then 
inaccessible. The production of works of investigative history notably triggered an 
intense debate about the methods used by the French army and the degree of the 
violence unleashed against Algerian nationalists. While some of these debates catalysed 
official gestures of recognition, the persistence of the amnesties still prevented the 
possibility of investigating and prosecuting past violations. To this day, France’s 
approach towards the Algerian past is characterised by a range of distinct and 
unstructured processes. Journalists and historians attempted to further the recognition 
process by publicly disclosing information that was until then inaccessible to the public. 
The courts did not sanction these efforts and despite signs showing the readiness of 
French society to revise its history, France has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy 
to address the issue of past violence.  
My interest in conducting research on the Algerian War as a case study to understand 
the impact of amnesty laws was initially aroused by the contradictory impression of, on 
the one hand, an general public ‘obsession’ for the French Algerian past and, on the 
other hand, the absence of formal process of revision of the French colonial past. I was 
struck by the persistence of use of amnesty laws enacted during the colonial period as a 
                                                 
2 Loi no 99-882, relative à la substitution, à l'expression ‘aux opérations effectuées en Afrique du Nord ‘, 
de l'expression ‘à la guerre d'Algérie ou aux combats en Tunisie et au Maroc ‘ parue au "Assemblée, 
Débats” 11 June 1999, 5710-33, ( hereafter Law 99-882).  
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growing number of consolidated democracies engage in reviewing the violence of past 
regimes. The prevalence of using international and domestic courts to deal with issues of 
revision of past crimes led me to consider that the struggles over the memory of past 
crimes are also largely located in the sphere of justice. 
This introductory chapter will firstly identify the general objectives of this thesis. 
Secondly, it will state the main research questions and present the arguments developed. 
Thirdly, it will outline the structure of the research. Finally, it will discuss the 
methodological approaches adopted in conducting the research.  
I. Why the Amnesty Laws?  
The concept of amnesty generally refers to a formal and defined measure by which 
convictions and punishments for particular offences may be avoided or extinguished. 
France has a long history in granting amnesties that can be traced back to the 
Revolution. It subscribes to the exercise of sovereign power and has been used as a 
political instrument to facilitate national reconciliation after serious political crisis. 
Historian Stéphane Gacon explains that amnesty laws form part of a ‘codified game that 
punctuates French history’. 3 His work on the use of amnesties in France from 1830 to 
1986 led him to contend that amnesty ‘are an expected moment in the ritual progression 
of the conflict, be it political, social, religious or regional’.4  
There has been a rich academic debate on the granting of amnesties in the aftermath of a 
conflict and the meaning of such measure. The term ‘amnesty’ itself derives from the 
Greek word ‘amnestia’-meaning forgetting-and embeds connotations of both clemency 
and forgetting past acts. Amnesty’s kinship to forgetting can be traced in history. The 
treaty of Westphalia (1648), for example, obligated its signatories to ‘perpetual oblivion 
and amnesty’ regarding offences perpetrated during the Thirty Years War.5 In the French 
tradition, the idea of forgetting was developed as a form of forgiveness. The notion of 
forgiveness, generally seen as the overcoming of hate, revenge and anger, holds strong 
religious connotations. 
In post-conflict settings, amnesties have long been used to alleviate tensions found in the 
social body destroyed by a civil war, to recreate a sense of solidarity and unity between 
                                                 
3 Stéphane Gacon, L’Amnistie de la Commune à la Guerre d’Algérie (Edition du Seuil 2002), 356. 
4 Ibid, 357. 
5 Bardo Fassbender, Westphalia, Peace of (1648), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
[MPEPIL], February 2011. 
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the members of the society.6 Ruti Teitel, pioneer in the field of transitional justice, 
usefully refers to amnesty in such contexts as ‘transitional amnesties’.7 She notably 
contends that amnesty has an instrumental character that offers potential to advance 
political transformation. 8 Yet, many of the authors who focus on the use of amnesties 
have highlighted the challenge for a post-conflict society to relate the act of forgiveness 
to the notion of justice. Mark Freeman aptly explains, if it is accepted that amnesty may 
deal with issues related to the transition of a society to peace they are not a transitional 
mechanism. 9   He notably underlines that amnesty is a transitional justice issue. 
However, to him amnesty cannot be considered a transitional justice mechanism. To 
Freeman, amnesty is paradox of justice, where is that where it can form an integral 
element of a transitional process and also constitute a “direct impediment to transitional 
justice, especially to the holding of criminal trials”.10  
This paradox notably highlights that while much has been said about the role of amnesty 
laws to solve conflict, a gap in the literature is evident. It concerns the relation between 
amnesty laws and the emergence of demands for justice after the transition is completed. 
The literature review that follows is organised into three sections. It begins with a 
discussion of amnesty within the paradigm of transitional justice. It then considers the 
present status of the scholarship, and finally, it identifies the gaps that this thesis aims to 
address. 
II. Amnesty and the Discourses of transitional justice 
Transitional justice is a field of enquiry that specifically studies ideas and practices 
related to the way in which societies face past abuses. It analyses how societies 
undergoing a political transformation address the issue of violations perpetrated by or 
during the precedent regimes.11  
Within the context of societies in transition, the grant of an amnesty is not a 
straightforward proposition or process. Amnesties generally results from a political 
                                                 
6 Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (Springer, Netherland, 2002), 
35. 
7 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2002)  55. 
8 Ibid,  56. 
9  Mark Freeman Necessary Evils: amnesties and the search for justice. (Cambridge; New york: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010),19.  
10 Ibid, 19. 
11  Arthur Paige, 'How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice' [2009] 31(2) Human Rights Quarterly 359. 
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bargain that may be negotiated between the opposing parties to the conflict. The 
introduction of amnesty as part of a reconciliation process raise the question its role in 
contributing to – or conflicting with – achieving an effective and sustainable 
reconciliation.  
In the 1990s, this question gained prominence as a first generation of scholars addressed 
the ‘peace versus justice dilemma’.12 More widely, these discussions relate to the thorny 
conflict between retributive and restorative approach to justice. 13 As regimes attempt to 
overcome past violences through the use of retributive mechanisms, societies are asked 
to draw a thick line under the past. Indeed criminal trials, seek to facilitate the transition 
and promise that will end once those responsible for the crimes are punished. On the 
other hand, non-retributive mechanisms of justice seek to invest in the rehabilitation of 
the offenders and their reintegration in society. Yet within these debates authors have 
generally focused attention to the effectiveness of international law in enforcing a state’s 
duty to prosecute.14 Claire Moon notably stresses that early literature on transitional 
justice is based on an ‘entirely dualised way of thinking about issues central to 
transitional justice’.15  More recently this dualised conceptualisation of justice paved 
way for more practical approaches. 16  Authors highlight that the transitional justice 
paradigm is not able to resolve fundamental questions on the nature of transition itself.17 
Past approaches unpacked the issue of post-conflict resolution in terms of opposed 
dichotomies: truth versus justice, restoration versus retribution, peace versus justice. As 
                                                 
12 For a historical view of Amnesty in Latin American see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Truth Commissions and 
Amnesties in Latin America: The Second Generation’, [1998] 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 313, 313–
15. 
13 Juan E. Méndez, ‘Accountability for past abuses’ [1996] 19 Human Rights Quarterly 225-282; Cherif 
M. Bassiouni ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability. Law and 
Contemporary Problems’ [1996] Duke University School of Law.  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol59/iss4/3 last visited march 2013 
14  See notably Diane Orentlicher ‘Settling Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
Prior Regime [1991] 100 Yale Law Journal, 2537 (See also contribution by Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State 
Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, [1990] 
78 Cal. L. Rev. 474–89. Jose Zalaquett 'Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former 
Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints', in Aspen Institute, State Crimes: 
Punishment or Pardon? (Wye Center, Colorado, 1989) 23-69. 
15 Claire Moon, Narrating Political Reconciliation: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). 
16  Leslie Vinjamury and Jack Snyder "Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice." International Security. 283 (2003): 5-44. 
17 Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, (2008) 
34 J. L. & Soc. (Journal of Law and Society) 411; C. Bell, c. Campbell & f. Ní Aoláin, ‘Transitional 
Justice: (Re) conceptualising the Field, [2007] 3 International Journal of Law in Context) 81 Ruti G. 
Teitel, ‘Human Rights in Transition: Transitional Justice Genealogy’, [2003] 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. (69 
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Instead, new generation of authors, such as Louise Mallinder explains, that societies 
undergo a ‘continual process of re-negotiation of the balance between impunity and 
accountability as the transition evolves’. 18 By reconceptualising political transformation 
as a process, regime change should refer to something more profound than, for example, 
the periodic changes of government in consolidated democracies. The transitional justice 
literature on amnesty laws is thus characterised by diverse approaches to explore the 
relationship between amnesty, justice and post-conflict resolution and other fields of 
study such as development, gender studies, human rights or memory studies.19 
Today, transitional justice practitioners advocate for a ‘smarter’ approach towards the 
design of amnesties. They move away from dichotomies and make the case for 
conditional amnesties, which “do not contradict the general obligation of the States 
under international law to prosecute gross violations of international crimes and to meet 
the calls for truth, peace and justice”.20 Within these debates the issue of amnesty is 
therefore addressed in terms of ‘potential’ to act as an expedient for peace. 21  The 
expediency of amnesties is said to alleviate the tensions and facilitate the rehabilitation 
of past offenders.  
A. Re-conceptualizing the Paradigm of Transitional justice  
                                                 
18  Louise Mallinder, Beyond the Courts? The Complex Relationship of Trials and Amnesty. In: 
International Criminal La, Schabas, William A. (Eds), (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham 2012), 
pp. 758-775; Eric A. Posner and Vermeule, Adrian 'Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice', [2004] 
117(3) Harvard Law Review 761–825; Leebaw A. Brownyn 'The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional 
Justice', [2008] Human Rights Quarterly 30(1): 95–118.Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G 
Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy, United States Institute 
of Peace. 2010 Keesing’s World News 
19 Christine C. Bell, 'Transitional Justice, Inter-disciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field ‘ or ‘Non-Field’' 
[2009] 3(1) International Journal of Transitional Justice1-27; Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, 'Transitional 
Justice as Ordinary Justice', [2004] 117(3) Harvard Law Review 761–825; Brownyn Ann Leebaw, 'The 
Irreconciliable Goals of Transitional Justice', [2008] Human Rights Quarterly 30(1) 95–118. Tricia D. 
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy (D.C: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2010). 
20 Anastasia Kushleyko ‘Accountability v. “Smart Amnesty” in the Transitional Post-conflict Quest for 
Peace. A South African Case Study’, in Szablewska, Natalia, and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann. Current 
Issues in Transitional Justice: Towards a More Holistic Approach (Springer series in transitional justice. 
2015),  31-53. 
21 Christine C. Bell, 'Transitional Justice, Inter-disciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field ‘ or ‘Non-Field’' 
[2009] 3(1) International Journal of Transitional Justice1-27; Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, 'Transitional 
Justice as Ordinary Justice', [2004] 117(3) Harvard Law Review 761–825; Brownyn Ann Leebaw, 'The 
Irreconciliable Goals of Transitional Justice', [2008] Human Rights Quarterly 30(1) 95–118. Tricia D. 
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, 
Weighing Efficacy (D.C: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2010).  
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Reconciliation, we are told, is achieved when the nation’s politics become normalised, 
conducted in deliberate and peaceful ways and the predominant issues are not 
transitional’. 22  Concepts like ‘truth’ or ‘justice’ or ‘reconciliation’ carry various 
connotations notoriously hard to pin down. Johan Galtung notably explains that 
‘reconciliation is a theme with deep psychological, sociological, theological, 
philosophical, and profoundly human roots – and nobody really knows how to 
successfully achieve it’.23 As Neil Kritz observes:  
In responding to trauma, groups and nations tend to function similarly to 
individuals. Societies shattered by the perpetration of atrocities need to adapt or 
design mechanisms to confront their demons, to reckon with these past abuses. 
Otherwise, for nations, as for individuals, the past will haunt and infect the 
present and future in unpredictable ways. The assumption that individuals or 
groups who have been victims of hideous atrocities will simply forget about 
them or expunge their feelings without some form of accounting, some 
semblance of justice, is to leave in place the seeds of future conflict. 24 
As transitional justice became a dominant field of inquiry to address past violence it has 
been under strong critical attention. Traditional approaches to transitional justice tend to 
reduce the success to transition to a society’s capacity to abide by liberal principles 
while it overlooks the criticism brought to liberalism itself.25 Notably, that colonial wars 
are excluded from this field of inquiry. However if left unaddressed, ashes of past 
atrocities may breed new violence. Authors have argued that the inability of transitional 
justice to address injustices in colonial context can be remedied by adopting a structural 
justice approach. Indeed recent times have witnessed an increase of interest in 
connecting transitional justice to colonial injustices. A transitional veneer developed to 
address these post-colonial demands of justice seems to be centred on the idea of 
acknowledgement and reconciliation. 26  Transitional justice offers the potential to 
                                                 
22  Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin, Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground 
(Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2007). 
23 Johan Galtung, ‘After violence, reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution: Coping with visible and 
invisible effects of war and violence’ in Mohammed Abu Nimer (ed), Reconciliation, Justice, and 
Coexistence: Theory & Practice, (Landham Md. Lexington Books 2001)4. 
24  Neil J. Kriz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights. Law and Contemporary Problems. (Duke University School of Law 1996). 
25 Ayal Gross, ‘The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and 
Israel’, [2004] 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 1, 52-5. 
26 See for exemple Courtney Jung, ‘Canada and the Legacy of the Indian Residential Schools: Transitional 
Justice for Indigenous Peoples in a Nontransitional Society,’ in Identities in Transition: Challenges for 
Transitional Justice, ed. Paige Arthur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Michelle Bonner 
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address historical injustices of settlers’ colonialism in terms of harm. However the 
paradigm of transitional justice needs to be adjusted so as to be apt to recognize how the 
structural injustice of the colonial system endures beyond the moment the moment of 
violation, shaping and constraining the conditions of life experienced by both the 
dominant population and particular groups.27 
A second cluster of critical evaluation is interested in exploring the relationship between 
processes of reconciliation and the emergence of post-transitional demands of justice. 
This approach, advocate for a more inclusive engagement towards past injustice. Cath 
Collins notably argues that post-transitional justice outcomes are influenced by a 
combination of factors.28  For her, the strategies adopted by states to deal with past 
injustice achieve reconciliation are responsive and inevitably influenced to the legal 
context the mode of transition and its ensuing impact on the relation between old and 
new order. Examination of the reception of an amnesty over time, in turn, enables an 
exploration of how social movements or groups may affect accountability settlements. 
However, in the context of colonial injustices, such enterprise is rendered complex by an 
initial difficulty. Indeed, by its very nature settlers’ colonial injustice implies continuity 
between past and present. Settlers’ colonial theory disrupts the affirmation that 
colonisation ended with the cessation of colonial governance.29 As notably argued by 
Patrick Wolfe, settlements should be seen as a structure rather than and event which 
unfolds in stages according to a persistent ‘cultural logic of elimination’ in support of 
settlers hegemony.30 As part of this movement, a recent contribution by Jennifer Balint 
calls for an institutional reform of the paradigm of transitional justice recognising the 
                                                                                                                                                
and Matt James, ‘The Three R’s of Seeking Transitional Justice: Reparation, Responsibility and 
Reframing in Canada and Argentina,’ International Indigenous Policy Journal 2(3) (2011): 1–29; Damien 
Short, Reconciliation and Colonial Power: Indigenous Rights in Australia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); 
27  Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans and Nesam McMillan, ‘Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing 
Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach’ [2014] 8(2) International Journal of Transitional Justice. 
28 Cath Collins, Post-transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador. (University 
Park: Penn State University Press, 2010).  
29  See for example Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Samir Amin, 
Eurocentrism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989); Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing 
History and the West (New York: Routledge, 1990); Anthony Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Matthew Craven, The 
Decolonization of International Law - State Succession and the Law of Treaties, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
30 Balint, Evans and McMillan, ‘Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New 
Conceptual Approach’ (n 27)citing Patrick Wolfe, ‘Nation and MiscgeNation: Discursive Continuity in 
the Post-Mabo Era,’ Social Analysis 36 (1994): 93–152;  
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structural continuities between past and present and future.31 Exploring specifically the 
paradigm of transitional justice in the context of settlers’ injustices, the concept of past 
injustice is understood as both material and discursive. 
B. Amnesty and Collective Memory of Past Events   
The construction of a narrative about the past can never be politically neutral since it 
depends on an authoritative construction of the past. Amnesty forms part of a discourse 
of reconciliation, restoration of national cohesion. It is generally accompanied by 
measures of rehabilitation of past offenders, and reparation of victims. Amnesty also 
relates to forgetting of the most contentious episodes of a conflict.32 As Peter Burke 
famously put it: ‘one way of seeing is one way of unseeing, similarly, one way of 
remembering is one way of forgetting’.33 The issue of the memory of past events in the 
aftermath of a conflict is as much about the present and the future as it is about the past. 
By understanding that historical narratives about past events are constructed rather than 
merely discovered, it is possible to identify the locus of power and how it affects the 
process of revisions of past events. 34  
In Memory, History and Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur contends that the amnesties limit the 
possibility to “juridicise” or adjudicate the offences it covers. 35 To him, ‘stopping trials 
amounts to extinguishing memory in its testimonial expression and saying that nothing 
has occurred.’ 36  Ricoeur’s famous argument highlights the danger of the ‘handling 
authorized, imposed, celebrated, and commemorated history’.37  Ricoeur’s critique of 
amnesty laws resonates particularly strongly in the human rights milieu. Increasingly, 
                                                 
31 Balint, Evans and McMillan, ‘Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New 
Conceptual Approach’ (n 27) 
32  Diane F. Orentlicher, ‘Settling accounts: the duty to prosecute human rights violations of a prior 
regime,’ [1991] Yale Law Journal, 100, 8, 2537. 
33 Peter Burke, History as Social Memory, in Memory: History, Culture And The Mind 97, 103 (Thomas 
Butler ed., 1989). 1762 47 UCLA Law Review 1747 (2000) 
34  Jonathan D. Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, (2002) 81(2) Foreign Affairs 140; Priscilla B. 
Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’ (1994) Human Rights 
Quarterly 16, 597. Among these mechanisms, the establishment of the National Commission on 
Disappeared Persons and an accompanying reparation scheme in Argentina; the National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation established in 1990 in Chile, the Commission on Truth in El Salvador 
established in 1992 under the direction of the UN, to investigate serious acts of violence that occurred 
since 1980, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in post-apartheid South Africa 
35 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.)  451. 
36 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting. (n35.)  451, 455. 
37 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting (n35.), 445, 448.  
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human rights activists advocate for integrating the recognition of past atrocities as part 
of politics of reconciliation. Post-conflict theorists have morphed this philosophical 
question into a practical one and inquire whether a sustainable politic of reconciliation is 
possible without the forgetting of controversial memories? Why is there a need to have 
an official memory? It is here, that the intermeshed relationship between amnesty and 
the politics of memory points to the role of post-conflict mechanisms in the political 
transformation of post-conflict society. Practices of commemoration at the end of a 
conflict often emerge as the instinctive reaction of a society to the trauma of left by 
violence. However benevolent these initiatives initially appear, the efforts undertaken to 
reckon the past translate an official language of recognition. Similarly, mechanisms of 
post-conflict resolution can be used to produce particular interpretations of past events. 
The construction of a narrative about the past can never be politically neutral since it 
depends on an authorised construction of the past. As Pinkerton explains, ‘remembering 
the past produces that past in the present’.38 Elizabeth Jelin considers these efforts to be 
a ‘foundational moment’ in the political construction of a conflicted society.39 However, 
she has drawn attention to the fact that ‘transitional justice sets apart institutional and 
symbolic measures’.40 Symbolic measures may happen through the creation of special 
commission of inquiry, trials or official commemorative initiatives. However, this 
symbolic dimension is viewed as being subjective or a secondary layer to practices and 
policies regarding the past.41 Instead, she argues that this is a ‘false distinction’ and that 
the symbolic aspect to transitional measures is central to the transition itself.42 
                                                 
38 Patrick Pinkerton Resisting Memory: The Politics of Memorialisation in Post-conflict Northern Ireland, 
[2012] 14(1) The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 141. 
39  Elizabeth Jelin, ‘The Politics of Memory: The Human Rights Movement and the Construction of 
Democracy in Argentina ‘, [1994] 81:2, Latin American Perspectives, 38-58. 
40Elizabeth Jelin, ‘Public Memorialisation in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of Past Repression 
in the Southern Corn of South America’, [2007] The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
Vol1,156. 
41  See notably Nora Sveaass and Nils Johan Lavik, ‘Psychological Aspects of Human Rights Violations: 
The Importance of Justice and Reconciliation, ‘[2000] Nordic Journal of International Law 69, 35.  
42 Elizabeth Jelin, ‘Public Memorialisation in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of Past Repression 
in the Southern Corn of South America’, [2007] The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
Vol1,156. 
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C. Domestic Approach Towards Amnesty  
Discussions on demands for justice that emerge after the reconciliation ‘deal’ is 
achieved require adopting a systematic and contextualised approach. Commentators 
notably highlighted that the solution for a successful resolution of conflict should be 
found in the society in which it occurs.43 As contended by Diane Orentlicher, ‘there 
cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach, for the underlying national and cultural 
experiences of each society should also be taken into account’.44   Lundy suggested 
addressing the issues of justice and accountability ‘below the gaze of formal institutions 
of transitional justice’. 45  Proponents of this approach advocate the exploration of 
whether and how transitional justice policies impact on relationships between different 
actors of transition in, in particular between private actors such as civil society groups, 
individuals and state institutions. 
However, the trajectories of post-conflict justice depend on a combination factors among 
which are patterns of transitional legacy and changes in the social and institutional 
environment. In order to follow this need for a systematic and contextualised approach, 
this thesis analysis remains focused on the intra-judicial process that resulted in the 
pursuit of criminal justice or lack of thereof in France from 1962 to 2012. While much 
of this analysis directly relates to the wider literature on democratic consolidation, this 
thesis is limited to explaining the shifts in legal and political dynamics observed in the 
proceedings. The examination of domestic proceedings hinges on fundamental questions 
of law’s application, such as the legal qualification of past events, the enforcement of 
international law and the recognition of victims. Domestic courts may be involved in 
                                                 
43 Chrisine Bell, Colm Campbell and al.‘Justice Discourses in Transition’, Social & Legal Studies,13 
(2004) 305; Pablo De Greiff, , Justice and Reparations: The Handbook of Reparations, (Oxford 
University Press Oxford date 2006); Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Reconciliation Without Justice’, Southern 
African Review of Books Nov. Dec. 3–5 issue (1996). 
44 Diane Orentlicher, ‘‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.1, 2007, 10-22p.18. A similar approach has been 
suggested by Rama Mani who advocated for ‘an alternative, holistic, and integrated approach to 
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and distributive. Cited in Patricial Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional 
Justice from the Bottom Up’, [2008] 35 (2)  Journal of Law and Society, 274. 
45 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom 
Up’, [2008] 35 ( 2) Journal of Law and Society, 281; Kieran McEvoy, Lorna McGregor  (eds.) Human 
Rights Law in Perspective : Transitional Justice from Below : Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for 
Change. (Oxford, GBR: Hart Publishing Ltd., 2008). 
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implementing an amnesty or they may review the decisions of the administrative body 
related to their grant.46  
This focus on judicial process is mainly based on the contention that trials serve a social 
function. As argued by Mark Osiel, domestic proceedings can play an important role in 
the construction of a social memory about past events and may contribute significantly 
to the management of conflicted narratives.47 The use of legal proceedings with intent to 
revise the past creates a sense of solidarity that is shareable and transmittable to further 
generations. Others have remarked that efforts engaged in investigating on past crimes 
may respond to the need of society as a whole and even contribute to the stabilisation of 
a democratic regime. 48  Ruti Teitel contends that legal prosecutions ‘advance the 
normative transformation’ of a society. 49  Trials serve therefore the purpose of 
transformation by combining two objectives: a first one concerns the need for peace and 
a second objective is to fulfil the need of victims and society for recognition, 
development and reparation. 50As such legal proceedings as part of a framework of 
‘transformative justice’ which goals extend to the one of a mere transition. This 
semantic distinction finds its relevance as it extends the frame of analysis beyond the 
paradigm of transitional justice so as to also include the symbolic dimension of 
rendering justice.  In cases investigating a repressed past, the role of trials to investigate 
on past events can be compared to the work of the historian to write the history of past 
events driven by fact-finding and based on evidence.  
III. Transitional Justice and the Decolonization of Algeria 
In 1962, the signature of the Evian Agreements put an end to the conflict and terminated 
130 years of colonization. During the period of implementation of the Peace 
Agreements, Algeria was placed under the authority of a Provisional Executive. A 
committee of the Algerian affairs headed by the French President of the Republic was 
                                                 
46 Louise Mallinder ‘Beyond the Courts? The Complex Relationship of Trials and Amnesty. In: William 
A. Schabas (ed) International Criminal Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham 2012) 
47 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick: Transactions Publishers 
1993), 3. 
48 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficacy (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010).  
49 Teitel, Transitional Justice ( n7), 28. 
50 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
(Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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created to review of the application of the provisions of the agreements. 51  The 
transitional government executive was composed of nine members: three were French 
and nine were Algerians, of whom four were not members of the FLN. The transitional 
government was established pending the result of the referendum on the independence 
of Algeria. 
From 1961, France prepared for the repatriation of the European settlers. The 
repatriation of the European settlers was seen as one of the inevitable consequences of 
the decolonisation of Algeria. In 1962, approximately 650 000 people left Algeria. 
These movements of ‘repatriation included not only the French settlers but also the 
Algerians indigenous who integrated the French army and almost all of the indigenous 
Algerian Jews. 52 The war ended in a pervasive atmosphere and general uncertainty 
leading many of the repatriates to define this return in France as an ‘exodus’.53  
IV.  Objectives of Research  
The main objective of this research is to examine the contemporary impact of the 
amnesties on accountability from 1962 to 2012. It specifically explores how the 
amnesties affect the judicial capacity of trials to frame accountability for acts of torture 
perpetrated by the French army. It investigates on the interplay between the political 
construction of a historical narrative and the use of trials to adjudicate past crimes. To 
what extent can and does law function as a place of memory both as a locus of official 
circumscribed memory and as locus open – albeit in limited ways – to record a long-
suppressed past? It locates these questions in the context of the French amnesty and 
explores the interplay between France political reconstruction after the cessation of its 
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colonial governance and the rise of a social movement for the recognition of colonial 
crimes.  
As a result, this thesis accounts for alternative factors affecting institutional strength, 
assesses their potential consequences, and determines the extent to which national trials 
specifically altered judicial capacity.  The purpose of this exercise is to examine the 
challenges confronted by marginal groups (here victims of torture) with the recognition 
of their suffering and arising from the complex collective memory and the role of legal 
institutions in dealing with tensions inherited from a conflict. It primarily focuses on the 
state’s policy of memory of a conflict and how socio-political movements grow to 
contest the status quo established by the granting of amnesties to ex-combatants. 
The selection of the amnesty following the Algerian War is a pertinent case study to 
illustrate this. The French experience of the amnesty provides a vibrant example to study 
how post-conflict mechanisms evolve over time. It offers the opportunity to isolate and 
identify effects of the amnesty on the attribution of guilt and the framing of 
accountability. Successor presidents thought to continue de Gaulle’s policy of 
restoration of national cohesion by introducing further measures of rehabilitation of the 
veterans. Following roughly fifty years of amnesty policing, trials began again the 
1990s.  
The issue of dealing with past violence emerges increasingly as a present-day topic. 
While such processes benefit from an important body of scholarship regarding Latin 
America, revising the past in European countries has occurred in a more discreet manner 
than in their Latin American counterparts. This work seeks to formulate an applicable 
line of reasoning to understand the long-term effects of amnesty laws. In doing so it 
understands the need to frame the study of amnesty within a relevant historical context. 
In the case of amnesty following the Algerian War, this relevant historical context 
requires integrating the theoretical insights of post-conflict theory on critical post-
colonial approach and cultural studies. Transitional justice institutions inevitably engage 
with ‘inherited traditions and centres of power’.54 Among these traditions, the legacy of 
wars of decolonisation remains unclear.55 Third world approaches to international law 
(TWAIL theory) emerged a valuable critic to the international law theoretical framework 
and provide with tools enabling to reveal the imperialist, gendered and racist 
                                                 
54 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (n7). 8. 
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underpinnings of international law. 56  This theoretical framework has provided with 
powerful insights on the relationship between international law and the colonial 
enterprise.57 This position shares similar vein to a sociological approach to law and 
enables to unveil the gender, racial and class demarcation that may run through the 
judicial system.58 
Nevertheless, there are inevitable consequences in undertaking a demystification of law. 
By focusing on the social environment to reveal the political content of law one run the 
risks to reinforce the idealisation of the law itself. Such take would also fail to 
understand how the law governs social relations and what would be the consequences of 
reforms. Therefore it is necessary to question the nature of law to first understand how it 
affects agency and second its limitation to spur change. Then it is possible to frame the 
scope of judicial capacity. 
A third reason for my interest in the Algerian amnesties lies in the fact that much of the 
existing literature on amnesty seems to have ignored the French case when addressing 
the issue of justice. 59  The field has recently benefited from multiple comparative 
amassing of data on amnesties on websites such as the Transitional Justice Data,60 Peace 
Agreement Database61or the Amnesty Law Database,62 but most accounts only give very 
summary accounts of amnesty laws following the Algerian War. The Algerian War is 
undeniably a rich area of investigation. Regarded as a prototype for conflicts in the 
second half of the twentieth century, it has notably served as a model for the fight 
against ‘subversion’ and terrorism in Iraq. The political transformation of France from a 
colonial power to a stable democracy provides an important example of dilemmas 
shared by societies experiencing a process of transition. The question of transition in the 
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French case needs to be examined in terms of the question of defining from what 
moment do we pass from the colonial to the post-colonial? In the French context, this 
period of history is blurred by the concern to guarantee the continuity of the regime and 
institutionalizing the silence on the colonial crimes and who is responsible. Over the 
years, these concerns have merged with contemporary struggles around racial grievances 
and social integration. France entered the post-colonial phase as brutally as it came out 
of the colonial model. The growth of anti-racism activism came up against the persistent 
refusal to admit the reality of France’s multicultural society. The French conception of 
multiculturalism is strongly associated with the negative concept of 
“communautarism”.63 Thus, contemporary debates of what it means to be French has 
been strongly directed into a debate on integration and acculturation. On the other hand, 
the dilation of the lens of historical perception has notably occurred within the North 
African community. By claiming a ‘legacy of oppression’, these groups seek to maintain 
identification with the nation’s past.64 However, the absence or unsatisfactory responses 
to their demands affect the nature of the claim supported by related social movements. 
In the case of France, demands for a more comprehensive colonial historiography 
overflowed the circle of professional historians and reached grassroots civil society 
movements and are interconnected with anti-racist initiatives. This thesis is certainly the 
first study to analyse amnesty laws within the paradigm developed by Transitional 
justice scholars and post-colonial literature.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to an emerging body of academic discourse about the 
impact of amnesty by looking at how amnesties affect the politics of memory of a post-
conflict society. As explored above, the transitional justice paradigm does not include 
the dynamics of contemporary formation of demands of justice in the post-transitional 
phase, nor does it address the impact of political measures taken to deal with the legacy 
of human rights violations. Nevertheless, these issues have become all the more pressing 
as a growing number of consolidated democracies address post-transitional justice 
issues. This thesis therefor suggests that the study of the impact of amnesties has to be 
complemented by an examination of the process of formation of post-transitional claims 
of justice. To do so, it suggests deconstructing the nature of claims of justice through the 
contextual analysis of how domestic courts receive demands for the revision of past 
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crimes. This socio-legal approach facilitates the identification of factors that contribute 
to the success or failure of post-transitional justice claims. It integrates these claims and 
their responses within the political aspirations held by the state and civil society 
communities. The second contribution of this thesis is to bring together the language of 
memory studies with that of socio-legal studies in order to frame the analysis of claims 
of justice for historical crimes. This allows for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the dynamics of explaining the emergence of post-transitional claims for justice and the 
formation of social movements that challenge transitional trade-offs that were made.  
V. Research Questions and Summary of the Argument 
One of the most difficult challenges of societies haunted by a violent past is to know at 
what point can the state demand that society and the victims ‘let go’ of the past. Should 
victims maintain claims for recognition even when it is known that “victimization” robs 
individuals and communities of something that will never be returned and never fully 
repaired? How are these demands managed by successor regimes to a violent past? In 
turn, the instauration of amnesty in the aftermath of a conflict seems to suggest that, in 
order be free from past suffering, the memory of past violence should fall into oblivion. 
The central question addressed in this thesis is to understand how amnesty laws may 
affect the prospect of post-transitional justice. It primarily focuses on state policy of 
amnesty and how socio-political movements of contestations try challenges them. 
Amnesty affects the post-transitional justice process by limiting and shaping the process 
of attribution of guilt and responsibilities. This thesis argues that amnesty following the 
Algerian War was an ambiguous mechanism of reconciliation. The amnesty was used as 
a political tool of expediency to allow France possibility to extricate itself from the 
Algerian crisis. It permitted control over the transition process and protection of French 
soldiers from prosecution of human rights violations. It has also been revealed to be a 
political means of alleviating other looming tensions by facilitating the reintegration and 
rehabilitation of the opposition to De Gaulle’s government. However, in the long term, 
the amnesties severely limit the judicial capacity of domestic courts to prosecute past 
crimes. The hypothesis is that by endorsing particular patterns and legacies, amnesties 
were part of transitional trade-offs between past actors in the conflict and newly 
established institutions. This function limits the didactic potential of trials. The case 
study undertaken in this thesis reveals how this functional use of amnesties influences 
the political and social context. First, it affects judges’ interpretation of the otherwise 
applicable law through the limited qualification of the facts that covered by the amnesty. 
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Second, it affects the political discourse and serves the ambiguity of language that 
enables demands for recognition not to be addressed.  
This thesis identifies factors that can affect the success of post-transitional justice, 
assessing their role in the process of reconciliation and determines the extent to which 
alternative strategies may emerge and re-equilibrate the political and social context to 
counter the political use of amnesty as a tool to forget the past. In order to demonstrate 
this, it is relevant to breakdown this argument by exploring further sub-questions: 
 Under which conditions are post-transitional justice demands likely to be 
successful? 
 Do amnesties prevent socio-political movements from articulating judicial 
demands of revision and how?  
From the 1990s, the production of work of investigative history, and greater access to 
the archives has provided an opportunity to challenge the way the Algerian War was 
understood. The French case enables the exploration of the potential of civil society 
groups (human rights activists, victim groups, non-governmental organisations, 
journalists and historians) to influence the official narrative of past crimes. As this 
analysis reveals, this potential essentially relies on the combination of three factors: the 
capacity of pro-accountability groups to maintain marginal memories as active; legally 
framed pressure, and the exploitation of ‘momentums’. This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that, in post-transitional settings, the role of socio-political movements is 
more about raising the awareness of the prevalence of injustices than actually accessing 
retributive justice and that the success of their claim result from a complex legal-
institutions-governance triangle. 
Whilst the conclusion of this thesis refers specifically to France, it makes an important 
contribution in the debate addressed by scholars on the issue of amnesty. The 
resurfacing of demands for accountability reflects society’s need to develop adequate 
mechanisms to come to terms with the past. 
VI. Preliminary Considerations 
This section introduces some of the central concepts used in this thesis and addresses the 
question of how they are used in the academic literature related to the topic of this 
thesis. The overall aim is not to provide with an encyclopaedic definition, neither to set a 
priori of the definition given to them. This thesis highlights that the question of amnesty 
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laws extends beyond questions of retribution to incorporate the issue of reconciliation 
within a historical debate.  
A first semantic challenge to address lies in the understanding of what forgiveness 
entails within the transitional and post-transitional justice agenda. Transitional justice is 
about the public and collective acknowledgement of past offence. In the last decades, 
restorative justice scholarship has put the concept of forgiveness at the centre of its 
objectives. Within these discussions, the question arises as to whom to forgive and for 
what. How to define who is responsible in the situation of mass crimes perpetrated by a 
group? In the case of a collective group demonstrating repentance, should the emotion 
triggered be viewed similarly to the concept of forgiveness occurring on the individual 
level? Authors have raised conceptual objections to the notion of a collective 
forgiveness or ‘institutional forgiveness’. Institutions can make a plea for forgiveness on 
behalf of a group. The act of forgiveness is a process, which involves emotion and a 
commitment that the wrongful act won’t happen again. However, apology, in the form 
of a speech or a symbolic gesture, necessarily relies on the emission of an emotion at the 
individual level. The public context can only influence but cannot affect the dynamic of 
transmission of emotion between victims and perpetrators. For these principal reasons, 
the interaction between the notion of forgiveness and the concept of reconciliation is 
unclear. Reconciliation is a concept that can be understood from a secular and religious 
perspective.  Cognitive studies on reparation show that forgiveness may bear different 
meanings even for members of a similar group and is associated with different variables. 
They notably remark that individuals can’t grant forgiveness as long as the feeling of 
anger is maintained.65 In the case of historical injustices, it is necessary that the garbled 
locus of resistance to change obstacle for future reconciliation may reside in the sphere 
of emotions.66 
At first stance, transitional justice seems to suggest that reconciliation requires 
forgiveness and access to the truth. Typically, this promotion is prevalent via the 
institution of Truth Commissions, whereby people are encouraged to forgive the 
offenders and offenders set to talk about the crimes they have perpetrated. Forgiveness is 
also very much promoted through the use of amnesty. As such, the institutional 
                                                 
65 Ricoeur , Memory, History, Forgetting (University of Chicago Press 2009). 
66 Damien Short, Reconciliation and Colonial Power: Indigenous Rights in Australia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008) 
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amnesty arrangements push individuals to forgive.67 However, the institutionalisation of 
forgiveness through transitional justice mechanisms is problematic. Indeed, it seems to 
deprive individuals of the right to decide whether they should or wish to forgive, and in 
the long term thus creates frustration that risks breeding further conflict.68 Institutional 
demands to forgive can be seen as “false reconciliation”, especially in the absence of 
complementary measures of truth and justice. Authors have explicitly addressed the 
dilemma occurring between victims’ need for acknowledgement and society’s 
willingness to move on. A state-sponsored policy to encourage forgiveness runs the risk 
of politicisation. Some victims expressed the view that amnesty “high-jacked” the 
possibility of knowing the truth and felt they were forced to forget the past. Brandon 
Hamber states “individual healing is often at odds with political, social and international 
political demands on people to leave the past behind.”69 In conclusion, the interaction 
between institutional demands to forgive and reconciliation is characterised by tensions. 
The transitional justice paradigm limits its understanding of forgiveness to the political 
and social dimension but fails to integrate the emotional implication to guilt, shame and 
remorse that may underpin the process of reconciliation on the individual level. While 
reconciliation is central to the transitional justice agenda, it remains unclear to what 
extent forgiveness is necessary for the success of reconciliation. 
VII. Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, each of which aims to respond to a set of 
research questions. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework to explore the 
relationship between amnesty and post-transitional demands of justice. The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the relevant literature on amnesty and then to 
present the author’s approach in relation to the existing literature in terms of concepts, 
analytical tools and research methods. After justifying how this theoretical approach 
helps both to elucidate and respond to the research questions that direct this thesis, it 
                                                 
67 John Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge and New 
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offers an analytical standpoint from which this thesis approaches the ‘French case’. It 
takes the widely accepted view that amnesty is a ‘necessary evil’ to post-conflict 
resolution. However, it highlights that, while amnesty deals with transitional issues, it 
cannot be considered a transitional mechanism. By its very nature, the transitional 
justice paradigm fails to address the impact that measures taken during the transitional 
period have in the long term. This chapter develops an analytical framework to assess 
the impact of amnesty laws in the long term. It notably explores the concept of 
institutional forgetting of past event as developed by memory studies and uses this 
notion to confront the question of justice. This analytical framework also seeks to 
provide tools to examine how post-transitional demands of justice are formed. 
Chapters 3 and 4 contextualise the question of amnesty in relation to the Algerian War 
and explain why there was a process of amnesty in the first place. These two chapters 
present the political and social conditions that surrounded the amnesty process. Chapter 
3 provides historical background to the amnesty laws passed by France in the aftermath 
of the Algerian War. It will discuss the historical background to the conflict between 
France and Algerian nationalists from 1954 to 1962. In particular, it elaborates on the 
use of torture by the French army, and the controversies this raised in public opinion. 
Chapter 4 examines the amnesty process that followed the end of the war. It focuses on 
the amnesty process from 1962 to 1981. It demonstrates how the implementation of the 
amnesty emerged as an answer to the dilemmas faced by the government of Charles de 
Gaulle and explains that rehabilitation of French ex-soldiers was key to the political 
reformation in France. It shows that the Algerian Amnesty sought to deal with tensions 
inherited from the conflict. These preliminary chapters provide a socio-political 
contextualisation that is necessary to the analysis undertaken in the subsequent chapters. 
In order to understand key dimensions of contemporary demands for accountability 
about torture, it is essential to take into account the concomitant political crises of 
France between 1954 and 1981. 
Chapter 5 examines the possibility of engaging criminal law for acts covered by the 
amnesty. This examination seeks to understand the nature of the relationship of amnesty 
laws and the normative function of criminal law. The amnesty restricts the attempts to 
adjudicate the acts of torture perpetrated during the Algerian war as crimes against 
humanity. The limitations imposed on judicial interpretation create a discrepancy 
between the normative function of the law and society acknowledgement of the Algerian 
war. The chapter thus analyses the effects of the Algerian amnesty on the didactic 
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function of French courts and argues that this has made it difficult to maintain narrative 
coherence in respect to the new testimonies that were put forth. 
Chapter 6 explores further the relation between amnesty and legal proceedings by 
analysing the effects of amnesty on the dissemination of information about the conflict. 
It traces the genesis of the controversy around access to the archives on the events of 17 
October 1961 in relation to the action for defamation launched by Maurice Papon, ex-
head of the Parisian police during the Algerian war, and historian Jean Luc Einaudi. This 
chapter examines the use of defamation claims by torturers to avoid their past being 
divulged by journalists and historians. 
These analyses then open onto the issue of the judicial capacity of trials to change the 
official narrative of a conflict. Chapter 7 turns to considering how the findings 
developed in Chapters 5 and 6 affect the political discourse on the commemoration of 
the Algerian war. This chapter argues that the amnesty shadowed the question of guilt 
and responsibilities circulating outside the official commemoration of the conflict. It 
links the absence of legal recognition of crimes to the lack of commemoration of the 
victims of the French army, in particular of the victims of torture. To demonstrate this 
argument, this chapter begins with a brief introduction to politics of memory in France. 
From the 1970s onwards, France’s politics of memory featured efforts to ‘conceal’ the 
atrocities of the war and the need to come to terms with the legacy of colonialism. 
Successive governments undertook the reintegration of the French soldiers and 
compensated the repatriated colonizers by enacting further amnesty laws in 1974 and 
1981. While this policy sought to rehabilitate the French army, it overlooked their 
responsibility in the perpetration of crimes and injustices during the conflict. In parallel 
socio-political movements undertook their own processes of recollection on the margins 
of the official process of commemoration. The official policy of deliberate forgetting 
resulted in the fragmentation of the memory of the legacy of the war in France. In 
explicating the role of civil society groups the chapter relies on Pierre Nora’s theory on 
the registering of memory to locates this activation of marginalised memories in terms 
of cultivating an alternative narrative of past events,  
Chapter 8 concludes this project of research on the effects of amnesty on post-
transitional demands of justice. It discusses the value of the research, proceeds to reflect 
on the findings and makes suggestions for future research. It explains that the evolution 
of the amnesty highlights law’s function as a narrative. Ultimately, it shows that these 
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efforts undertaken to maintain the narrative of the war create tensions between opposing 
fringes of society.70  
VIII.  Note on Methodology 
This research is based on a historico-legal examination of the Algerian amnesties. This 
approach is important as it is assumed that most of the initial obstacles to prosecutions, 
such as immediate security priorities or the lack of judicial capacity are expected to 
diminish over time. Fieldwork was conducted during 2012–2013 in Paris and was 
divided into two stages: data collection and interviews.  
The first stage of the fieldwork focused on gathering a comprehensive historical account 
of the Algerian War and the political debate related to dealing with the Algerian past in 
France. Interviews were conducted in the second stage. This research thus mainly 
focuses on three types of primary sources: historical archives, official documents and 
interviews collected during fieldwork.  
 
Archives – Research in archives of material prior to 1992 was conducted on site as there 
are no online resources. Primary sources such as newspaper articles and memoirs were 
researched at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris. I consulted the repository 
of three major newspapers: Le Monde, L’Observateur and l’Express. Military archives 
were accessed at the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (S.H.A.T.) in Vincennes. 
Archives related to documents issued after 1992 were for the major part available online.  
Official documents – Official documents such as the text of legislation, presidential 
decrees and parliamentary debates are accessible from the website www.legifrance.fr.  
With respect to cases, the online research proceeded as follows: I adopted a systematic 
coding method to analyse the content of the cases selected. This method of analysis 
included elements of legal decisions that could be collected only by a close reading of 
the judicial opinions, such as legal, factual, analytic, or linguistic, information available 
in a digest or abstract of the decision. Cases were selected using a database provided on 
the French website legifrance.fr, using the following key terms (in French): Amnistie, 
Algérie, Torture. I supplemented this with archival research in the library of the Cour de 
Cassation in Paris.  
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Interviews – This research is informed by a series of formal and informal conversation 
with relevant protagonists in the conflict and in claims of justice related to the Algerian 
war. Finding and meeting with those who maintain a claim for historical injustice was 
not an easy task. Starting in 2011, I gathered a dedicated list of relevant stakeholders 
who could potentially provide me with answers and at the same time be willing to be 
cited in my research. There was an initial difficulty even to be able to reach out to these 
stakeholders, first by email and then by phone. A second difficulty was to ensure that the 
list of contacts represented a diversity of perspectives, ideologies, and strategies toward 
the amnesty. I started by contacting five people who seemed relevant to my research. 
The selection of these five people relied first on a basic research online to find relevant 
names of actors on three different levels: state-level actors, intermediate actors and 
direct actors. ‘State level actors’ includes the National Office for Veterans and Victims 
of War, ONACVG, and the Secretary of State for the Veterans and Memory. The 
ONACVG is a public body, attached to the Ministry of Defence and the Secretary of 
State for Defence and Veterans is an individual, currently Monsieur Hubert Falco. 
However, he did not respond to my request for an interview. On the other hand, it was 
possible to meet with the Secretary of State for the Veterans and Memory, Monsieur 
Jean-Marc Todeschini. ‘Intermediate actors’ refer to stakeholders who participated in the 
debate on the memory of the Algerian war. Research here began with contacting 
historians Raphaëlle Branche and Sylvie Thénault, whose work in the archives in 1999 
made it possible to open the debate on the use of the torture by the French army. I also 
interviewed journalist Florence Beaugé, who has been at the centre of the defamation 
trial for disclosing the Algerian past of Jean Marie Le Pen. Thirdly, the interviews also 
targeted direct protagonists making claims for justice. I was able to contact and meet 
with Mohammed Garne, who succeeded in his claim for recognition of victimhood, and 
Josette Audin, wife of Maurice Audin who brought an action of justice against the 
disappearance of her husband after he was arrested by the French army. Interviews with 
these key informants were undertaken following a semi-structured approach. (see 
questionnaire of interview in appendix 2). 
 
At the second stage of the research process, I used a snowball approach, asking each 
person interviewed to help me identify and contact other stakeholders. This second set of 
interviews was primarily used to understand the political, institutional, social and 
cultural dynamics on the ground in France (annexe 1). Interviewees included 
representatives of victims associations, relatives of tortured victims, lawyers, historians, 
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academics, and State officials. The data collected through these informal interviews 
were not used as hard evidence.  By coalescing scholarly work and primary resources 
the examination of the amnesty policy as well as the role of civil society becomes more 
compelling.  
The third form of analysis relied on the observing the changes in the relationship 
between transitional justice and the rule of law. The growth of civil society movements 
and their ability to act reflect the relation developed towards the rule of law. In France, 
the shifts within civil society offer a dynamic narrative of change in response to actions 
and subsequent inactions on post-conflict resolution at the highest levels of government. 
While it does not build an entirely causal argument, such a contextual minded focus not 
only open the breadth of analysis to non-governmental actors, but it also provides 
significant correlative evidence for any transformations to take place.  
IX. Ethical review: Doing Research on a Sensitive Issue  
Before starting fieldwork, I read the Research Ethics Guidelines designed by the 
university and obtained the necessary approvals to undertake the project. I was aware of 
the particular sensitivity of the issue of the torture during the Algerian war in France.  At 
least two concerns overshadowed my research. A first one concerned the role played by 
the conflict as a context allied with contemporary structures of oppression, and 
resistance to oppression. Therefore, my immersion in the French colonial history 
indulged in an epistemically unequal truth. A second one concerned the meaning given 
to the testimonies collected for which location and context are intrinsically relevant. 
Questioning and listening to people about their past grief requires some preliminary 
consideration of discretion and tact. Indeed, some of the victims and descendants of 
victims have been deeply traumatized and scarred by the atrocities they witnessed. 
Victims of traumatizing events are in a particularly vulnerable position to be affected by 
discussion their past grief and present-day injustices. As a socio-legal researcher, I was 
not qualified and equipped to respond to the psychological support some of them 
demanded. As a consequence, a semi-structured approach was adopted to conduct the 
interviews, taking a sensitive approach towards some of the issues addressed. 71 A list of 
questions and themes were prepared beforehand and they were explored further during 
each interview (see appendix 2). Open-ended and informal questions allowed the 
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respondents to elaborate on a topic as they chose and to offer their interpretations of 
events. Mark Hall and Ronald Wright explain that content analysis method consists of 
systematically ‘recording the content of these opinions for information beyond merely 
the subject matter and outcome of the case and the parties’ identity’.72 
 
Turning to my position, a French Muslim woman with a Moroccan descent and coming 
from a marginalized community of the Parisian suburb, provides interesting insights on 
the outsider/insider predicament when conducting research. It also outlines the 
possibilities of possessing multiple locations and sites of affinity and “identity”, which 
appear to be increasing with the norms of transnationalism and globalization. My own 
position and objectives framed the responses I was given (or not given) as well as how I 
absorbed and analysed (or not) interviews and observations.  
Throughout my fieldwork, I tried to remain, as much as possible, transparent in my 
position, background, and the objectives of my research. This included being open, as 
much as possible, about my “ethnicity/(ies)”and education and background. I tried, as 
much as possible to avoid “performing” in certain ways as a short-cut to trust as much as 
I could. Thus even in highly politicised contexts, where being “a second-generation 
migrants ” and/or a “Muslim”, depending on which identity “dominated”, could be 
perceived negatively, I felt an ethical imperative to be clear about my background if I 
was asked about this information.
 
And, perhaps in an attempted effort to produce a more 
inclusive narrative, I felt that the objectives of this work would be able to transcend 
forms of compartmentalisation and categorisation in which predicaments of being an 
“insider”, “outsider” along lines of nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion, or class 
predominate. 
Post-modernist approach to the responsive responsibility of the researcher, lead me to 
consider my position in this academic activity. How to respond to remarks inducing that 
my research had an underlying apologetic agenda against the colonial enterprise? 
Borrowing Spivek formulation I asked myself can I, as a “subaltern” speak?73 Of course 
considering oneself as postcolonial or ‘ethnic’, does not necessarily or naturally qualify 
one as Third World expert or indeed subaltern. As much as I was asking and observing, I 
understood the need for others to ask and observe my own position. Besides, her 
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concerns about the impact of discursive constructions are intimately linked to 
problematic of the field of development and therefore demands a “hyper self-
reflexivity”. The ethical pressures of being responsible for the production of a form of 
knowledge and history continually forced me, to clarify the objectives of my work -why 
does a discussion on accountability in relation to the Algerian war matter? - with 
interviewees and the readers of this thesis.  
Be it of an “insider”, “outsider”, “quasi-insider”, or anything else, every researcher will 
have to face its own set of challenges.74 A way out is by seeing and accepting the 
different positions of identities while also seeing and beyond these categories. As a dear 
colleague shared with me: “whilst affinities and attachments remain, an effort to 
transcend these and hear human stories must be pursued”.75 
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Chapter 2  
Amnesty Legislations 
 
 
This chapter sets out the starting point of this research. The purpose of this chapter 
is to presents the author’s approach in relation to the existing literature in terms of 
concepts, analytical tools and research methods. To do so, it is first necessary to situate 
the research question within the existing literature on amnesty law. It develops a 
theoretical framework to address the role of amnesty legislation in post-conflict 
resolution. The primary purpose of this chapter is to situate my thesis (and concerns) 
within the existing transitional justice debates.  
In the past decades, scholars from different disciplines including, but not limited to, law, 
political science, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and criminology have 
contributed to the question of amnesty’s role in reconciliation process by engaging in 
empirical research and essays. Amnesty embeds not only legal connotations but also 
emotions and inevitably engages with the meaning of justice. However, state practice of 
the grant of amnesty has centred on the peace versus justice debate. This thesis argues 
that amnesty affects criminal accountability but also the attribution of guilt, which does 
not necessarily, requires prosecution. By exploring the effect of amnesty over time, it 
seeks to further extend the field of inquiry on amnesty beyond the traditional 
dichotomies of transitional justice. While amnesty reflects political bargaining by 
opposing parties, over time amnesty becomes the nexus between a particular meaning 
of justice and the need for peace of past crimes. Yet, the grant of amnesty may bar the 
possibility for a conflicted society to recover from its wounds and move on.  
Amnesty is indeed widely explored in terms of its potential to act as an expedient 
mechanism for peace. The following overview of the literature seeks to identify the 
main axis of the relationship that connects amnesty to justice and the need for peace. 
This chapter argues that understanding the role of amnesty in post conflict settings 
requires extending our understanding beyond that. It is particularly interested to 
explore and develop the claims made by the new generation of transitional justice 
authors such as Mark Freeman and Louise Mallinder, who have brought nuances to the 
role of amnesty as a ‘transitional mechanism’.  
Building upon these insights, this chapter first explores the impact of amnesty laws on 
post-conflict settings. It examines the plurality of meanings embedded within the 
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concept of amnesty. It lays out the array of dimensions attached to the meaning of 
amnesty from transitional justice literature and political science standpoint. Second, this 
chapter begins to develop a framework to analyse the effects of using amnesty over 
time.  
I. The Promises of Amnesty 
In answering the question as to what ensures lasting peace, St. Augustine replied that 
‘by punishing past offences we glut our anger; by being compassionate we ensure the 
future’.76 It is the same logic that leads to the growth of a restorative justice scholarship 
promoting the use of non-retributive mechanisms. The deconstruction of the meaning 
of amnesty demonstrates that it is essentially a tool of restorative justice. This 
section first discusses the potential of justice mechanisms to promote peace and 
reconciliation. It then argues that the potential of amnesty as a post-conflict mechanism 
to successfully bring peace has much more to do with the ability of a society to break 
with the past than the terms of the amnesty itself. Finally, it explores claims made by 
authors on the effects of amnesty on the construction of a collective memory about past 
crimes. It shows that this role extends beyond forgiving to reach the forgetting of past 
events.  
 A. The Meaning of Amnesty 
Amnesties have a long history of being used by states in the aftermath of a 
conflict or political crisis. From ancient Greece to more recent conflicts, States have 
justified introducing amnesties to stem tensions inherited from conflict and to foster 
reconciliation.77
 
 
Over time, amnesty has taken different forms and shapes, borrowing a diversity of 
roles.78
 
For example amnesty can be legislated by a parliament, granted by presidents, 
or even be included in peace agreements. Amnesty may be enacted either during or after 
a conflict, in relation to a political crisis and as part of negotiated transitions. In some 
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contexts, amnesties are limited to specific types of offences and to specific members 
of a given population. Similarly, amnesty is granted for a wide range of reasons, from 
facilitating peace negotiations to being used as a tool for the rehabilitation of ex-
combatants.  
The term amnesty generally refers to an act of oblivion of past offences. Andreas 
O’Shea, defines amnesty as an ‘immunity in law from either criminal or civil legal 
consequences, or from both, for wrongs committed in the past in a political context’.79 
Mark Freeman provides further details and defines amnesty as an:  
extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to remove the 
prospect of criminal liability and the consequences of criminal 
sanction for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect to 
designated types of offenses irrespective of whether the persons 
concerned have been tried for such offence in a court of law.80 
The notion of amnesty has often been likened to the grant of pardon.81
 
Both amnesty 
and pardon constitute measures of clemency. They consist in the reduction or 
elimination of all penalties for specific crimes. However, they have different effects and 
act differently on the rehabilitation of criminals.82
 
Pardon is ‘an exemption in respect of 
the enforcement of the sentence’. 83  Its effect is to release an offender from the 
execution of a sentence pronounced by a criminal court, or diminish his sanction by 
transforming it into a less severe sentence.84 It does not eliminate the civil responsibility 
of the offender and does not erase the passing of the sentence, which remains in the 
person’s criminal record. As opposed to pardon, amnesty completely erases the sentence 
pronounced. Article 133-9 of French Nouveau Code Pénal (criminal code) provides that 
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an amnesty makes the criminal proceedings as if they had not taken place by expunging 
the conviction.85 
Unlike amnesty, no judicial body reviews the decision to grant a pardon. Pardon 
comes from a discretionary decision of the President of the Republic, which cannot be 
delegated. It may be subjected to specific conditions such as compliance with specific 
monitoring or assistance measures or compensation of victims, or again, the absence of 
another conviction during a specified period of time. The decision to grant a pardon 
takes the form of a ruling countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Justice. The decision to grant pardon is not published in the Journal Officiel (Official 
Journal). The reasons for the pardon are not made public and the legality or 
constitutionality of the decision is not subject to control. 
Furthermore, amnesty and pardon approach the question of accountability differently. 
Indeed, measures of pardon are only granted to individuals who have already been 
convicted for an offence. On the contrary, the grant of amnesty does not necessarily 
require a judgment. As Bruno Py explains, by granting amnesty, the legislator is led to 
‘review the facts and acts carried out in order to remove any criminal stigma they 
could have in the future’.86 By contrast, pardon does not exclude the possibility of 
determining the legal or moral guilt of the criminal. In the words of legal scholar 
Austin Sarat, ‘pardon presupposes the very moral guilt that amnesty precludes’.87 
One question that emerges is how the remission of criminal stigma affects the 
recognition of the crime. Briefly, the condemnation of a criminal serves two purposes: 
to acknowledge the responsibility of the offender and to ensure that the offender repairs 
the harm caused. Without the endorsement of a conviction, amnesty abolishes this 
possibility. By examining amnesties according to their phenomenological effects, 
Klaus Günther points to the notion of attributions of guilt. He distinguishes amnesties 
that prevent the legal classification of acts as crimes and the attribution of guilt from 
those which do not have such effect.88 As such, amnesties can either have the effect of 
lifting the possibility of punishment or lifting the possibility of criminal proceedings at 
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all. This distinction leads to the question of what is the role of a criminal trial apart from 
leading to punishment? As will be shown further below, trials also play a role in the 
attribution of guilt. This separation of trial from punishment is an important opening for 
the role of truth commissions as being able to satisfy some of the aspects of trials 
without going through the criminal justice process. French legal scholar Bruno Py 
argues that ‘facts’ covered by an amnesty are considered to be a ‘legal fiction’.89 This 
does not means that the acts that are inexistent, rather that amnesty acts retroactively to 
effectively erase the sanction attached to the criminal offence. As such this leads to an 
ambiguous situation whereby the crimes covered by the amnesty are not deemed to have 
never existed but they cannot be prosecuted. On a doctrinal level, the debate about 
amnesty sits at the heart of the opposition between the ‘retributive school of justice’ and 
the ‘restorative school of justice’. Within the retributive approach to justice, amnesty is 
viewed as a deviation from the normal course of justice.90
 
Indeed, retributive theory is a 
crime-focused approach and comprises a retrospective view in which the concept of 
justice entails punishment. As such it considers that criminal justice plays a central role 
in the restoration of the rule of law.91
 
John Rawls notably developed the argument that 
before political society can be cultivated, serious crimes must be adjudicated and 
conflict resolved. 92  Prosecutions therefore serve a political purpose by laying the 
foundation for a transition that disavows the political norms of predecessors and works 
‘to construct a new legal order’.93 Within this role, punishment has the potential to 
act as both retribution and as a deterrent.94 On the other hand, the restorative school 
of thought emphasises non-prosecutorial mechanisms, the rehabilitation of past 
offenders and the restoration of relations between members of a society. Inspired by a 
utilitarian vision, a new generation of authors contends that amnesty laws offer the 
potential to strengthen a new regime’s democratic institutions, prevent the repetition of 
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abuse in the future, aid political reconciliation, and have a therapeutic effect on 
society.95 The concept of amnesty presents the particularities, which are to be anchored 
in these two schools of thoughts. It has a retributive dimension because it recognises 
the criminal character of the act it covers. As Mallinder explains, ‘in extinguishing 
liability for a crime, amnesty assumes that a crime has been committed’.96 But it is also 
restorative oriented to the extent that it embeds and political considerations. Andreas 
O’Shea offers a mitigated approach and suggests considering amnesty as a ‘refinement 
of the understanding of punishment’,97 a trade-off between victims and perpetrators, but 
also between victims of past violations and future victims.98 
 
 B. The Amnesty Debate in Transitional Justice Scholarship 
Transitional justice is a field of inquiry that makes it possible to address how societies 
overcome a period of violence. Within the past decade, several scholars have begun to 
stress the need to reassess the foundations of transitional justice. A central theme that 
unites these critics reflects their unease with the bifurcation inherent within many post 
conflict schemes. This theme is captured by a provocative question: what is transitional 
justice transitioning ‘from’ and what it is transitioning ‘to’?  
This following discussion of transitional justice as a concept frames the question of 
amnesty within the use of amnesty as an alternative means to break from violence. 
Amnesty introduced in the aftermath of a conflict presents one of the most contentious 
issues associated with peace-building and reconciliation. 99  The shift from violence, 
inherent in the concept of a post-conflict ‘transition’, is by implication a shift from 
impunity to an accountability framework. Victims abused during conflict may seek 
accountability and retribution after the end of the conflict. Yet without condition 
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attached, amnesty mechanisms run the risks simply reassert and cement the tensions that 
lead to the conflict in the first place.  
1. Amnesty and International Law  
With the development of international criminal law, amnesty is presumed to be 
illegal.100 Indeed International Law provides that states have the obligation to investigate 
violations, to prosecute the perpetrators and if their guilt is established to punish them.101 
Criminal prosecution is a fundamental aspect of justice and peace. Since 1945, 
international law has steadily reinforced the State’s duty to prosecute crimes identified 
by international criminal law.102  The Rome Statute provides for jurisdiction over serious 
violations of the rules applicable in internal armed conflicts.103  In the International 
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Criminal Court the issue of large-scale instances of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity has been dealt by prosecuting the main agents responsible for these crimes. 
These legal norms are derived from a range of sources, including the Hague 
Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, including Additional Protocols I, II and III. As 
Yoram Dinstein explains, ‘given the complementarity principle enshrined in the Rome 
Statute, domestic courts also have jurisdiction over these offences where enabling 
legislation providing for domestic jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against 
humanity identified in the Rome Statute has been passed. On this basis one could go a 
step further and assume that a duty to prosecute under international criminal law 
attaches to such offences, with the corollary that amnesties for such crimes could not 
normally be recognized’.104  
The ‘near universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions and the widespread 
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation lead to a strong view that there is an 
obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (and genocide), as a 
customary rule of international law’. 105  According to the principle of universal 
jurisdiction over “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional 
Protocol I States party must also suppress all other violations and can take whatever 
legislative, administrative or disciplinary measures deemed appropriate.106 ‘States party 
to either or both the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I are formally obliged 
to prosecute or extradite any person suspected of grave breaches, wherever the 
commission of the crimes occurred and whatever his or her nationality’. In its 
Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the ICRC explains that this obligation 
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is “absolute”.107 Indeed it further explains ‘the Geneva Conventions was intended to 
prevent the vanquished from being compelled in an armistice agreement or a peace 
treaty to renounce all compensation due for breaches committed by persons in the 
service of the victor’.108  This provision seeks to prevent States from avoiding their 
obligation to prosecute those accused of grave breaches, insofar as this may form part of 
war reparations.109 One would therefore assume: ‘that any amnesty covering a person 
accused of grave breaches could not ordinarily have any legal effect in the State 
promulgating the amnesty, nor could it be given recognition in other States’. 110 
However, the question arises whether serious violations of other rules of armed conflicts 
also entail such a duty. Yasmin Naqvi explains that The Hague Conventions and 
Regulations (where many of these other crimes are identified) themselves do not specify 
a duty for States Parties to prosecute those who have perpetrated grave offence. 111 
However, a presumption of inclusion of the humanitarian rules included in the 
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 can be found from the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 1945 which held that they ‘were 
recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws 
and customs of war’.112 Furthermore, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
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for the former Yugoslavia provides for jurisdiction over ‘violations of the laws and 
customs of war’.113 Finally, it has to be noted that during negotiations in drafting the 
Rome Statute it was a guiding principle that definitions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity should reflect customary international law.114 
The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute may lead to the assumption that a 
general duty to prosecute exists. Indeed, the Rome Statute implies a duty for States to 
prosecute individuals’ accused of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.115 If States 
are unable or unwilling to fulfill this duty, the ICC will assume jurisdiction. However, as 
Naqvi notes, this point is debatable. Indeed, it cannot be assumed from the 
complementarity principle that an absolute duty to prosecute is attached to international 
crimes.116 It remains however the case that the inclusion of the large majority of serious 
violations of the laws and customs of war in the authoritative list of crimes identified by 
the Rome Statute and the existence of universal jurisdiction was reinforced with the 
creation of hybrid courts, or regional courts such as the Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights. 117 The conditions that enable the creation of these courts point towards 
the idea of an international consensus upon the irrefragable duty of State to prosecute 
certain kind of crimes.118
  
As Yasmin Naqvi explains: ‘The unsettling response as to whether a customary duty to 
prosecute could be assumed on the basis of the complementarity principle of the Rome 
Statute applies equally to serious violations of humanitarian law committed in non-
international armed conflicts. In fact, given the historic reluctance of States to assume 
precise duties in relation to the law of armed conflict in internal conflicts, there is more 
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reason to be hesitant about inferring a mandatory system of enforcement from the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute.’119 
Transitional Justice scholarship sought to embrace these debates and itself entered the 
‘age of accountability’.120 This emphasis on accountability coincides with the creation of 
the United Nations ad hoc tribunals and the reinforcement of retributive measures to 
deal with past crimes. 121
 
The strong argument for greater accountability however 
clashes with the persistence of the use of amnesty legislation. 122  During the 
preparatory stages of the creation of the ICC, several negotiating states resisted calls that 
amnesties be explicitly prohibited in the Rome Statute 1998. International law also 
encourages the use of amnesty at the end of an armed conflict. Article 6(5) of 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions notes that: ‘At the end of hostilities, the authorities 
in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to 
the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained’.123  In its commentary on 
Protocol II, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) specifies that the 
object of article (6)5 is to ‘encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to 
re-establishing normal relations in the life of the nation which has been divided’.124 
Furthermore, semantic analysis of the language used in the Rome Statute seems to tilt 
the argument towards a positive duty to prosecute. The international court jurisprudence 
also seems to point towards the prohibition of amnesties.  The 2004 decision of the 
Appeal Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone confirmed that amnesties cannot 
bar the prosecution of international crimes before international or foreign courts by 
virtue of the existence of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes perpetrated in 
non-international armed conflict. 125
 
It notably states that ‘[w]here jurisdiction is 
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universal, a State cannot deprive another State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the 
offender by the grant of amnesty’.126 
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine whether the duty actually exists in 
customary international law. However these debates are significant to show how 
domestic courts can give effect to an amnesty by choosing not to exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crimes it covers.127 
 
2. Amnesty and the Goal of Peace  
In the 1990s the democratic transitions in Latin America reshuffled the debate on 
amnesty. 128  Amnesties enacted by outgoing regimes in Latin America have come 
under attack by human rights advocates and anti-impunity campaigners for being used 
as a shield for perpetrators of crimes. 129  This movement triggered important 
discussions on the permeability of international law to non-retributive measures. In 
Uruguay130
 
or Brazil,131
 
for example, domestic legal institutions have been called on 
to review the validity of amnesty. Such amnesties were considered illegitimate because 
offering immunity without requiring an initial inquiry into the facts. 132
 
Another 
example has been to seek justice via the use of universal jurisdiction in the effort to 
extradite former Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet from the United Kingdom 
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to stand trial in Spain in the late 1990s.133
 
In spite of these important developments, it 
still remains difficult to assert that
 
Amnesty is deemed inconsistent with international 
law.134
  
Furthermore, authors questioned the potential of amnesty as a tool of justice by 
inquiring on its potential to act as an expedient for peace. Is peace possible when 
perpetrators have not been prosecuted? It seeks to facilitate the restoration of peace, 
forgiveness and truth-recovery. It is argued that amnesty is an expedient for peace by 
encouraging leaders of dissident groups to participate in the democratic process.135 
This role is played by protecting ex-soldiers from the stigma of prosecution and 
enabling their reintegration in society- by facilitating the release of prisoners, 
protecting State agents from prosecution, encouraging exiles to return, or even merely 
recognizing the cultural or religious traditions). One key example is the case of Sierra 
Leone. In this case the Truth and Reconciliation Commission acknowledged that the 
Lomé Agreements would not have been possible without the granting of an amnesty.136 
Besides, prosecuting criminals in situation of mass violence is not always possible and 
in some cases limited amnesties have been more efficient in achieving 
reconciliation. 137  Naqvi further explains, that ‘in armed conflicts where serious 
violations of the laws of war and international humanitarian law have been committed 
on a massive scale, peace and justice for victims has to be balanced against the need for 
a progressive response and not provoke or maintain further violence’. 138 In these 
circumstances a ‘restorative justice approach incorporating limited amnesties, focusing 
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on the normalising rather than the punitive objectives of criminal law, has been 
advanced as a more appropriate model’.139 Another reason why states choose to grant 
amnesty to past offenders is to prevent, once and for all, the past from seeding renewed 
conflict. As such, the granting of amnesty finds justification as a political tool used to 
alleviate the tensions and facilitate the rehabilitation of past offenders. Indeed, political 
leaders may choose to grant an Amnesty to ex-combatants as the result of a political 
bargain between opposing parties in favour of assuring political stability over 
criminal justice. 
The persistence of the use amnesty in state practice reflects another conceptualisation of 
justice. Amnesty enables to deal with situation that cannot be resolved in a 
courtroom.
 
As Tom Hadden explains, a strict retributive approach aiming at the 
punishment of all violators may serve to maintain tensions rather than reconcile 
opposing parties. 140  Gerhard Werle further suggests that ‘refraining from punishing 
crimes under international law can be necessary in individual cases to restore domestic 
peace and make national reconciliation possible’.141 The argument that prosecution may 
impede the peace process was advanced in the case of South Africa. Martha Minow 
notably stressed that prosecutions are ‘slow, partial and preoccupied with the either/or 
simplifications of the adversary process’. 142  In her work on the Truth Commission 
process she highlights that the ‘adversarial nature of prosecution tends to depreciate the 
pain and suffering for those who survive violence and on healing societies torn by 
hatred and brutality’.143 Further, it was suggested that the indictment of perpetrators 
might have the counter-productive effect of stigmatising criminals and excluding them 
from the reconciliation process.144  Hence authors have turned to the use of amnesty as an 
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alternative to prosecution. The reference of the concept of Ubuntu in the 1994 Interim 
Constitution of South Africa reflects the moral dimension embedded in the notion of 
Amnesty and emphasises its role in preventing vengeance. It states that: ‘there is a need 
for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a 
need for Ubuntu but not for victimization’.145 This led Martha Minow to conclude that 
the South African amnesties enabled the restoration of the dignity of victims by 
protecting them against further violence and that the suffering they endured is 
integrated within the wider narrative of nation building in the aftermath of the 
conflict.146  
While on the premise the grant of amnesty contradicts the principle of criminal justice 
on accountability, it can also offer an alternative solution to the need for justice It is 
therefore crucial to define the conditions for an internationally acceptable amnesty.   
Questions on the legitimacy of amnesty, their compatibility with international law, are 
resolved through the understanding of accountability in terms of ‘ a practical 
continuum’. As Ronald Slye sees it, amnesty is ‘the realistic price one has to pay for 
ending a destructive war or removing a government that has committed gross violations 
of human rights in the past’.147Amnesty therefore can be crucial in a state’s trajectory 
towards political transformation. The political use of amnesty ultimately leads to the 
question not only whether peace is possible, but what kind of peace do we want. 
For Andreas O’Shea, amnesty is the ‘achievement of a state of affairs in a particular 
political context that reflects the ultimate goal of humanity’.148 Further he continues by 
justifying this calculus and says that ‘the need for retribution, denunciation, deterrence 
and reform must be outweighed by the need for transition peace, reconciliation, 
forgiveness or truth’.149 Therefore the grant of amnesty depends on a practical sum of 
choices. The utilitarian use of amnesty reflects the recognition that in some cases the 
success of transition depends on a move away from traditional normative assumptions. 
Thus amnesty mirrors a more reflective and focused approach to justice and peace.150
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Chandra Sriram highlights this need for a utilitarian approach and explains that ‘in 
reality the choice is seldom “justice” or “peace” but rather a complex mixture of 
both’.151 The strength of this approach develops its full potential when expanded beyond 
the traditional language of development. Jessica Gavron notably contends that ‘the 
amnesty was conceived, in part, to facilitate the recording of the truth rather than the 
denial of the past, thus the traditional association of Amnesty with amnesia is 
inverted’.152In Uganda, for example the amnesty process was complemented by a ‘truth-
seeking’ and ‘truth-telling’ processes.153 She further states that ‘victims have the right 
of access to relevant information about their experiences and to remember and 
commemorate past events affecting them’. 154  Another example is Colombia which 
deconstructed the traditional representation of their past. The Justice and Peace Law 
imposed a ‘duty on individuals claiming an amnesty to make reparations to victims, 
who could claim against the legal and illegal assets of such individuals’. 155  In 
circumstances where perpetrators had limited or no assets, victims could be 
compensated by a State reparation mechanism. 156   The Colombian Constitutional 
Court, similar to the Omagh bombing judgment, also allowed ‘victims to claim against 
both individuals and organisations, with the effect that any member of an 
organisation found responsible for atrocities can be sued’.157 
By way of conclusion: despite its controversial foundation, the grant of amnesty is 
undeniably useful in post-conflict societies as it makes it possible to deal with a whole 
range of issues that ‘cannot be satisfied by action in the courts’.158 It reflects the 
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need for an approach to conflict that stretches beyond narrow views on justice based on 
strict retribution. Where prosecutions can address the need for punishment, amnesty 
provides another way to address the need for reconciliation.159
 
To understand the use of 
amnesty, it is necessary to explore the question of justice beyond strict dichotomies.
  
 
C. Amnesty and the Politics of Memory 
This thesis investigates the impact of amnesty on the politics of memory of a conflict. As the 
previous section explains, amnesty is an institution that engages with diverse sets of dynamics 
related to dealing with violence. It has notably highlighted the utilitarian use of amnesty 
to overcome the limitations of a strict retributive approach to justice. Decades after the 
end of a conflict, the obstacles to prosecution that justified the grant of amnesty –  the 
fragility of democratic institutions, lack of judicial capacity and military resistance – are 
set to reduce over time, and tensions may arise as demands for recognition of past 
crimes prevail. One issue that emerges concerning the effects of amnesty after the 
transition relates to the perception that amnesty entails the forgetting of past crimes. The 
term ‘amnesty’ is etymologically rooted in ancient Greek ἀμνηστία (amnestia), which 
connotes oblivion and the forgetting of past events. The Oxford English dictionary 
defines amnesty as ‘an act of forgetfulness, an intentional overlooking, and a general 
pardon of past offences’.160 The ‘forgetting’ of past event is not necessarily excluded 
from post- conflict resolution programs. In El Salvador, for example, President Alfredo 
Cristiani claimed that to ‘build a better future’ it was necessary to ‘erase, eliminate and 
forget everything in the past’ . 161 Forgetting in order to bring a close to an 
unmanageable past may be at first attractive to governments. Hirsh contends the 
construction of particular memories of the past can be used to motivate and incite 
populations towards committing atrocities.162 This has notably been the case in Former 
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Yugoslavia and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. David Bell notably contends that 
perceptions of the past have been essential in de-legitimising previous regimes and 
establishing new claims to political authority. 163  However, Minow warns that the 
‘failure to address the roots of past violence is likely to ensure that the consequences of 
mass violation will persist and may give rise to new rounds of revenge’.164 Hence 
she argues that in a healthy society, an individual has access ‘to both an individual 
memory and a collective memory’.165  
The connection between collective memory and national reconciliation remains unclear. 
A ‘unified memory’ of past human rights violations can be an effective tool for 
reconciliation and healing for individuals and local communities. Judt explains the 
period that witnesses the construction of a historical narrative needs to be regarded as 
intimately linked to the transitional justice paradigm. He explains that the late 1940s in 
Germany constitute ‘the period during which Europe’s post-war memory was molded’, 
which constituted a key element of reconstruction of German society and contributed to 
the design of future policy options.166 By building continuity with the past, memory does 
the work of laying the foundation for identity, on an individual and a cultural level.167 
However the grant of amnesty breaks this continuity without addressing the 
circumstances that led to the crimes. The use of amnesty to act as a waiver to 
prosecutions can in some cases have been a direct obstacle to the establishment of truth 
and compensation mechanisms.168
 
In settings where amnesty is granted, it is not rare 
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that controversies over past crimes resurface decades after the end of a conflict.169
 
Given the nature of memory and its modes of transmission, as seen below, it is likely 
that contestation over the meaning of the past spans decades, even affecting several 
generations. The intervention of the State in the field of memory to establish official 
narratives of past violence is problematic for several reasons. 
The interests of post-conflict scholarship in practices of commemoration grew out of 
seeking to understand how memory can form part of a framework of transformative 
justice. Post-transitional governments have sometimes addressed this issue by 
establishing investigatory mechanisms to look into past crimes. For example, Indonesia 
mandated a Commission of Truth and Friendship to ‘accumulate, synthesise, and 
interpret individual memories so as to offer society as a whole an official 
interpretation of its shared past’. 170  Similarly, the Aylwin Government in Chile 
entrusted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission with producing an account of the 
origins and evolution of the armed conflict, focusing on victims’ experiences of past 
violence. These alternative mechanisms have enabled adding a meaningful 
acknowledgement of past abuses to conflict resolution while addressing victims’ need 
for truth. 171
 
Other states may have addressed the issue of memory indirectly and 
invested in symbolical measures to unlock the disclosure of the truth and end the 
secrecy. 
 
In conclusion to this first section, it may be said that amnesty laws are a complex 
mechanism of conflict resolution. On the one hand, amnesty seeks to respond to the need 
for peace and reconciliation. However, the effects of amnesty on the remembrance of 
past violence lead one to inquire how the forgetting of past crimes affects the need for 
recognition of victims. The crimes covered by the amnesty are not deemed never to have 
existed. This means that it is not that the acts that are inexistent, but that amnesty acts 
retroactively to effectively erase the sanction attached to the criminal offence. 
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Assessing how amnesty contributes to post-conflict national reconciliation within the 
transitional justice paradigm is made difficult for three principal reasons. First, such an 
assessment can suffer from a lack of coherent approach towards amnesty, due to the 
unsettled status of amnesty under international law. While international custom has yet 
to crystallise, State practices shows that amnesty laws are often introduced to tackle 
on-going conflicts and insurgencies, and is included in negotiated peace agreements. A 
second reason is that a counterfactual scenario, i.e. non-adoption of amnesty or the 
hypothetical effects of a trial, are impossible to test and that correlation does not 
necessarily mean causation. 172  Further Mark Osiel warns against selective bias in 
attempting such analysis: 
Countries whose relevant experience of transition does not support the 
author’s favoured position on this question (such as Spain, El 
Salvador, Brazil, and several others) are simply ignored, like 
inconvenient cases that an opposing advocate can be expected to call 
to the court’s attention. Such methods should be no more acceptable in 
serious legal scholarship than in social science, where the main point 
is precisely to compel our confrontation of inconvenient facts.173  
Thirdly, by framing amnesty in terms of dichotomies (peace versus justice, truth versus 
oblivion, and impunity versus accountability),  transitional justice fails to address the 
ever-evolving nature of transition and reconciliation. Authors have therefore advocated 
a contextualised and more comprehensive approach. The next section explores how this 
approach makes it possible to deconstruct amnesty’s interaction with resurfacing 
demands of justice. 
II.  Analytical Framework 
This research seeks to understand how amnesties affect the prospect of post-transitional 
demands of justice. It suggests that exploring the effects of amnesty on the prospect of 
justice is relevant in the present but also in the future after the transition is over. It 
notably argues that amnesty is more than a transitional mechanism: its effects are also 
observable in the political construction of the society in which they are implemented. 
The previous section explored the meaning of amnesty laws and demonstrated that it is a 
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tool of justice whose effects in the long term are difficult to address within the 
transitional justice paradigm. Indeed, the paradigm of transitional justice tends to 
overlook how amnesty affects the recognition of accountability of past perpetrators.   
This section turns to developing a framework of analysis that will enable the exploration 
of how the granting of amnesties may constitute a limitation on law’s capacity to 
respond to demands for justice for past violations, building its foundations on a 
‘contentious politics’ approach and combining sociological considerations with legal 
methods of analysis.  
III. Judicial Capacity of Domestic Legal Proceedings to Produce a 
Narrative 
One of the primary legal effects of amnesty is to remove the prospect and 
consequences of criminal liability for designated categories of individuals.174 However, 
Lawrence Douglas argues that the role of criminal justice is not only to punish but is 
also a pedagogic endeavour.175 Indeed, the ultimate goal of a trial is to find whether the 
accused is guilty or innocent. Furthermore, the process of the hearing of witnesses 
implies truth finding. Judges therefore play a central role in the formation of post-
transitional justice outcome, through their interpretative role.  
The exploitation of judicial proceedings to challenge the transitional bargain is 
becoming increasingly popular. 176 However achieving ‘Truth’ through legal 
proceedings is an elusive goal. The historiographical interpretation of past events may 
lead to over  simplification or even in some cases distortion. The intervention of law 
in the construction of a national history is a ‘perilous endeavour’.177 Claims of justice 
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constructed on the establishment of a shared ‘truth’ risk becoming transformed into a 
broader struggle of recognition between narratives and thus overshadowing the 
demands of victims or their relatives. The first risk is the risk of over simplification 
embedded in the individualisation of criminal accountability. Observing the trial of 
Eichmann, Hannah Arendt criticised the overtly didactic purpose of the prosecution of 
Eichmann and warned against the use of trials for didactic ends.178 It is not the role of 
the Courts to write history, but to grant justice. The most obvious reason for this is that 
judges and jury are not trained historians and cannot establish historical ‘truth’. Their 
role is to decide on individual cases.179
 
Against Arendt’s critique, Douglas defends 
the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials as an imaginative, if flawed, response to extreme 
crimes
180
 Debates on historical crimes happening in front of courts cast light upon the 
power imbalances within the transitional state, the goals and structure of the post-
conflict society and the competing narratives that attempt to explain the causes of the 
violence. 
A. Law as a Narrative 
A first limb of this analytical framework relies on considering the role of law to act as a 
narrative of past events. Ronald Dworkin compares judges to writers and refers their 
interpretative function to a larger definition of narrative coherence whereby legal 
processes participate in the construction of a coherent narrative of what happened.181 At 
the most basic level, the construction of a narrative about the past draws meaning 
from the ‘master narrative’, that is the conceptual framework for historical 
interpretation. 182  This framework usually relies on periodization, assessment of the 
contributions of the different historical actors and turning point events.183 The master 
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narrative serves the function of structuring the past. In the realm of law, this narrative 
colours the judges’ assumptions about their role in interpreting law and historical 
evidences.184 Conversely, the narrative produced in courts, is influenced through debate 
and the presentation of historical evidence.185
 
Ronald Dworkin has argued that legal 
interpretation is inevitably linked to political commitment and that procedures of legal 
interpretation are politically loaded.186 The relevance of this approach stems from the 
fact that judges participate in the didactic function of trials through the interpretation 
they provide. This interpretative function of the law and the facts results in the 
production of a particular narrative and meaning given to an event. Subsequently, Law’s 
function in the construction of meaning about what took place in the past point to role of 
law in memory transmitting, and community strengthening.187 Dunné referring to Mac 
Cormick’s work explains that the law as a narrative resumes by its coherence, which can 
be tested on two different levels. A first level refers to the concept of narrative 
coherence that is  ‘the justification of findings of fact and the drawing of reasonable 
inferences from evidence’. 188  A second level concerns the examination of law’s 
‘justifiability under high order principles or values’ or of its so called normative 
coherence. 189
 
Examples generally given are preambles of statutes, declaration of 
intentions or introductions.  The function of amnesty as a constraining norm can be 
assessed through the deconstruction of the process of ‘law’s narrativism’.190  
A central question therefore emerges as to whether amnesty acts like norms that give an 
orientation and direction towards the interpretation of other norms or as a norm 
containing values?  The function of amnesty as a constraining norm can be assessed 
through the deconstruction of the process of interpretation of law in cases related to the 
acts covered by the amnesty.  
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B. Rules of Proceeding on the Admission of Evidence 
Secondly, this analytical framework relies on understanding the process of creation of a 
judicial ‘truth’. In the courtroom, the truth being measured by way of evidence, there is 
an important link between the progression of legal proceedings and the historiography 
of past crimes.191
 
Legal proceedings offer an opportunity for victim to provide their 
own ‘narrative’ about the conflict. Proceedings of criminal trials follow the 
accusatory regime in which the debate is public, oral and contest-oriented. The record 
of their testimony guarantees that their version of history will not fall into oblivion. 
Kristen Campbell has identified this link in her study on the production of legal archives 
during the proceedings at the International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).192 She highlights the role played by legal archives as a mnemonic device.193 
With the sudden termination of the Milosevic case, ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
declared that the tribunal had achieved its objective: to set down a historical record.194 
As such, similar to practices of commemoration, trials form part of a framework of 
transformative justice. As Gready explains a transformative justice approach allows 
shifting the focus of inquiry from the ‘legal to the social and political, and from the state 
and institutions to communities and everyday concerns’. 195  As such, this approach 
enables to address the structural violence of past crimes. This enables addressing the role 
of judges within a historiography of the conflict. Judges and historians are both 
concerned by the past, yet unlike the latter, the allocation of punishment introduces a 
forward-looking element in the legal process, for instance in determining the chances of 
re-socialisation. 
By framing the question about amnesty within the discussion on the didactic function 
of trials, this thesis points to the rules of proceedings on the admission of evidence. In 
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this regard, defamation proceedings offer an interesting illustration to explore the nature 
of evidence admitted by judges. One key variable for the examination of this type of 
proceedings is that defamation can either be civil or criminal and in civil actions the 
standard of proof is significantly easier to satisfy than in criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, unlike criminal prosecutions, the idea of punishment in defamation 
litigation is rendered in the form of compensation or reparation. Because the judges are 
more concerned with repairing the damage than retribution against the offender, 
defamation proceedings offer less of a moral dilemma. Therefore, the outcome carries a 
less important political cost. In the process of a  hearing, judges may order the 
disclosure of documents so as to verify the accuracy of the claims. It also may require 
individuals to appear in court to be cross-examined about past events and for the 
veracity of their accounts to be probed and tested.196In addition, Douglas explains that 
‘those taking the action only have to present evidence which proves that the harm was 
‘more likely than not’ caused by the defendant, in contrast to a prosecutor having to 
prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the accused was responsible. 197
 
Furthermore, 
defamation proceedings can constitute a political reality. By opening investigations of 
crimes of smaller stakes, they can provide victims and justice actors with an 
opportunity to hear hidden accounts and shape the content of history.198
 
Defamation 
has thus permitted the strategic exploitation of legal proceedings to expand the judicial 
capacity of courts to deal with claims of justice related to historical crimes. Defamation 
proceedings occurring in the context of a quest for attributing responsibility for the war 
crimes perpetrated during the Algerian war made it possible to hear claims made by 
historians against retired officers. As such, it reveals that the success of defamation 
proceedings lies more in the fact that trials proceedings provide a public space to 
discuss and record the memory of past victims and survivors than the direct outcome of 
the trials. Hence, even when there is little or no attribution of individual responsibility, a 
form of limited sanction can advance a historical record and the construction of public 
shareable knowledge about past repression.
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IV. Amnesty and the Contentious Politics Model 
Amnesty, as explored above, is said to provide the conflict with an ending. It seeks to 
reconcile opposing parties around the idea of forgiveness and forgetting of past grudges. 
Demands for the reopening of space to review past crimes highlight the role played by 
social movements and the efforts undertaken to create and exploit accountability 
opportunities after transition. The success of these efforts is largely attributed to legal 
changes occurring in the post-transitional society. 199  In exploring how change in 
accountability can occur, this thesis also seeks to understand how “accountability 
movements” can be formed. 
‘Contentious politics’ is a field of inquiry interested in the connection of clusters of 
actors making claims on behalf of a public or the collective. The analysis of the process 
of formation of collective political struggles helps understanding the nature of post-
transitional claims of justice.200 Contentious politics particularly looks at claims that 
bear on someone else’s interests. Contentious politics theorists rely on four major 
aspects to assess the success of a group mobilization. The first one refers to the 
external circumstances or ‘political opportunities’ that permit a group to act. Secondly, 
this action needs to be internally structured. Next, it requires a ‘collective process of 
interpretation, attribution [and] social construction [that] mediates between opportunity 
[and] action’.201 The fourth element relates to the ‘repertoires of contentions’ or the 
‘means by which people engage in contentious collective action’. 202  Contentious 
politics is a causally coherent domain with distinctive properties. It is causally coherent 
in the sense that similar cause-effect relationships apply throughout the field of inquiry. 
It is distinctive in the sense that some features of contentious politics appear nowhere 
else in social life. 
A. Social Movements of Change 
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Contentious politics involves interaction between a set of actors to create a social 
movement. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow define social movement as ‘a sustained 
campaign of claim-making based on organisations, network, traditions and solidarity to 
sustain these activities’.203 Social movement actors can have multiple and overlapping 
identities whereby some civil society actors may be a grouping of individuals who act 
both collectively and individually. The range of actors involved in cases of 
transformation of narratives of accountability widens as a political space opens. Over 
time new actors can enter the arena of dispute over human rights violations and 
recognition of responsibilities. What determines the formation of social movements is, 
as Tilly and Tarrow explain, a ‘sustained challenge to power holders’.204 As such, the 
success of a  social movement relies on the development of strategies that can be 
communicate effectively and balance the expectation of the audience while producing 
resonant frames. It is further argued that the success of a movement to effectively 
compete with a government requires the support of a diverse network of actors.205
 
Jay 
Winter and Emmanuel Sivan point to the growth of civil society as the locus where 
many groups develop their own strategies of remembrance, sometimes in tandem with 
the state and other times against it.206 Their impact on contentious politics depends on 
their resources, legitimacy, and the ability to extend the acceptance of their narrative 
within wider society. 
B. Political Participation of Individual in the Reconciliation Process 
Conflicts and reforms within a society in a process of reconciliation grow out of the 
interaction between contentious and institutional politics. This triggers the formation of 
new forms of organisations and networks, which can turn into social movement 
campaign. Popkin and Bhuta highlight ‘the pivotal role played by human rights 
groups and individuals in attempting to ensure that amnesty laws do not result in 
complete impunity for those responsible for egregious crimes’.207 Participatory theory of 
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justice provides a useful lens to approach the question of the mobilisation of private 
actors and what involvement they have in the justice process. In this paradigm, 
survivors and their descendants should be able to see themselves as ‘participants’ in 
positive change with the capacity to organise around solving problems experienced 
by society as a whole. This approach calls for greater consideration of the ‘unheard 
voices’ of the conflict resolution process.  
Daly and Sarkin usefully suggest breaking down the process of reconciliation into 
five levels: (1) individual; (2) inter-personal; (3) communal; (4) national; and (5) 
international. This categorisation makes it possible to observe how strategies and 
choices adopted by civil society actors, or ‘accountability actors’ shape the political and 
legal environment. 208  At the individual level, civil society actors are concerned to 
redress wrongs or retrieve information concerning the whereabouts of victims’ ‘family 
members, human rights organisations or other form of social organisation’. At a 
collective level, the action of civil society group subscribes to a project of establishing 
political accountability at a national and communal level, participation theory links the 
role of grass-root movements to the process of democratization of the country.209 
Contentious politics adds that the expansion of social movement groups is historical and 
their degree the participation takes shape within political and cultural opportunities.  
C. Memory as a Strategy for Contentious Politics 
Cultural and political factors shape the symbolic environment in which contentious 
politics take place. In the context of reconciliation, the formation of a collective memory 
is the symbolic ground upon which the contention is displayed. Not only does the 
collective memory of a particular event provide symbolic material from the past, but 
also at the same time it can constrain people’s ability to mobilise by imposing 
exclusions and prescriptions. In the field of memory, the contention involves the 
struggle for the recognition of forgotten events and the participation of social groups in 
the construction of a collective narrative about the past. It seeks to gain recognition of 
marginal narratives that have been excluded from the collective memory. French 
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sociologist Maurice Halbwachs initiated the discussion on collective memory by 
addressing it in terms of the inevitable interplay between an individual’s experience of 
an event and its reconstruction by society. Collective memory, helps to form a 
collective identity, is not just a collection of individual memories. With the concept of 
collective memory, it is useful to understand at a general level the effect of a rhetorical 
exclusion or inclusion of a past in a community’s consciousness. The past of a nation is 
constructed through institutions of transition such as investigatory and legal 
proceedings. Policy actors select which particular historical episodes should be recalled 
according to their objectives.210 The process of construction of an official narrative of 
past events forms part of the transitional process but it can also stir up and project 
controversies around a particular memory.211 A politics of memory presumes a degree of 
consensus and dialogue between individual subjectivities and a societal or collective 
sense of belonging. The construction of an official narrative of the past is necessarily 
adjusted to present circumstances. As Valerie Rosoux rightly contends, ‘references to 
the past are rarely made per se’ and that ‘their importance derives from the intentions of 
the speaker’.212 
The contention over memory begs the question why is the past important? As 
observed by Georg Simmel, state-sponsored initiatives of commemoration of past 
crimes creates opportunities for socialisation and rebuilding bonds between people. 213 
On the other hand, the obstacles to their participation indicate how pockets of resistance 
can rise. 214  To Simmel, ‘the unifying power of the principle of conflict nowhere 
emerges more strongly than when it manages to carve a temporal or contextual area out 
of competitive or hostile relationships’. 215  Contentious politics reveals several 
complications concerning collective memory. First, there is no such a thing as a single 
memory. Official memories provide reference points for framing the memories of 
groups. If the latter is totally dominant, then society could be described as totalitarian. 
If, on the other hand, individuals have no access to a collective consciousness, then 
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society does not meaningfully exist.216  However official narratives presented as the 
truth about past events often distort past memory and extend beyond simply giving a 
factual account. Second, the concept of ‘truth’ is essentially political. While it inevitably 
embeds absolute and ethical aspects, its intensely political character renders the nature 
of the pursuit of justice and the truth-seeking process intrinsically complex. 217 
Feminist, post-colonial, and Marxist literature has gone a long way in questioning 
dominant narratives of ‘truth production’, showing how the claims to ‘truth’ cannot 
be separated from forms of power and political control.218
 
What is the truth? Whose 
truth is it anyway? Thus what is often sought as a ‘truth’ in the purest sense of the term 
is, rather, a selective narrative whose purpose is to legitimise the political consensus by 
which violence ended. We find an integrated, dictatorial memory, commanding, all-
powerful, spontaneously actualising a memory without a past that ceaselessly reinvents 
tradition, and linking the history of its ancestors to the undifferentiated time of 
heroes, origins and myth. 
The emergence of counter-memories pinpoints the ellipses, short cuts and repressions 
of the past and challenges the capacity of official memories to providing the only all- 
encompassing narration.
 
Rebecca Saunders and Kamran Aghaie argue that counter- 
memories are generally the result of informal, private or socially marginalised 
contexts.219 These counter memories can normally coexist with a hegemonic perspective 
on the past or they can engage in overtly disputing the dominant narrative of the 
past. In recent years, civil society actors have undertaken to counter the denial of past 
crimes in terms of rights and justice. In Spain, for example, a campaign spearheaded by 
the Asociacion Para la Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica (Association for the 
Recuperation of Historical Memory, ARMH), focusing its efforts on locating and 
identifying the bodies of republican non-combatants as well as demanding official 
recognition of Francoist crimes, has gathered momentum.220 After the death of General 
Franco in Spain, the successor regime introduced a set of amnesty laws which not 
only prevented any trials to investigate and prosecute past human rights violations but 
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also restricted the possibility of discussing publicly the legacy of the civil war and 
Franco eras.221
 
The 1977 amnesty law prevented any trials or public debate on the 
legacy of the civil war and Franco.222 However in 2007, the Pacto del Olvido, a tacit 
silent pact, began to crack. 223  Human rights advocates and victims’  groups put 
pressure on the government and this resulted in the creation of an Inter-ministerial 
Commission to investigate the ‘moral and legal rehabilitation’ of the victims of the civil 
war. In November 2007, the government met their demands and enacted the Law of 
Historical Memory, which officially declares that the repression of the Franco era was 
illegitimate and requires the government to remove all statues and memorials, which 
were glorifying the dictatorship.224
 
This law enhanced the rights of recognised victims 
and also of unrecognised victims. As explained by Paloma Aguilar, the human rights 
framing of the law enabled a move away from victor/defeated dialectic and re-coded the 
Civil War memory so as to contest the consensus that had led to a silence on the scale 
of the repression.225  
The concept of sites of memory or lieux de mémoirs is useful here to address how 
ritualised practices of commemoration of past events came about and how they are 
integrated in an initiative of transitional justice. It generally refers to particular places or 
artifacts that evoke a connection to the past, such as museums or plaques that 
commemorate specific events.226
 
Pierre Nora explains that sites of memory require 
‘conformity to pre-established [sic] accounts and symbolic frameworks’ in which 
‘each event acquires meaning only in relation to a legendary organisation of the 
past’.227 It can also include sites already charged with past memories to which new 
connotations are added. Moreover, the notion of sites of memory does not only refer to 
material markers. There are also symbolic dates in which the past becomes present 
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through public rituals, when feelings from the past are activated and meanings 
investigated, memories constructed and renovated.228
 
Nora explains that the creation 
of ‘sites of memory’ or territorial markers enables a revitalisation of social group 
history. 229
 
Jelin observes that t hese  markers  have to involve governmental 
decisions and resources t o  l as t  over  t ime .230 The dynamics of memorialisation play 
an important role in the redefinition of the nation and the reconstruction of broken 
relationships.231 In contrast to historical objects, sites of memory have no referent, Nora 
highlights. They are their own referent. Sites of memory turn critical history into 
historical criticism. This is what makes the study of sites of memory relevant for the 
purpose of this thesis. The creation of sites of memory can offer an opportunity to 
challenge the official historical language on past events and shake its selective and 
‘exclusive’ foundation. Although these objects are themselves unable to account for the 
myriad of experiences and stories relating to past human rights crimes, it allows for a 
revision of the historical narrative. Particularly in the context of traumatic events, 
renewed memories become the locus of conflict and competition among different 
narratives of that past, with opposing interpretations being suppressed, contested or 
subverted. The concept of sites of memory and their dynamic of construction challenges 
the assumption that without an authoritative sanction a future revelation, counter 
memories are bound to remain marginal and at the periphery of the collective 
consciousness. 
Conclusion 
Much has been written on the potential of amnesties to expedite the resolution of a 
conflict or a political crisis. This chapter has evaluated the existing the literature, and 
examined the assumptions and predictive functions of amnesty legislation in post-
conflict settings. It emerged that the literature overlooks some important aspects of the 
role of amnesty laws in post-conflict settings. The proposed framework seeks to develop 
tools to understand the relation of amnesty, accountability and memory. The first 
section illuminated the nature of this relationship by exploring the effects of amnesty on 
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accountability. It explained that the principal role of amnesty is one of expediency. 
Understanding that post-conflict resolution is an evolving process highlights that it is 
difficult to evaluate the impact of amnesty on political transformation. From one context 
to another, the practice of amnesty differs significantly according to the crimes covered, 
the purpose and the mode of implementation. The framework developed in the second 
section throws light on areas or spaces where an assessment can nonetheless be 
undertaken. These preliminary insights provide the seeds for the analysis of French 
court’s application of the amnesty and to understand further the obstacles confronting 
attempts to circumvent the effects of the amnesty. This framework is later applied to 
untangle the political and memorial dimensions of judicial proceedings (Chapters 5, 6 
and 7). 
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Chapter 3:  
“La Sale Guerre”  
France and the Independence of Algeria (1954-1962) 
 
‘Torture in colonial Algeria became a routine even before 
we knew about it. But the hatred of the man that manifests 
itself in this practice is an expression of racism.’ 
Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Une Victoire’232 
 
This chapter provides important contexts for understanding the French amnesty laws in 
Algeria by presenting the historical background to the war of independence of Algeria 
and the political transformation of France from a colonial power to a stabilised 
democracy. It focuses on France’s strategy to counter the Algerian insurrection and the 
wider history of Algerian and European involvement in the country. 
From 1954 to 1962 Algeria was the theatre of a brutal confrontation between the French 
army and the Algerian nationalists, which resumed in the recognition of the right to self-
determination of the Algerian people. The economic and political dominance of the 
colonisers, and the political desire to maintain the Algeria a French territory all played a 
role in turning an insurrection into a full-scale war. However, unlike traditional warfare, 
the Algerian war did not oppose two armies against each other. In order to counter the 
anticolonial movement, the French government institutionalised an approach based on 
the deployment of military forces in operations of police and the gathering of 
intelligence to destroy the nationalist movements.  
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section is interested in exploring the 
French attitude towards the Algerian population under the colonial rule and strategy 
developed in order to repress the nationalist movement. It then focuses specifically on 
the controversies related to the use of torture by the French army during the conflict. The 
final section explores the impact of the conflict on France and the ensuing polarisation 
of French society on the decolonisation process.  
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I. The end of French colonial rule (1945-1954) 
The reasons for the emergence of an Algerian insurrection in Algeria are located in the 
French history of the colonisation of Algeria. The growth of an Algerian nationalist 
movement calling for the independence of Algeria was a serious threat to the stability of 
the French Republic. This section first explains that Algeria was at the heart of an 
ambitious imperialistic project based on universalism and a hegemonic cultural 
ideology. It continues by exploring how the Algerian nationalist movement managed to 
bring France at war. This first section lays the contextual framework for understanding 
the French counterinsurgency doctrine, which is analysed in more detail in section II. 
A. The Colonial Administration of Algeria  
Invaded by the French in 1830, Algeria was not only a territorial conquest but also a 
settlement colony. 233  From 1848, the Algerian territory constituted three French 
departments incorporated into the French Republic. Algeria was the colonial holding and 
most of its inhabitants were of French origin.234 The society in Algeria was composed of 
a mixture of settlers of French, Spanish, Italian and Maltese descent.235 
The status of the indigenous Algerians in the colonial society relied on an imperial 
ideology with distinctive French principles. Algeria was a French territory, which 
belonged to the French Republic. 236  The French imperialistic ideology justified the 
extension of French sovereignty on the basis that it could only be beneficial to those to 
whom it was extended. The colonial administration of Algeria relied on the idea of 
Algérie Française (French Algeria). The notion of Algerie Francaise translated the 
conceptualisation of the Algerian territory as an extension of France. On an ideological 
level, France developed a system of governance based on the belief that France held a 
mission to civilise (une mission civilisatrice) the colonised indigenous population. This 
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mission to civilise was deployed in three models of integration of the Algerian 
indigenous people: assimilationism, associationism and coexistence. The first model 
refers to ‘the pursuit of a unitary conception of the state that excluded, in principle all 
particularities for ethnic, religious or social groups’. 237  On the other hand, the 
associationist model recognises the specificities of each group and accordingly 
associates local and traditional institutions to the colonising administration. The 
coexistence model consisted in the recognition of different legal systems coexisting 
alongside to the French judicial institutions. As such, Islamic and Israelite (Jewish) 
jurisdictions were established in their respective communities and the Algerian 
indigenous population were ‘subject’ destined to become a French citizen. In practice, 
the government acceptance of the coexistence of different local system based on 
personal law did not put an end to the project of a full assimilation and was loaded with 
tensions.238  These tensions are particularly visible in the condition attached to the grant 
of French citizenship. A Senatus-consulte was issued in 1865 by which stated, first, that 
all indigenous Algerian Muslims were French subjects, French nationals, and as such 
could serve in the French army and navy and be appointed to minor civil functions. 
Second, the law also laid down a process of naturalisation by which indigenous Algerian 
males could acquire French citizenship – but only if they abandoned their civil personal 
status under Muslim law and agreed to be bound in all matters by the civil and political 
laws of France rather than Muslim law.239 ‘Naturalization‘ to French citizenship was not 
widely taken up. Later, in 1919, legislation was introduced which allowed a limited 
number of Muslims who had fought in the French Army during the First World War 
access to French citizenship, but still with the condition of renouncing civil personal 
status. The system of voting divided voters into two electoral colleges, the first 
consisting of French citizens, European and Algerian Muslims, and the second, which 
consisted of certain males of local civil status to elect certain officials including almost 
one and a half million Algerian.240 In 1936, the Blum-Violette project proposed that a 
number of educated Algerians (around 25,000 out of a population of 6 million) could 
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become French citizens without having to abandon their personal status. But the 
European settlers opposed this initiative and the project was not discussed in the French 
parliament. Belatedly, the Ordinance of 7 March 1944 implemented the Blum-Violette 
proposals. 241 
In practice, the assertion that Algeria was an extension of the French national territory 
and the project of assimilation of the Algerian people did not necessarily mean that 
indigenous Algerians would benefit from full equality in terms of rights. Economically, 
Algeria was a fractured society, a land of enormous contrast between the European 
settlers and the indigenous population. Economic domination was permitted and it went 
hand-in-hand with European monopolisation of political power in Algeria. Agricultural 
production, and in particular the products of the vineyards, were destined for the French 
market.242  In addition, the colonial law authorised the dispossession of the best land for 
the benefit of the European settlers. In 1840, a first decree confiscated land from all 
those indigenous Algerians who had taken up arms against the French in the initial 
pockets of resistance against French rule. Two other ordinances allowed the confiscation 
of non-developed land for which no justifiable titles under French law were held before 
1830.243 An act passed in 1863, which had proclaimed tribes to be the rightful owners of 
the land they had enjoyed in perpetuity, was offset by the Warnier Act of 1873, which 
made communal land available for sale and once sold, this land remained subject to 
French land codes. Then, following a revolt in Kabylia, several million acres of land 
were confiscated from Muslims by way of punishment. As a result, three-quarters of the 
Algerian population, who, almost without exception, were Muslim, lived in poverty.244 
50% of male Muslims were unemployed and only one in six Muslim children went to 
elementary schools. In 1948, Muslims earned on average an estimated 16,000 old francs 
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per year whilst the European equivalent was 450,000 Francs. As Crenshaw Hutchinson 
points out, on the eve of the “Algerian Revolution”, no political reform was in sight to 
develop Algeria and alleviate the poverty of the indigenous Algerian population.245 
Furthermore, the regulation of the civil rights of the indigenous population consisted of 
constitutional laws blended with imperial policies that safeguarded the interests of the 
small population of European settlers. After the Second World War, in 1947, an elected 
Algerian Assembly was created, which had the power to modify laws that were relevant 
to Algeria and passed in Metropolitan France. To college elected the same number of 
deputies. The first college comprised about 500,000 French colons and around 60,000 
Muslims who were considered sufficiently ‘Europeanised’ to belong to this group. 
Under this electoral system, the vote of a European effectively counted around ten times 
more than that of a Muslim. With half of the seats in this Assembly held by colons and a 
two-thirds majority required to pass any legislation, the colons had an effective veto 
over any measure considered too progressive. Moreover, the French were not averse to 
election rigging in order to ensure that any Muslims with nationalist leanings were kept 
away from the Assembly. The most striking example was the 1948 elections, which 
were systematically falsified by the Governor-General, Marcel Naegelen, to ensure that 
Muslims who were favourable to the French presence and unlikely to question the status 
quo were elected.246 
Overall, the relationship with the Algerian indigenous population was characterised by 
an obstinate and authoritarian paternalism. 247  In addition to a paralysing system of 
governance, the indigenous Muslim population was maintained in a state of permanent 
inferiority.248  Behind the guise of a “mission to civilise” the indigenous population, 
principles of sovereignty of the people, equality, unity and indivisibility were never fully 
applied to the indigenous.249  
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B. The Outbreak of the War  
Early sparks of Algerian nationalism can be traced to around World War I among the 
Algerian labour community in France. It took some time for a cohesive and united 
Algerian liberation movement to organise itself.250 In 1937, the Étoile Nord-Africaine 
(North African Star) was one of the first modern Algerian nationalist organisations, 
followed by the Algerian People’s Party (PPA) and the Association des Ulamas 
(Algerian association of religious leaders).251  
In 1943, Ferhat Abbas released his Manifesto of the Algerian People.252 The manifesto 
outlined the ‘evils of colonial rule’ and denounced the continued oppression of Muslims. 
The Algerian nationalists defined their program around three central ideas: putting an 
end to the French occupation, returning ownership land to the indigenous Algerians and 
establishing a policy of social democracy. Broadly, the Algerian nationalists rejected the 
concept of assimilation and claimed the right of self-determination of the Algerian 
people. They denounced the discriminatory system of governance whereby the European 
settlers and Algerian indigenous people were living in two mutually exclusive worlds.253 
In 1944, de Gaulle’s provisional government initiated a programme to educate the 
Muslim population and abolished the Code de l’indigenat (code of the indigenous 
people). A new administrative entity, the Union Française (French Union), was created 
to coordinate and combine resources and efforts in order to ‘civilise’ the colonies, 
improve their well-being perfect their democratic institutions and ensure their 
security.254 It was defined in the constitution as an institutional framework situated in 
between a Federation and a Commonwealth. Within this framework, an executive 
council ruled with the cooperation of the members of the community. As a result of this 
transformation, the definition of “cooperation” was understood in a flexible manner.255 
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The French Union sought to reflect French Republican values and emphasised the 
principle of equality of rights and obligations without distinctions of race and religion. 
The government initial response to the growth of an indigenous anti-colonial movement 
in Algeria was, therefore to undertake reforms in the hope of reducing tensions. 
However, the calls for independence grew louder. On the day of the liberation of France 
from the German occupation (8 May 1945), the nationalists also scheduled a celebratory 
march. The liberation of France was associated with the demands of liberation of the 
Algerian people. However, it quickly turned into violent clashes in the cities of Guemla 
and Setif. The security forces fired at the Algerian section of the 14 July Paris March, 
when an Algerian flag was raised. Out of this event seven people, six of whom were 
Algerians died. A parliamentary debate ensued, during which Algerian Deputy, 
Abdelkader Cadi, asked the Assembly: “Why do the French police lose their cool in 
front of Algerians? […] why is there such discrimination?”256 
When the revolt came, it was officially launched on 1 November 1954 with a series of 
coordinated attacks against military installations, police posts, warehouses and public 
utilities.257 The attacks were conducted by no more than nine men who would form the 
Front de Liberation National (FLN), National Liberation Front258 on the same day that 
the FLN broadcast a message urging the Algerian population to fight against the French 
colonial rule. The day after the official outbreak of the conflict Prime Minister Pierre 
Mendes-France announced at the National Assembly in Paris:  
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal 
peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic. The 
Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been 
French for a long time and they are irrevocably French. […] Between 
them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable 
secession.259 
The FLN conducted targeted operations of sabotage on public facilities (roads, railways, 
telegraph poles) and targeted assassinations of Algerians who were collaborating with 
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the colonial authorities or who refused to take part in the FLN activities. The Algerian 
nationalist movement found support from three major groups: a popular working class 
represented by leader Messali Hadj, an indigenous intellectual elite whose main figure 
was Ferhat Abbas, and the Communist Party.260 
Reforms having failed to prevent the growth of a nationalist movement, the French 
leadership undertook to confront the FLN directly. In 1955, as the attacks intensified, the 
French parliament declared the first Algerian ‘state of emergency’. Law n° 55-385 
extended France’s civil and military authority for a period of six months.261 A second 
law was enacted on 23 April 1955, which enlarged the judicial power of the military 
courts.262 On 20 August 1955, the killing of 123 European civilians by FLN fighters was 
a turning point.263 France responded to the “Massacre de Philippeville” by killing 1,273 
guerrillas. 264  In response to the Philippeville massacre, the French government 
prolonged the state of emergency.  
The state of emergency involved the suspension of most of the guarantees of individual 
liberties in Algeria. It facilitated house arrests and authorised the displacement of 
nationalists to ‘settlement camps’.265 Young Muslim men were rounded up in a stadium 
and shot, while the villages from which the assailants came were destroyed by mortar 
fire. The state of emergency also enabled the army to assist the police in their 
operations.266 Resident governor in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, ordered the guillotining of 
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FLN members convicted of acts of terrorism.267 According to the FLN, the police armed 
forces and vigilante groups in retaliation for the attacks killed 12,000 Muslims.268 
The FLN developed a complex network of political and military cells within Algeria. 
The formation a military wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN) took the nationalist 
movement into guerrilla warfare. The ALN was organised into two levels: 30,000 
soldiers training and operating outside Algeria and, by 1957, an estimated 20,000 to 
50,000 guerrilla fighters operating in cells within Algeria. 269  The ALN adopted a 
strategy of terrorism that included kidnapping, capturing French military personnel, 
raiding key military or political targets and carrying out assassinations. 270  On 1 
November 1954, the ALN carried a series of coordinated terrorist attacks throughout 
Algeria marking the beginning of the war on the independence of Algeria.  
C. French Counterinsurgency Warfare: La Guerre 
Révolutionnaire  
The revolutionary guerrilla went beyond what the French police and government in 
Algeria could handle. As the French leadership struggled to deal with the rise of an 
Algerian nationalist movement, the situation evolved into a war. Unlike conventional 
wars, the French police were not confronted by an army but by bands of guerrillas 
operating across the Algerian territory and benefiting from the support of the indigenous 
population. As a result, the French military leadership developed an original 
counterinsurgency strategy. La guerre révolutionnaire or revolutionary warfare 
combined military operations with political and psychological actions.271 Essentially, 
this meant political indoctrination in democratic ideology, as well as aggressive 
psychological operations to counter enemy information operations, at least at the tactical 
level.272   
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1. Destruction of the FLN 
In 1955, the French troops numbered around 100,000 and by 1956 there were 
approximately 400,000 French forces in Algeria. Edgar O’ballance estimate the total of 
French men that served in Algeria between 1955 and 1962 to 2,000,000.273 The French 
operations ranged from small-scale ambushes to conventional battalion operations. They 
involved artillery as well as air power, notably helicopter support. The French army was 
officially engaged in a campaign of “pacification” and was not officially considered to 
be waging war. 274  Hence, alongside the police force, special units of the army 
participated in police operations to maintain order. Algeria’s governor, Robert Lacoste, 
charged General Jacques Massu, head of the 10th Paratroopers, with the task of pacifying 
Algeria by any means possible.275 
The efforts of the French were focused first on understanding the structure of the FLN. 
For this reason, renseignement (intelligence) played a central role. The primary aim was 
to identify the nationalist network, and then to dismantle and destroy it. These activities 
were completed using a quadrillage (grid) system, which divided the Algerian territory 
into quadrants. 276  They also involved the creation of a cordon sanitaire along the 
Tunisian and Moroccan borders, so as to cut off external support to the Algerian 
insurgents.277 
2. Political-psychological Operations  
The war in Indochina had taught the French military that counterinsurgency required the 
defeat of not only the enemy’s forces but also of its message. 278   Psychological 
operations included leaflet drops by aircraft, the use of loudspeakers in urban areas, 
recruitment of collaborators, counter-propaganda efforts, and general non-lethal 
targeting of the diplomatic and international information efforts of the insurgents. 
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Essentially these operations aimed to connect the French administration with the poorer 
inhabitants. 279  In 1955, Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle created the 
Special Administrative Sections (SAS) with a role to promote ‘democratic ideals’ to the 
Algerian youth, reform local government, set up medical services, and train local 
officials and police forces. 280  Within the communes and military districts, military 
personnel conducted civilian education at all levels, which was heavily laced with liberal 
democratic philosophy. 
Linked to the quadrillage system, the SAS also operated population control. The French 
forces practised the regroupement or resettlement of the Algerians.281 The population 
was moved to barracks-style camps and relocated to areas that were more accessible and 
controllable by the Army. From 1957 to 1961, over two million Muslims were 
relocated. 282  The control of the population through this policy of resettlement was 
intended to achieve two purposes. First, it sought to make the resettled population 
secure. The second goal was to achieve civic re-education of the individuals within the 
“new” villages. This policy, however, created more hatred among the population that it 
was designed to protect. 
Another aspect of the political-psychological operations that should be mentioned was 
the use of torture by the French forces. Torture became an acceptable instrument in 
countering the insurgency, particularly by the intelligence elements within the French 
military. Many in the army believed that it was a necessary practice to ensure victory 
and it was used against an enemy that was viewed as communist and therefore an enemy 
of the Republic.283  
The Algerian insurrection was a severe threat to the preservation of the colonial empire. 
France was slowly recovering from the damage left by the Second World War. At the 
highest level, the French government and military commanders refused to accept the 
insurgency for what it was, and recognise that the nation was at war. 284 France was 
officially at peace and the revolt was characterised as of a purely ‘internal’ nature. The 
conflict was not a war but a mere ‘police operation’.285  
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In 1958, in Cairo, a provisional government of Algeria had been created by the FLN, the 
Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA), which France refused 
to recognise.286 Taken together, the implications of the refusal to admit the belligerency 
of the conflict or to recognise the GPRA affected the conduct of the fight against the 
Algerian nationalists. Excluded from any legal protection, be it domestic laws or 
international laws of armed conflict, the Algerian nationalists were acting in an 
unrecognized war.287  As the following section explains, this specificity allowed torture 
to be repeatedly used for tactical and even operational purposes.288 The legal framework 
discussed above, legitimated the army to respect neither the laws of the Republic nor the 
laws of war, which cover the treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilians.  
II. The Thorny Issue of Torture   
The Algerian war was a brutal confrontation between the French army and the Algerian 
nationalists. As explained above, it was characterised by the establishment of a state of 
exception whereby military rule was introduced alongside to the police. This section 
explores the prevalence of the French military’s use of torture during the conflict. It 
underscores the integration of torture as a military practice in the counterrevolutionary 
strategy. It shows that torture became a standard method used by the French 
counterrevolutionary forces to obtain information. However, it was also one of the key 
components of their strategic failure. The issue of torture negated the legitimacy of the 
French mission and international and French opinion turned against the military.  
A. An Organized Practice  
The French intelligence network relied on information garnered from interrogations 
involving torture by the paratroopers.289 By 1957, the arbitrary arrest and detention of 
suspected sympathisers were widespread. Many arrests occurred through informants. 
The jails and prisons were filled to capacity with the limited judicial action being 
                                                 
286 Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, (n 10) 489-90. 
287 Arlette Heyman, ‘Les Libertés Publiques et la Guerre d’Algérie’, Doctoral Dissertation, Law (Paris: 
Librairie Générale de Droit et ee Jurisprudence 1972) 2.  
288 Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism, (n 10) 490. 
289 Mohammed Harbi, Le F.L.N., Mirage et Réalité: Origines a la Prise de Pouvoir, 1945-1962 (Paris: 
Editions Jeune Afrique 1980) 199. 
 80 
undertaken in a timely manner.290 Additionally, as part of the pacification process, the 
wholesale resettlement of the population into areas de regroupement  (grouping areas) 
had the consequence of creating a “prison-like” environment.  
The use of torture was highly effective from a tactical perspective. As Louis DiMarco 
explains:  
These tactics rested on five key counterinsurgency fundamentals: 
isolating the insurgency from support; providing local security; 
executing effective strike operations; establishing French political 
legitimacy and effective indigenous political and military forces; and 
establishing a robust intelligence capability.291  
The French counterinsurgency relied on information. It built multiple, overlapping 
layers of sources of information. Hence the French built detailed networks composed of 
local loyal Algerians, former FLN members and paid informers, but they also used 
aggressive interrogation.  
Interrogation methods were often harsh, involving many methods that were generally 
illegal under the Geneva Convention.292 One document archives explicitly some of the 
methods used. Among these was ‘the temporary surprise abduction and the 
transportation by helicopter of a few inhabitants selected at random or identified as 
suspects with a view to interrogating them about the rebel organization established in the 
douar [rural administrative area]’; interrogations “to be utilized immediately”, which 
should be “as vigorous as possible”.293 In another document, based on notes taken by a 
trainee at a military training centre, protocols of torture are detailed as follows. Torture 
must:  
(1) [be] clean; (2) ... not take place in the presence of young [soldiers]; 
(3) ... not take place in the presence of sadists; (4) ... not [be] inflicted 
by an officer or a person of rank; (5) and must especially be “humane” 
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that is to say, it must end as soon as the guy has talked, and mostly that 
it does not leave any trace. Considering which, in conclusion, you 
have the right to use water and electricity. This I have noted down as 
he [the instructing captain] spoke.294 
Methods of interrogation involved beatings, water treatment such as the bathtub or the 
water pipe, and electric shock by gégène (a ﬁeld telephone dynamo).295 Prisoners were 
interrogated by specific units like the Operational Protection Detachments. 296  The 
directives recommended questioning the prisoners immediately after their capture.297 
Raphaëlle Branche explains that torture was always practised under the supervision of 
an officer of a higher rank during a session of interrogation.298 She explains that most of 
the men performing the torture were conscripts although it was sometimes conducted by 
a commander.299  
Torture of prisoners took place in different locations including, the Villa Sesini in the 
area of El Biar; an apartment building still under construction, also in a residential area 
of the city; a farm a few miles away from the city of Constantine; an abandoned candy 
factory; old wine storehouses in western Algeria; a racetrack; basements of public 
buildings; stadiums; schools (the most notable was École Sarouy in the Casbah of 
Algiers); and a Turkish bath when extra space was needed.  
Secondly, torture was used as an instrument for the “re-socialisation of prisoners into 
obedience and, through proper psychological action, collaboration”. 300  The French 
counterinsurgency also used psychological control over the Algerian population. 
General Trinquier notably developed a doctrine of combat in which he emphasised that, 
unlike conventional warfare, revolutionary war required winning over the indigenous 
people. 301  Special administrative sections, the Sections Administrative Specialisées 
(SAS), were established in each quadrant to engender French political legitimacy among 
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the local population and to build indigenous democratic institutions. 302   The SAS 
reformed local government, set up medical services, and trained local officials and 
police forces.303 The SAS promoted ‘democratic ideals’ to the Algerian youth. Torture in 
this context was therefore intended to “make people listen more than talk”.304 French 
soldiers were sending a message to the families and villages and the greater political 
community to which the suspects belonged.  
Units like the 10th Parachute Division developed very successful methods for using 
torture to gain actionable intelligence at the tactical level. The French authority’s 
widespread dissolution of civil law allowed the French to apply combatant status to just 
about anyone they detained, reducing their legal rights even more. Initially, the French 
military and civilian leadership tacitly approved of such measures, justifying them as a 
necessity of the conflict. 
B. The Status of the Conflict  
France was a signatory to the Geneva Convention since 1951 yet it insisted that it was 
not applicable to the violence in Algerian.305
 
Throughout the conflict, France avoided  
recognising the belligerency of the violence in Algeria.306  As Thenault expresses it: ‘the 
French government deployed an impressive variety of creative legal semantics to avoid 
officially recognizing the conflict as a “war.’307 Examples of such official terminology 
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include opérations de maintien de l’ordre en Afrique du Nord (order maintenance 
operations in North Africa). 308 For jurists, the Algerian violence was a rebellion and the 
FLN a terrorist organisation. 309  
There were several points of contention. A first point of contention was, therefore, the 
categorisation of the conflict as an armed conflict. Common Article 3 was drafted to 
come into effect for any ‘armed conflict, not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’.310 This article binds France to the 
application of minimal humanitarian principles common to of all four Conventions upon 
the parties’ non-international armed conflict. However, there are no objective criteria 
that would enable to identify when an internal conflict qualifies as an armed conflict.311  
As historical analysis of France legal position reveals, French jurists argued that there 
was no international conflict and that the violence in Algeria was not governed by 
international law.312 Draper notably explains  “a few days after the attacks of November 
1954, Minister of the Interior François Mitterand wrote: 
‘The terrorist attacks are common law crimes. The men who commit these 
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attacks against people and property are in no case to be considered as having a 
military nature since the antinational propaganda strives to attribute precisely this 
[military] characteristic to the bandits.’313
 
Furthermore, Draper explains that ‘domestic penal code provisions, reserved only for 
times of war, were never employed to prosecute FLN rebels’.
 
Under this framework, 
FLN fighters were considered as part of a ‘sedition movement’ and as such were bound 
to domestic law related to national security and state of emergency provisions.314 
The background issue was whether this was an international conflict. An international 
conflict is understood as violence occurring between at least two states powers. 315 
France maintained that Algeria was part of France and further skipped away from the 
qualification of the conflict first by refusing to recognize the legitimacy of an Algerian 
government. The French legal position considered the creation of the GPRA as 
inconceivable. Jurist Jean Charpentier notably argued that an Algerian state could not 
exist as it had no distinct territorial existence.316 For him, ‘the struggle for independence 
was not being conducted by organized troops subject to military discipline and 
conforming to the laws and customs of war’.317 Drawing a comparison with the First 
World War Czech and Polish committees, he argued that at best the GPRA should be 
treated as a national committee.318  
Considering the FLN, the French put forward the argument that the organization and the 
functioning of the FLN did not comply with the laws of war. The ‘struggle for 
independence was not being conducted by organized troops subject to military discipline 
and conforming to the laws and customs of war’. 319 Until 1958, the French legal system 
considered the FLN fighters to be part of a sedition movement. However, by 1959, as 
Draper encapsulates:  
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[I]t was generally recognized that, despite continuing weaponry shortages, the 
ALN forces showed sufficient military organization to constitute at least the 
semblance of an army. The ALN was trained both abroad and in Algeria, had a 
hierarchically organized command structure, was composed of relatively 
standardized units and wore a distinctive sign – a red crescent and a star on the 
cap. One prominent contemporary legal scholar contends, though perhaps 
overstates, that the bulk of the ALN consisted of soldiers in uniform. 304 
She continues by highlighting that, the requirement of ‘occupation of a certain part of 
the State territory by insurgents’ was not met. Indeed, the ALN did not maintain 
‘exclusive control’ over the Algerian territory. 304 The Algerian fighters were therefore 
in between the status of insurgents and terrorists. 304 General Salan notably commented 
that ‘It is well settled that the detainee must not be considered as prisoners of war. The 
Geneva Conventions are not applicable to them’.320 Consequently, this ambiguous legal 
situation led to uncertainties on the application of humanitarian law and human rights to 
the Algerian fighters. The military leadership suggested the creation of centres militaires 
d’internés (CMI). Within these centers, the Algerian caught with weapons could be 
arrested and not be prosecuted.321 By the end of 1958, between 9,000 and 16,000 were 
detained under these conditions.322  
The GPRA called for the application of humanitarian law. To them, the conflict in 
Algeria constituted a war and the FLN was an organized movement of resistance.323 In 
1958, it issued the “White Paper,” in which it demanded Common Article 3 treatment 
“as a minimum,” and asserted that ALN forces qualified for the full protection of 
prisoner of war status under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.324
 
Supported by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC) it denounced the absence of due 
process, summary execution and the conditions of detention.325  
 
During this period, the issue of the status of the conflict was raised in the trials of the 
Algerian prisoners held for charges of  “terrorism”. However, the French courts did not 
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directly address the status of prisoners of war.  Article 4(A) sets forth various categories 
of persons ‘who have fallen into the power of the enemy’ and that qualify for prisoner of 
war status, including “members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power’.326 French courts 
dismissed on the ground that the conflict was not categorized as an international war.327 
In the case of an appeal from a military tribunal conviction Zamouche, an FLN member 
was convicted of “criminal association” and  “aiding attacks” on civilians not 
participating in combat. 328  The Court based it’s reasoning on the nature of his acts, 
libelled as terrorism. In any case, the lower court had acquitted him of all offences 
committed when he was in combat. 329  Draper’ review of court case shows the 
ambiguous attitude of the Court of Cassation with regard to Algerian combattants. In a 
sentencing against an Algerian figher, it states to not recognise the Algerian combattants 
as an army.330 Nevertheless, it also admits the possibility of applying the Conventions to 
the violence in Algeria.331 Draper notably highglight a sentencing whereby the court 
dismissed the death penalty to a prisoner on the ground that if  “the prisoner could not 
benefit from prisoner of war status, the tribunal had therefore not properly determined 
whether he could be prosecuted for his crimes”. In the case of Abdellah Berrais, a 
caporal of the ALN troops, the court of Cassation declared the military tribunal 
incompetent to interpret an international convention
245
— it notably stated that: 
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[T]he response of the military tribunal to these contentions does not permit the 
Court of Cassation to verify whether the said Convention was irrelevant to the 
facts of the case or whether an official interpretation should have been sought 
from the government.332 
The case of Bellais and Berrais stand out as an instance where the Cour de Cassation 
went beyond implicit reliance on Convention-based reasoning. However, in the absence 
of official recognition by the government of the applicability of the prisoner of war 
provisions of the Convention, which would have amounted to an admission that this was 
an international conflict, and the military tribunals‘ resolute refusal to recognise such 
defences, these decisions by the Cour de Cassation probably had few practical 
implications.  
C. The controversy Over the Use of Torture 
The use of torture was a reaction to a deepening crisis in which the French military, 
originally looking for suspect Algerians, came to see all Algerians as suspects. However, 
conscripts or officers who voiced their concerns were put under pressure and would face 
consequences. Horne notably gives the example of General Jacques Paris de la 
Bollardière who was sentenced to 60 days’ detention after he publicly voiced his 
disapproval to the tactics used in Algeria.333The French military leadership developed a 
rhetoric vindicating the army’s methods by relying on the theory of necessity.334 In 
Réflexions d’un prêtre sur le terrorisme urbain (memoirs of a priest on urban terrorism) 
Father Louis Delarue provides a moral justification for the use of torture.335  As he 
explains  “by behaving like bandits: “there can be no hesitation in choosing the lesser of 
the two evils, in an effective but not sadistic interrogation”. 336  This justification of 
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torture created a stir of indignation in the Metropolis. 337  In the press, journalists 
commented on the Algerian crisis by comparing it with the horror of Nazism. Several 
articles were published assimilating the methods used by the French army in Algeria to 
the Nazi repression. As a way to illustrate this, Claude Bourdet, who had been a member 
of the French resistance during World War II, questioned the role of the Army in Algeria 
and published an article entitled ‘Is here a Gestapo in Algeria?’.338 In another article 
published later, he gave specific examples of persons who had been tortured. 339 
However, Minister of Interior, Maurice Bourgès Manoury, dismissed these claims as 
untrue.340 Henri Beuve-Méry, the editor of the newspaper Le Monde, wrote that “from 
now on the French must know that they don’t have the right to condemn in the same 
terms as ten years ago the destruction of Oradour and torture by the Gestapo”. In 1955, 
novelist and ex-Minister Francois Mauriac published a compelling work, in which he 
made serious claims about torture being used by the French police forces in Algeria.341 
These publications broke the code of silence maintained by the army.  
Any opposition to the methods used was considered as a betrayal. These denunciations 
countered the attempt of the government to maintain a veil of secrecy on the methods 
used by the French army. Indeed, the orders given rarely mentioned torture. The only 
instances where the term ‘torture’ can be found in official military documents speak of 
its prohibition. Furthermore, it is contended that, as these practices became widespread, 
only one rule prevailed: these interrogation sessions and the use of torture must not leave 
permanent marks on the victim’s body; where this was not the case, the victim was then 
executed.342 Secondly, archival investigations undertaken by historians reveal how the 
wording used in official military documents, in reality, concealed the use of torture by 
the army between 1955 and 1962.343 Raphaëlle Branche’s thesis explains that not all of 
the orders were transmitted in writing.  She particularly notes the importance of the oral 
transmission of military orders between different echelons of the military hierarchy.344 
Equally, the use of neutral terms avoided defining the nature of the violence that was 
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perpetrated. Robert Lacoste, a one-time resident minister in Algeria, spoke of “alleged 
atrocities”345 and General Massu, who used torture systematically during the Battle of 
Algiers,346  recommended using the term “coercive methods”.347  General Salan often 
referred to a “recent experiment” and recognised the beneficial lessons to be learnt from 
‘interrogatoires poussés’ during the operations known as the Battle of Algiers.  
The attitude of the government was first to reject these allegations and consider that 
torture was an “epiphenomenon” of the war.348 In 1955, the French government sought 
to respond to the allegations made in the press. The French leadership tried to silence the 
voices denouncing the atrocities perpetrated by the French army for fear of losing the 
support of the French population. It adopted an attitude of denial towards the 
denunciations by human rights activists and victims. In an attempt to wash away the 
accusations and the public debates, Minister François Mitterand commissioned a report 
and mandated Roger Wuillaume to investigate the torture allegations.349  The report, 
published on 2 March 1955, was addressed to the Governor-general of Algeria Jacques 
Soustelle. Its brief was to address three points: 
1. The type of (mal)treatment that occurred (les sévices).  
2. Who had authority over the treatment of those detained (les responsabilités). 
3. The usefulness, under certain conditions, of this maltreatment (l’utilité dans 
certaines conditions des sévices).350 
In a note addressed to the Governor-General, Wuillaume explained that his role was to 
“carry out an enquiry into the violence denounced by certain press articles, to which 
individuals arrested by the police services following the events of the 1st November 
would have fallen victim”.351 Ultimately, the report confirmed the recourse to violent 
methods and that they were “old-established practices”.352 It also confirmed that the 
magistrates were undemanding regarding the procedures utilised by the police in the 
cases brought before them. 
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Nevertheless, the Wuillaume Report itself used euphemistic and oblique language to 
address the abuses, such as the phrase “physical maltreatment of the nature of torture” 
and, where it was admitted that “violent acts have been committed: some are extremely 
serious and amount to real torture”.353   Wuillaume concluded his report by saying:  
 I am in a position to say that the content of press articles concerning 
the maltreatments exercised on individuals arrested by the police 
services has a basic truth: Maltreatments have been committed; certain 
ones are truly serious and have the character of true tortures.354 
The report was sent to Prime Minister Faure and to the President of the Republic, René 
Coty, but no further decisions were taken. Algerian Governor General Jacques Soustelle 
considered that it was “inopportune” to seek those responsible for acts committed before 
1 February 1955.355 
On 5 April 1957, the French government created the Commission de Sauvegarde des 
Droits et Libertés Individuels (Commission to Safeguard Individual Rights and 
Liberties, CSP) to report on the abuses by the French army. The reports of the 
commission described the conditions of detention of prisoners. It notably reported on the 
deaths by asphyxiation that occurred because the ‘suspects’ were held in small and stark 
windowless chambers located in wine storeroom.356 
General Delavignette’s report notably describes the conditions of the death of 101 
Algerians on 14-15 March 1957.357 The report explains that “the suspects” were locked 
in four wine storehouses measuring 3m or 3.5m by 3m with an air capacity of 30 m3 
each. The men were introduced into the space through a hole at the bottom. The report 
further explains that air was supposed to flow from a small opening at the top of the 
room. The morning after they were placed in these storehouses, 24 of the men were 
found dead in one storehouse and 17 in another. Survivors told of having tried in vain to 
summon help by making a noise. Lieutenant Curutchet, attempted to cover up the death 
of the Algerian suspects by hiding the corpses of Algerian prisoners. After the report by 
the CSP, Lieutenant Curutchet was later interrogated by the Commission and sentenced 
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to 30 days’ detention.358 In another report, Fernand Grevisse explains that when he 
asked the people of the village of Bou Saada whether they had been “interrogé”, they 
took “torturé” to be a synonym.359 
According to Marnia Lazreg, “sex was understood to be the fundamental, most efficient 
way of making a combatant or suspect talk” and therefore systematized torture in 
Algeria logically led to the widespread sexual abuse of prisoners. 360  Violence 
specifically perpetrated against women occurred in parallel with attempts to bend 
Algerian women to the colonial project. Rape was another expression of the violence 
inherent in the colonial war. The subversion of gendered stereotypes of the Arab woman 
created a hysteria surrounding gender that led to sexual abuse and the rape of women as 
another form of unofficially sanctioned military policy.  
Condemnations of torture undermined the legitimacy of the French efforts within the 
international community, discredited their strategic objectives, caused internal 
fragmentation and degradation of the ethical climate among the army and pushed many 
Algerians to actively support the insurgency. Despite some success, the use of torture 
overshadowed the successful defeat of the insurgency at the tactical level and created a 
vulnerability to propaganda supporting the army’s efforts. France’s colonial presence in 
Algeria was based on the myth of the French mission civilisatrice that aimed to position 
France as the nation of Enlightenment where principles of justice and reason were 
associated with human nature and were therefore universal.361 
III. Polarisation of the French people   
This section turns to a third limb of the history of the Algerian war: the revolt of the 
colons and military subversion against the decolonisation of Algeria. The opening of 
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negotiations by the government with the FLN was perceived as volte-face for the colons. 
A revolt grew out of their frustrations regarding the politics of disengagement, which 
was supported by some elements of the army. One important element in the picture 
presented here is that, in an important antecedent to the amnesty process (Chapter 4), de 
Gaulle established special military courts in which to prosecute subversive soldiers.  
A. Crisis of May 1958  
Vexed by the lack of political leadership, the European population in Algeria, supported 
by some members of the army, felt that a politics of disengagement was inconceivable. 
In February 1958, a diplomatic failure brought the Fourth Republic into a terminal crisis. 
A squadron of the French army bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi Youssef, 
suspected to be the home of an FLN household.362 Dozens of victims, including civilians 
and children, were killed in the attack. Condemnation by the international community 
weakened the French position and revealed the incapacity of the government of Prime 
Minister Felix Gaillard to deal with the Algerian crisis. 363  This diplomatic failure 
resulted in the resignation of Pierre Pfimlin as Prime Minister. It also marked the 
popularly acclaimed return to power of the Second World War hero, General de 
Gaulle.364 On 1 June 1958, de Gaulle was invested as Prime Minister with the power to 
rule by decree for a period of six months as the state of emercengy would allow it. His 
new position permitted him to form a coalition government and receive full power to 
govern without having to consult parliament during this six-month period.365  
For the colons, Charles de Gaulle was a national hero due to his role in leading the 
French resistance against Nazism.366 Consumed throughout his life by the idealisation of 
France as a great and independent power, de Gaulle himself incarnated this identity.367  
Invoking the traditional myth of French identity imbued with Republican values in his 
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speeches, he managed to garner support from public opinion at large.  For the colons, de 
Gaulle was the only one capable of restoring a Republican unity and reconstructing lost 
French Grandeur. He had the support of both the army and the European community in 
Algeria.  
On 26 April 1958, approximately 20,000 European colons shouting “L’armée au 
pouvoirs!” and “Vive de Gaulle” marched to headquarter of the Government General in 
Algiers and demanded the return of Charles de Gaulle to power.368  This solid mass was 
joined by high ranked military commanders who sent an ultimatum to French Prime 
Minister Felix Gaillard. General Jacques Massu, a commander of the 10th Parachute 
Division, was preparing a plan to overthrow the government in Paris.369 After several 
weeks of demonstrations, President René Coty resigned and Charles de Gaulle assumed 
power as Prime Minister.  
Shortly after his return to power, de Gaulle put forward the draft of a new constitution. 
On 28 September 1958 both Europeans and the Muslim population (men and women) 
were asked to vote in a referendum on the approval of the new constitution.370 The wider 
objective in the minds of the drafters of the constitution of 1958 was to reshape 
republican legitimacy and break free from the paralysis of the Fourth Republic. It set up 
government techniques that would reflect the views of de Gaulle. Universal suffrage was 
kept as a source of power but it also provided the separation of the legislature and 
executive, the independence of the judiciary.371  
After the institution of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle’s priority as President was to 
restore the authority of the state. In a press release, he announced that he would begin 
the process “necessary for the establishment of a republican government capable of 
ensuring the unity and independence of the country”.372 However, in a speech given on 
the 16 September 1959, de Gaulle officially recognized Algerian people’s right to self-
determination, stating that:  
Given all the facts in Algeria, national and international, I consider it 
necessary that the recourse to self-determination be proclaimed 
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beginning today. In the name of France and the Republic, by virtue of 
the power vested in me by the constitution to consult the citizens, on 
the condition that God may grant me life and that the people may 
listen to me, I commit myself to asking, on the one hand, the Algerians 
in their twelve departments what they definitively want to be, and, on 
the other, all the French people to endorse that choice.373 
To the settlers’ community, this declaration sounded like a disavowal. After this 
declaration, the anti-decolonisation opposition intensified. In January 1960 a week of 
revolt saw the colons ranged against the French police. The centre of Algiers was closed 
behind barricades; 14 policemen were killed and 123 wounded.374 This event, commonly 
known as ‘la semaine des barricades’ (the barricades week), marked the rupture of the 
colons with the French government. In January 1961, a referendum organized on the 
question of the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Algerian people 
marked the break between the colons and the French government.375 The referendum 
asked French people the following question:  
Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people, by the 
president concerning the self-determination of the Algerian population 
and the organization of the public powers in Algeria prior to the self-
determination? […].376  
A clear majority of 75 % voted in favour of Algeria’s independence.377 The positive 
result was also a vote of confidence for de Gaulle and prompted him to open the 
discussion on the future of Algeria. The law in question was then voted by the 
                                                 
373 ‘Discours sur l'Autodétermination de l'Algérie’, 16 September 1959, available at http://www.charles-
de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/accueil/discours/le-president-de-la-cinquieme-republique-1958-
1969/discours-sur-l-autodetermination-de-l-Algérie-16-septembre-1959.php. 
374 On the European settler side of the barricade, six died and 26 were wounded. See Stora and Quandt, 
Algeria, 1830-2000 (n 2); Horne, Savage War of Peace (n 5); Benjamin Stora, La Gangrène et l’Oubli: La 
Mémoire de la Guerre d’Algérie (Paris: La Découverte 1998). 
375 As a result of the referendum, the French Parliament enacted the Law/Loi n° 61-44 of 14 January 1961 
on the right of self-determination of the Algerian people and the interim organization of public powers. 
376 Law/Loi n° 61-44, 14 January 1961. 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19610115&numTexte=&pag
eDebut=00578&pageFin= last visited March 2013. 
377 Serge Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle 1958-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993) 
53. 
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parliament and became Law no 61-44 of 14 January 1961.378 After the result of the 
referendum, the colons considered that the French people were abandoning them. 
B. The OAS  
 Feeling abandoned by the French government, the colons and branches of the army 
organised an anti-decolonisation opposition. The Organisation Armée Secrete (OAS) 
was created as an ultimate attempt to overthrow de Gaulle and sabotage the process of 
decolonization. The OAS was a coalition of French soldiers and colons headed by 
notorious soldiers who became celebrated figures in the settler community for their 
success against the Algerian nationalist movement.379 The goal of the OAS was to resist 
the policy of Algerian “disengagement” conducted by the de Gaulle administration. and 
to construct a new “fraternal and French Algeria based on Lyautey’s work”.380  
The OAS engaged in urban terrorism, borrowing the methods of the FLN. It targeted 
anyone inside Algeria devoted to an “Algerian Algeria”, setting off a series of major 
explosions and targeted assassinations in Algiers to terrify the Muslim and European 
communities both in Algeria and France.381 On 1 March 1961, the Mayor of the city of 
Evian, Camille Blanc, was killed in an explosion set up by the OAS. Over 14,000 
French troops were involved in the in the revolt. The killing of seven conscripts by the 
OAS led the officers to conclude that the OAS was a threat to the army itself. Overall, 
the numbers are disputed: it is reported that the OAS terrorist activities were responsible 
for killing 1,660 people and injuring approximately 5,148. On 21 April 1961, four army 
generals – Generals Raoul Salan, Andre Zeller, Maurice Challe and Edmons Jouhaud – 
attempted a putsch against President de Gaulle.382 The coup failed and the officers were 
arrested. 
                                                 
378 Loi n°61-44, 14 January 1961 (n 115).   
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French Army general and colonial administrator. 
381 Horne, Savage War of Peace (n 5) 486. 
382 Maurice Vaïsse, 1961: Alger, le putsch (Brussels: Éditions Complexe 1983) 55–7, 65, 93. For more 
detail, see Pierre Viansson-Ponté, ‘Les “méthodes” du colonel Argoud’, Le Monde (18 October 1974), 
reprinted in Le Monde: dossiers (note 23) 6; Argoud, La décadence (n 44); Jean-Hubert Levame, Putsch. 
Algérie, 22 avril 1961 (Paris: Éditions Heimdal 1997); Jacques Fauvet and Jean Planchais, La Fronde des 
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De Gaulle reacted firmly to the military subversion by reactivating the state of 
emergency. On the basis of this legislation, De Gaulle authorized the internment of 
subversives for 15 days under orders of prefects and indefinitely by the minister of the 
interior. Custody (garde à vue) was extended from five to 15 days; two military courts 
were set up to try insurgents and subversive newsletters were outlawed. De Gaulle also 
ordered the withdrawal of pension rights and other benefits from rebellious agents. After 
one of the Putsch generals, Salan had been condemned to life imprisonment instead of 
the death penalty on the grounds of mitigating circumstances, de Gaulle reformed the 
judicial institutions.383 By decree de Gaulle created special courts in Algeria located in 
Tlemcen, Tizi-Ouzou and Sétif in which to try the OAS for their criminal offences.384 
The Haut Tribunal Militaire (High Military Tribunal) came into existence on 27 April 
1961 and the Tribunal Militaire (Military Tribunal) on 3 May 1961. These two 
jurisdictions had the function of hearing criminal offences perpetrated in Algeria after 19 
March 1962, which could constitute a threat to the safety of the state.385 
Conclusion  
The Algerian War was a particularly violent page in France’s history. This chapter has 
sketched an outline of the essential moments and characteristics of the war. The first 
section focused on the colonial administration of Algeria. It showed that France strived 
to maintain a façade of peace and order despite the growth of an Algerian nationalist 
movement. The declaration of the state of emergency in 1955 enabled the French 
leadership to transfer de facto the police and judicial power to the military without 
recognising the belligerency of the conflict. The systematisation of the use of torture by 
the French army was not a planned project, rather it reflected the reaction to a deepening 
crisis in which the French military, originally looking for suspect Algerians, came to see 
all Algerians as suspects. 
                                                 
383See the testimony of Judge Jean Touzet in Jean Touzet, ‘Le tribunal de l’ordre public’ [2005] 16(1) 
Histoire de la justice 281–92. 
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‘Un maintien de l’ordre entre naufrage des principes démocratiques et faillite de l’État?’ in S. Berstein, P. 
Milza et J.-F. Sirinelli (eds), Michel Debré, Premier ministre, 1959-1962 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France 2005) 543. On the préfets, see J. Aubert, ‘L’administration du territoire’ in Institut Charles de 
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Plon 1977) 281. 
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Furthermore, it has shown he dilution of the rule of law caused internal fragmentation 
and the degradation of the army’s ethical milieu. In turn opposition from the colons 
community to the decolonisation of Algeria confronted the French leadership. The 
creation of the OAS constituted another threat to the political stability of the French 
regime.  
 If we disregard these events, it is not possible for us to understand why the question of 
amnesty came to be such a relevant issue in the aftermath of the conflict. The amnesty 
was a relevant element in the consolidation of the newly born Fifth Republic. Nor can 
we understand why, even today, different actors – victims, human rights NGOs, 
journalists, academics – continue to promote the deployment of strategies designed to 
deliver the truth about the past or accomplish justice for the victims.  
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Chapter 4:  
The amnesty process: transition and the rehabilitation 
 of ex-combatants (1962-1982) 
This chapter analyses the process of implementation of amnesty following the official 
end of the Algerian conflict with the Evian Accords in March 1962. This chapter 
follows the evolution the amnesty debate as it developed from 1962 to 1982. It argues 
that President de Gaulle employed amnesties to consolidate his power. The Algerian 
past was freighted with memories that could bring further tensions and divisions. The 
amnesty was considered a political tool to facilitate the transition from colonisation and 
to reinstate social cohesion. This chapter describes the amnesty process from its advent 
in 1962, looking in particular at the political discourse surrounding it. This historical 
exploration opens a space to contextualise the reasoning of by the French leadership 
and how amnesty operated as an important element in the political construction of the 
French Republic after the decolonisation.  
The ‘Algerian amnesties’ are based on the long republican tradition of clemency, which 
amnesty measures aimed for. The principal role of amnesty was to ensure peace with 
Algerian combatants. President de Gaulle also used amnesty to solidify the structure of 
the newly established Fifth Republic. The amnesty was used at several junctures after 
the conflict and during the phase of political reconstruction. The amnesty process first 
started in 1962 at the same time as the Evian Accords and was finalised in 1968. As well 
as the two initial amnesties, three further amnesty laws were introduced, extending its 
scope in 1964 1966 and 1968. Many of the individuals who benefited from amnesty 
were not prosecuted or convicted for their alleged actions. In this way, the amnesties 
constituted a shield against prosecution. Furthermore, the 1968 amnesty process sought 
to satisfy the colons that had been repatriated to France after the war and embedded a 
strong symbolic meaning. Granting amnesty to French soldiers imprisoned for acts of 
subversion was an important step towards national cohesion. While these measures 
covered larger groups of individuals, there has been little space for the victims to enter 
the debate on the amnesty. A first reason explaining this is the structure of the 
presidential regime. Indeed, the initial 1962 amnesties were implemented by presidential 
decree and were not debated in parliament. Second, at the beginning of the amnesty 
process, victims’ groups were not organised and there was no structured social 
movement to support claims made by lawyers and human rights activists against the 
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grant of amnesty to those who perpetrated torture. This context is instructive in 
understanding the absence of a clear opposition movement and, later on, how grievances 
emerged through the efforts of historians (see Chapter 7). 
Inspired by literature on post-conflict amnesty, this chapter demonstrates the role of 
amnesty in the political transformation of France following the Algerian War. It unpacks 
the debates on amnesty within the broader discourse of national cohesion and political 
reconstruction. Along with this process, antagonist and competing approaches towards 
the legitimacy of the French operations in Algeria emerged. It does so by first exploring 
the legislative steps needed in the progressive process of implementing amnesty. 
France’s history of granting criminal amnesty enacted in relation to the events in Algeria 
reveals the multi-layered role played by amnesty to manage a past conflict. Amnesty 
played an important role to appease tensions and acted as an incentive for the members 
of the OAS to give up violence. The amnesties were at the centre of the politics of 
national reconciliation.  
 
I.  Amnesty in the Aftermath of the Algerian War: Genesis and 
Initial Scope 
After the cease-fire on 19 March 1962, the decolonisation process deployed more like a 
political transformation rather than a clean-cut transition. The amnesty formed part of 
this political transformation and was sought to facilitate peace. The amnesty was 
initially incorporated in the peace agreement signed on 18 March 1962. It was 
subsequently implemented by two executive decrees. As the content of the Evian 
agreements reveals, the end of the conflict did not mean that all ties between France and 
Algeria would be terminated.  
A. Negotiating Peace: The Evian Agreements 19 March 
1962 
The peace process started informally as early as 1957 when French and Algerian 
representatives met to discuss the modality of the right of self-determination and the 
future of Algeria and France without Algeria. In late 1957, scenes of fraternization 
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between Europeans and Muslims were carefully orchestrated.386 Algerian women were 
dramatically burning their veils in a celebration of the colonial myth of assimilation.387 It 
however, took five years before peace was signed with the Algerian nationalists. An 
initial reason for this delay is found in the French refusal to admit the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) as a legitimate entity to negotiate the fate 
of the Algerian people. As explained in Chapter 3, France’s diplomatic position was to 
consider the FLN a terrorist organisation. Seventeen countries gave de jure recognition 
to the GPRA;388 however, the French government did not attach any legal significance to 
these recognitions. For the French leadership, the international support of the GPRA was 
a political move by the Soviet-bloc states and the member countries of the non-aligned 
movement. Secondly, France was undergoing a deep internal crisis. The revolt of the 
army and the colons made it clear that cohesion between the settlers and the Algerian 
indigenous after the withdrawal of France was not possible.  
During this period, Algeria was placed under the authority of a provisional Executive. A 
committee of the Algerian Affairs headed by the French President of the Republic was 
created to review of the application of the provisions of the agreements. 389  The 
transitional government executive was composed of nine members: three were French 
and nine were Algerians, of whom four were not members of the FLN. The transitional 
government was established pending the result to the referendum on the independence of 
Algeria. 
 
On 8 January 1961 a referendum was held on recognition of the right of self-
determination of the Algerian people: 
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Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people by the president 
concerning the self-determination of the Algerian population and the 
organization of the public powers in Algeria prior to self-determination?390  
The positive vote in the referendum prompted de Gaulle to further the idea of 
decolonisation. Indeed, in his speeches, before the referendum, de Gaulle had opened the 
possibility of decolonization in terms of fraternal relations, emphasising that the country 
was largely ‘pacified’.391  
Nonetheless, President de Gaulle asked that a ceasefire agreement be reached before 
engaging in any discussions.392 Hence the peace negotiations initially began informally. 
French representatives, Louis Joxe, Bruno de Leusse and the personal envoyé of General 
de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou met secretly with the state secretary of the foreign 
ministry of the GPRA, Saad Dahlab, and two other Algerian representatives, Ahmed 
Boumendjel and Tayeb Boulharouf in France. A first meeting was organised in 
Neuchatel on 5 March 1961. From these first discussions, one can trace the deep 
divergences that would reoccur along the negotiation process. During this secret 
meeting, the GPRA and the French conceded that maintaining a form of cooperation was 
a necessity. The negotiators struggled on the question of citizenship of the Europeans 
living in Algeria and the status of the Sahara emerged as an issue. The Algerian 
representatives wanted total independence and territorial integrity, including the Sahara 
and its rich resources. The French government added several gestures of goodwill in an 
attempt to ease the tense climate of the truce: 6,000 prisoners were released; Ben Bella 
and other figures of the Algerian Revolution were granted better conditions of detention, 
and the FLN was engaged to guarantee the security of the colons. Nonetheless, these 
talks were inconclusive and further talks in 1961 also ended in stalemate. However, by 
19 February 1962, a measure of general agreement was reached, and a preliminary set of 
agreements, known as the Les Rousses Agreements, was signed. The following month, 
in the meetings at Evian, 7-18 March, the final version was achieved and signed: a 
cease-fire came into effect the following day.   
The General Declaration of the Evian Accords begins:  
                                                 
390 [Author’s translation.] As a result of the referendum the French parliament enacted Loi n°61-44 du 14 
janvier 1961 concernant L’auto-determination des populations algériennes et l’organisation des pouvoirs 
publics en Algerie avant l’autodetermination.  
391 Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011)  261-2.  
392 Maurice Flory, ‘La fin de la souveraineté française en Algérie’ [1962] 8 Annuaire français de droit 
international 921. 
 102 
The French people by the referendum of 8 January 1961 recognised the right of 
the Algerian people to choose, through a vote by direct and universal suffrage on 
their political destiny in relation to the French Republic.393  
On 8 April 1962, Charles de Gaulle organised a second referendum on the Algerian 
question, asking the people to approve the Evian Accords, which included Algerian 
independence.394 The referendum was held in the French mainland and the overseas 
departments, with a significant ‘yes’ outcome (91%). 395  It still remained to put the 
question of independence to the Algerian people themselves: on 1 July another 
referendum was held in which they were asked ‘Do you want Algeria to become an 
independent state, cooperating with France, according to the conditions defined by the 
declaration of 19 March?’396 The Algerian people voted in favour of the independence of 
Algeria with an overwhelming majority (99 %). De Gaulle formally recognised the 
independence of Algeria on 3 July 1962.  
Although facilitating Algerian independence and decolonisation, the Evian Accords puts 
in place a specific system in order to not break ties with Algeria entirely. For instance, 
Title B provides that:  
Algeria shall guarantee the interests of France and the rights acquired 
by individuals and legal entities under the conditions established by 
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the present Declarations. In exchange, France will grant Algeria 
technical and cultural assistance and will contribute preferential 
financial aid for its economic and social development.397  
It also secures a monopoly of mining rights in petroleum hydrocarbons for France:  
French interests will be assured, in particular, through the exercise, in 
accordance with the rules of the Sahara Petroleum Code as it exists at 
present of rights attaching to mining entitlements.398 
Authors have noted the sui generis nature of the agreements. Guy Pervillé notably 
explains that the Evian Agreements is better to be understood as a ‘contractual 
decolonisation’.399 The provisions of the Evian Agreements reflect a ‘delicate system of 
counterbalancing obligations between Algeria and France’.400 
The Evian Accords and the referendum of independence did not meet universal 
approval. The prospect of the end of the colonial empire inspired opposed visions of 
France’s political future. Senator Bernard Lafay condemned France’s policy and 
considered that the negotiation with the Algerian nationalists was a capitulation. 401 
Further, de Gaulle’s opponents claimed that he was exercising executive power at the 
expense of the democratic functioning of its institutions. 402  The unusual procedure 
adopted to ratify the agreements through referendums did not follow the traditional 
procedure of Article 89 of the Constitution, which requires the approval of both houses 
of Parliament before submitting a bill to referendum.403 Instead, de Gaulle had invoked 
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Article 11 of the Constitution, which allows the simple use of referenda ‘the 
organisation of the public authorities.404  By this procedure, de Gaulle had managed 
bypass parliamentary opposition. After the 1962 referendum, the President of the 
Republic passed the Law of 13 April 1962 allowing him to conclude the Accords and, 
until a new government was formed in Algeria, to issue ordinances and decrees of the 
Council of Ministers needed to implement ‘all the arrangements as stated by the 
governmental declarations of the 19 mars 1962’.405 In other words, this allowed the 
president to legislate without the express consent of parliament. For Senator Gil Paulian, 
the law implied more than a mere application the Evian agreements: it also extended ‘the 
most extreme, most complete and the most exorbitant delegation of power [of France] 
history’ to the executive‘.406 Indeed this power had already been included in the 1962 
referendum itself, whose second clause, by which the President would be granted full 
legislative powers to decree any measures that the executive deemed necessary to 
implement the Agreements.407 
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B. Restoration of Order: The Tribunal of Public Order 
and the Military Court of Justice: 
The Accords symbolized a diplomatic turn in the historical conjuncture of the colonial 
and post-colonial period.408 However, the signature of the Evian Accords did not end 
violence. The progressive withdrawal of the French troops and the dismantling of the 
OAS organization after independence put the colons France in a vulnerable position. 
Algerian mobs started attacking them despite the fact that their safety formed part of the 
agreements negotiated at Evian. It is reported that illegal French police forces as known 
as the barbouzes and legal police forces known as Mission C transmitted to the FLN a 
list of people suspected to be members of the OAS. In July 1962, in the Algerian city of 
Oran, seven Katibas (companies) of FLN fighters entered the city and killed colons on 
sight. 2,788 died in this attack, while 7,541 were wounded and 875 disappeared. France 
was held responsible for these killings. Exposed to the retaliation of the Algerians, the 
colons and the Algerians who collaborated with the French, the Harkis had to be 
repatriated in France.  
The French efforts concentrated on dismantling the OAS threat. Chapter 3 has described 
the creation of the High Military Tribunal, which after the independence referendum was 
retained under the title Military Court of Justice. A special court was created to deal with 
the issues that could threaten the reestablishment of public order, with the OAS 
particularly in mind. Despite its brief existence, the Tribunal of Public Order (TOP) was 
the symbolic representation of the continuing authority of the state during the 
transitional period. The primary role of the TOP was to ensure stability in a territory that 
was still struggling with containing violence. The institution of the TOP played a key 
role in protecting the process of conflict resolution. 
The decree creating the TOP relied on the special powers granted to the government of 
Guy Mollet in 1955.409 Article 1 of the decree instituting the TOP provides that the 
tribunal is competent to hear crimes and infraction perpetrated after the cease-fire, which 
pose a threat to peace, reconciliation between the different communities as well as the 
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République [1962] 8(1) Annuaire Français de Droit International 873-888.  
409 Jean Touzet, ‘Le Tribunal de L’Ordre Public’ [2005] 16(1) Histoire de la Justice 281–92; see also 
Sylvie Thénault, La Justice au Secours de l’État: le Cas Particulier du Tribunal de L’Ordre Public‘ [2005] 
16(1) Histoire de la Justice 247-56. 
 106 
free exercise of self-determination or to the authority of the public powers.410  In the 
files of the chambers of Tizi- Ouzou (one of the three regional seats of the TOP), out of 
88 cases, only 13 involved Algerians, of which three involved acts of terrorism linked to 
the FLN.411 This ‘justice of exception’ judged 1,081 soldiers and 156 police officers and 
over 3,000 police agents. 938 sentences were pronounced; pensions were withdrawn 
from 1,108 military personel and 1,637 civil servants and nine judges in Algeria. It also 
banned twelve newsletters for inciting to violence or rebellion against the French 
state.412  
Meanwhile, the High Military Tribunal (HMT) and Military Tribunal (MT) (described in 
Chapter 3), were still in existence or, rather, the HMT had been reconstituted under the 
title the Military Court of Justice (MCJ).413 The HMT had notably sentenced the OAS 
putsch generals, Maurice Challe414 and Andre Zeller 415 to 15 years’ imprisonment for 
treason. Jouhaud416 and Salan417 who at first had escaped were sentenced, respectively, 
to the death penalty and life imprisonment. However, the legitimacy of the MCJ was 
challenged in a case brought before the Conseil d’État (Council of State) on 19 October 
1962 by Canal, a dissident French officer belonging to the OAS. Five months after its 
creation, MCJ was deemed incompatible with Article 34 of the French constitution.418 ’ 
In this case, the Council had to decide the validity of the ordinance issued pursuant to 
the Law of 13 April 1962, which had brought the MCJ into existence. Canal had been 
tried and condemned to death penalty. The Council pronounced on the unusual 
constitutional practice by which de Gaulle had bypassed parliament and Article 34 of the 
                                                 
410  Decret N° 62-327 du 22 Mars 1962 Portant Amnistie des Infractions Commises au Titre de 
L’insurrection Algérienne, JORF 23 Mars 1962 3143.  
Article 1: ‘[ …] les crimes et délits commis en Algérie postérieurement au 19 mars 1962 et susceptibles de 
porter atteinte au rétablissement de la paix publique, à la concorde entre les communautés, au libre 
exercice de l’autodétermination ou à l’autorité des pouvoirs publics’ [author’s translation]. Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000673799&categorieLien=id [last accessed 
March 2013] 
411 Touzet, ‘Le Tribunal de L’ordre Public’ [2005] 16(1) Histoire De La Justice  281–92.  
412 Martin Harrison, ‘The French Experience of Exceptional Powers: 1961’ [1963] Journal of Politics 143. 
413 Ordonnance N° 62-618 du 1 Juin 1962 Instituant une Cour Militaire de Justice, JORF Du 2 Juin 1962 
5316. Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000517822 
414 HMT 29-31 May 1961.  
415 HMT, 29-31 May 1961. 
416 HMT, 11- 13 April 1962.  
417 HMT, 15-23 May 1962. 
418 Conseil d’Etat 19 octobre 1962.  
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Constitution and determined the illegality of the military court. However, the judgment 
was later nullified by the enactment of the Law of 15 January 1963, conferring full force 
of law upon decrees passed pursuant to the Law of 13 April 1962. 419  An official 
statement of the Council of Ministers declared decided that the Conseil d’Etat had 
‘exceeded its jurisdiction as a court of Law’.420 The government reaction reflected the 
tensions that existed between the General and the Council.  
In short, torn between a pragmatic approach and considerations of justice, France made 
efforts to transit out from the conflict by utilising the ‘justice of exception’.421 In this 
unique historical relationship, the main concern of de Gaulle was to preserve the unity of 
the French nation and prosecute the men who threatened the stability of the Republic 
even at the expense of the democratic functioning of its institutions.422 
C. The Amnesty Clause(s) in the Evian Agreements  
In parallel to the prosecution of the OAS, de Gaulle was concerned by the rehabilitation 
of the French soldiers who fought for the preservation of France sovereignty and moving 
on from the Algerian conflict. The amnesty clause in the Evian Accords reflected this 
willingness to redefine France and Algeria’s historical relationship on the ground of 
cooperation. Hence, alongside measures concerning the continuity of an economic 
cooperation, the Accords declared that amnesty would be granted to prisoners who were 
still detained for war-related offences. The preamble situates the amnesties in the context 
of  the promotion of peace and reconciliation between the two people:  
‘In order to facilitate the exercise of self-determination by the 
Algerian population [...], an amnesty is declared for all offences 
committed before 20 March 1962 with the aim of participating in or 
providing direct or indirect aid to the Algerian rebellion. An amnesty is 
also declared for offences committed before 20 March 1962 in the 
                                                 
419Lionel Neville Brown , John S. Bell and Jean-Michel Galabert. French Administrative Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1998) 57. 
420 Roland Drago, ‘Some Recent Reforms of the French Conseil d’Etat’ [1 October 1964] 13(4) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1282–1299.  
421 Brown,  Bell and Galabert, French Administrative Law (n 44) 57. 
422 Gacon, L’Amnistie (n 3) 256. 
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context of operations directed against the Algerian rebellion for the 
purpose of restoring order.423 
The amnesty was incorporated as a substantive provision of the Evian Accord. Chapter 
I, Clause K states, in very broad terms, which can benefit from the amnesty:  
‘An amnesty will be proclaimed immediately and detained persons will be 
released’.424  
Chapter II (II) (1) of provides that:  
No one shall be subject to police or legal measures, to disciplinary sanctions or 
to any discrimination on account of opinions expressed at the time of events that 
occurred in Algeria before the day of the self-determination vote; Acts 
committed at the time of these same events before the day of the cease-fire 
proclamation.425  
The amnesty clause in the Evian agreements was designed to cover both civilians and 
soldiers who had participated in the war and was unconditional. The release of prisoners 
was a key part of the negotiation of the cease-fire. 
II. Implementation of the Amnesty and Extension to the OAS 
(1962-1968) 
The previous section has demonstrated how amnesty formed part of a peace process 
with Algeria. After exploring the political context of the end of the war, this section 
turns to the circumstances that led to the enactment of full amnesty in 1968. Before the 
general amnesty, President Charles de Gaulle took the helm of debate on amnesty and 
was anxious to maintain control over who would benefit from it. 
                                                 
423Accords d’Évian, ‘Préambule’: En vue de permettre la mise en oeuvre de l’auto-determination des 
populations algériennes [...] sont amnistiés toutes infractions commises avant le 20 mars 1962 en vue de 
participer ou d’apporter une aide directe ou indirecte A l’insurrection algérienne. Sont amnistiées les 
infractions commises dans le cadre des opérations de maintien de l’ordre dirigés contre l’insurrection 
Algérienne avant le 20 mars 1962 [English  translation from Grenville,  Major International Treaties (n 
10) 649]. 
424 Chapter I (K) Accords d’Évian: ‘l’amnistie sera immédiatement proclamée. Les personnes détenue sont 
libérées’ [English translation from Grenville Major International Treaties (n 10) 675]. 
425Accords D’Évian, Chapter II (II)(1): ‘Nul ne pourra faire l’objet de mesures de police ou de justice, de 
sanctions disciplinaires ou d’une discrimination quelconque en raison: d’opinions émises à l’occasion des 
événements survenus en Algérie avant le jour du scrutin d’autodétermination; d’actes commis à l’occasion 
des mêmes événements avant le jour de la proclamation du cessez-le-feu. Aucun Algérien ne pourra être 
contraint de quitter le territoire algérien ni empêché d’en sortir’ [English translation from 
Grenville,  Major International Treaties (n 10) 676]. 
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A. Decrees Implementing the Amnesty Clause in the 
Evian Accords  
The amnesty clause negotiated at Evian was rapidly implemented in France by two 
executive decrees on 22 March 1962. The first decree, Decree no 62-327 of 22 March 
1962, grants amnesty to all of those who participated in, or helped the Algerian 
insurrection.426 The wording of this first decree invoked the Law of 14 January 1961 on 
the self-determination of the Algerian people.  
In order to facilitate the exercise of self-determination by the Algerian 
population, an amnesty is declared for all offences committed before 20 March 
1962 with the aim of participating in or providing direct or indirect aid to the 
Algerian insurrection.427 
The decree grants amnesty to those Algerians who had participated in or ‘ provided 
direct or indirect support to the Algerian insurrection, before 20 March 1962’. The 
decree was complemented by ordinances granting amnesty to French Muslims in the 
French428 and other French territories.  
The second decree implementing the amnesty was Decree no 62-328 of 22 March 1962, 
concerned the French military and police who had fought against the FLN combatants. It 
grants amnesty for the ‘acts committed during “‘public order operations’ directed 
against the Algerian insurrection.429Article 1 of the decree states that: 
                                                 
426 Décret no 62-327 du 22 mars 1962 (n 23). 
427  Décret no.62-327 du 22 mars 1962 (n 23) Article 1: ‘En vue de permettre la mise en œuvre de 
l’autodétermination des populations algériennes prévue par la loi du 14 janvier 1961, sont amnistiées: – 
toute infractions commises avant le 20 mars 1962 en vue de participer ou d’apporter une aide directe ou 
indirecte à l’insurrection algérienne, ainsi que les infractions connexes ; – toutes infractions commises 
avant le 30 octobre 1954 dans le cadre d’entreprises tendant à modifier le régime politique de l’Algérie;  – 
les tentatives ou complicités de ces mêmes infractions.’ [author’s translation] 
428  Ordonnance no 62-427 du 14 avril 1962, rendant applicable sur l’ensemble du territoire de la 
Republique le décret no 62-327 du 22 mars 1962 portant amnistie des infractions commises au titre de 
l’insurrection Algérienne. Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?cidTexte=JPDF1504196200003892&categorieLien=id 
429 Décret no62-328 du 22 mars 1962 portant amnistie des faits commis dans le cadre des opérations de 
maintien de l’ordre dirigées contre l’insurrection Algérienne JORF 23 March 23 1962 3144. Available at:  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf/common/jo_pdf.jsp?numJO=0&dateJO=19620323&numTexte=0314
4&pageDebut=03144&pageFin= [last accessed March 2013] 
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 The infractions perpetrated during the operation to maintain order 
against the Algerian insurrection before the 20 March 1962 are 
amnestied.430 
The amnesties applied to pending criminal proceedings, provided for the remission of 
sentences of those already convicted and prevented any future proceedings. Although 
presented as balancing the first decree, however, it has been claimed that, unlike the first 
decree, the provisions of Decree no 62-328 of 22 March 1962 was not negotiated at 
Evian and as such was not part of the agreements negotiated with the Algerian 
representatives.431 Notably, the second decree blocks any judicial attempts to prosecute 
the officers who engaged in acts of torture. It concerns the police officers and military 
who were prosecuted or sentenced for all crimes and offences perpetrated in the fight 
against the Algerian nationalists.  
These amnesties (and ordinances) produced strong reactions, particularly from the 
Communist Party, who denounced the ‘treacherous attitude’ of the French government 
for not including French citizens who had collaborated with Algerian nationalists. A 
campaign was organized to demand the release of members of the Jeanson Network, the 
‘porteurs de valises’, Europeans who helped the FLN in the Metropole; a number of 
them had been tried and sentenced in France. This campaign was supported by the 
Algerian by government (who formally asked the French government to grant amnesty 
to French citizens who had participated in the liberation movement).432 However the 
Jeanson network was considered to be a ‘Franco-French’ affair, it did not benefit from 
the amnesty of the Evian Accords.433  
Speaking of the second amnesty, in 1962, lawyer Robert Badinter voiced this opposition 
in an opinion piece published in the newspaper L’Express:  
[A] nation is responsible for each crime committed in its name […] It 
cannot save itself if it has not recognised the act as its own because, 
                                                 
430 Décret no62-328 du 22 mars 1962 (n 42). Article 1: […] sont amnistées les infractions commises dans 
le cadre des operations de maintien de l’ordre dirigées contre l’insurrection algérienne avant le 20 mars 
1962.  
431 Guy Pervillé,‘Trente ans après: Réflexions sur les accords d’Évian’ [1992] 70(296) Revue française 
d’histoire d’outre-mer 367. 
432 On the stance of the Communist Party during the Algerian War, see Jean Jacques Becker, ‘L’intérêt  
bien compris du Parti communist francaise’ in Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli (eds), La 
Guerre d’Algérie et les intellectuels français (Brussels: Editions Complexe 1991) 235-244. 
433 Malek Redha, L’Algérie à Évian: Histoire des négociations secrètes 1956-1962 (Paris: Editions Le 
Seuil 1995) 236-237. The said law was passed only in 1962 and in 1966, but three out of the 15 
condemned were still in prison while other members were in exile. 
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for nations as for men, there is no choice but to be the accomplice of 
the executioner or one’s own judge.434 
President of the Bar Association René William Thorp published an article in Le Monde 
expanding on Badinter’s argument.435 He contended that the infractions amnestied were 
not facts that could be justified as a common casualty of the war. For Thorp, the acts 
perpetrated in the name of the nation entail the wider responsibility of society and 
covering over these crimes by the amnesty would be detrimental to France in the long 
term.436 
As with the referenda, there were disputes about constitutionality and the democratic 
process. The French procedure generally provides that amnesty can be enacted through 
the legislative process to the benefit of a group of people (Article 34 of the 1958 
Constitution). Amnesty may also be granted by a presidential decree. However, the 
implementation of amnesty by decree permitted by these terms could potentially 
constitute an obstacle to peace.437 Constitutionalist Jean Touscoz commented at the time 
that parliament had been deliberately excluded from the process of application of the 
agreements.438 The implementation of the amnesty by decree was a means for de Gaulle 
to bypass the debates in parliament on the legitimacy of such measures. He notably 
wanted to avoid the opposition left-wing parties, especially the communists, to 
amnestying soldiers who had perpetrated torture. 
B. 1964-1966: Amnesty Legislation and Presidential 
Pardons 
As a result of these debates, the next amnesty was passed by parliament in 1964. It 
sought to conceal the criminal offences perpetrated by the colons defending their 
interests. Article 1 of the Law of 23 December 1964 amnesties: 
                                                 
434 Robert Badinter, ‘Détournement d’Amnistie’, L’Express (Paris 10 May 1962): ‘[…] une nation est 
engagée par chaque crimes commis en son nom […] Elle ne peut se sauver qu’autant qu’elle n’a pas 
reconnu cet acte comme le sien car pour les nations comme pour les hommes il n’est pas d’autre choix que 
d’être le complice du bourreau ou son juge’ [author’s translation].  
435 Rene William Thorp, ‘L’amnistie Des Gardiens De L’Ordre’, Le Monde (Paris, 21 June 1962). 
436 Thorp, ‘L’Amnistie des Gardiens De l’Ordre’ (n 48). 
437 William G Andrews, Presidential Government in Gaullist France: A Study of Executive-Legislative 
Relations, 1958-1974 (Albany: State University of New York Press 1974) 134. 
438 Jean Touscoz, ‘Les Accords Franco-Algériens’ [1962] Revue de l’Action Populaire  559; Charles 
Rousseau, ‘Chronique des Faits Internationaux’ [1963] Revue Générale du Droit Internationale Public 119 
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[…]all the infractions perpetrated in Algeria before 20 March 1962 in 
retaliation for the excess of the Algerian insurrection, under the 
condition that they [the infractions] are not related to attempts to 
prevent the State from acting or  participation in an attempt to take 
over the authority of the State and replace it with an unlawful 
authority.439 
Article 4 extended the scope of amnesty to the OAS members convicted for acts 
perpetrated between the signature of the Evian Accords and Algerian independence. 
However, this was subject to presidential discretion and restricted by two conditions: the 
sentence was less than fifteen years and – excluding the putsch generals –they must not 
play a high-level role in any enterprise attempting to prevent the State from acting or to 
take over the authority of the State and replace it with an unlawful authority.440 The law 
specifically distinguishes a legitimate use of violence in self-defence from the acts of 
subversion such as terrorist attacks perpetrated against the French authority in Algeria.  
The 1964 law was passed in a time of crisis for the Gaullists. However, this amnesty was 
still considered insufficient by a majority of the opposition. Two years later, the 
National Assembly adopted the Law of 17 June 1966, which extended the scope of the 
amnesty even further. Article 1 provides that amnesty shall be granted to individuals 
sentenced for crimes or offences directly connected to the events in Algeria, as well as 
‘crimes or offences directed against the authority of the State’‘.441  The granting of 
                                                 
439 Loi n° 64-1269 du 23 Décembre 1964 Portant Amnistie Et Autorisant La Dispence De Certaines 
Incapacités Et Déchêances, JORF 24 Décembre 1964 11499. Article 1: […] sont amnisties de plein droit 
toutes les infractions commises en Algérie avant le 20 mars 1962 en réplique aux excès de l’insurrection 
algérienne, à la condition qu’elles soient sans rapport avec un entreprise tendant à empêcher l’exercice de 
l’autorité de l’Etat ou à substituer à cette autorité une autorité illégale. [author’s translation, emphasis 
added.] Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000875632 
440 Loi n° 64-1269 du 23 Décembre 1964 (n 52). Article 4: Le Président de la République peut admettre 
par décret au bénéfice de l’amnistie, les personnes condamnées définitivement pour crimes ou délits 
commis avant le 3 juillet 1962 en Algérie et en relation directe avec les événements d’Algérie. Sont exclus 
du bénéfice du présent article : 1° Les condamnées à une peine privative de liberté égale ou supérieure à 
quinze années, compte tenu des mesures de grâce; 2° Les condamnés qui ont assumé un rôle déterminant 
d’organisation ou de commandement dans une entreprise tendant à empêcher l’exercice de l’autorité de 
l’État ou à substituer à cette autorité une autorité illégale [author’s translation]. 
441 Loi no 66-396 du 17 juin 1966 portant amnistie d’infractions contre la sûreté de l’État ou commises en 
relation avec les événements d’Algérie, JORF 18 juin 1966 4915. Article 1: […] sont amnistiées de plein 
droit les condamnations définitives pour crimes ou délits commis en relation directe avec les événements 
d’Algérie ainsi que pour crimes ou délits constituant une entreprise individuelle ou collective tendant à 
empêcher l’exercice de l’autorité de l’Etat ou à substituer à cette autorité une autorité illégale, ou commis 
en relation directe avec une telle entreprise […] [author’s translation]. Available at : 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000504433 
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amnesty concerns three types of individuals: 1) authors of crimes or offences sentenced 
to a fine or; 2) authors of crimes or offences sentenced to a suspended prison sentence 
(d’une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis; (3) authors of crimes or offences released 
before the promulgation of the present law.442 
Article 2 provides that, for crimes committed before the 3 July 1962, amnesty would be 
given to those sentenced to less than ten years’ imprisonment.443 Prisoners sentenced for 
more than ten years had to ask for a presidential pardon. Amnesty was also permitted for 
those who left the army to return to France. Article 3, covering all offences committed 
between 1 November 1954 and 3 July 1962 by the police seeking to re-establish order or 
acting against attempts to impede or overthrow the state’.444 Essentially, the 1966 law 
amnestied the crimes and misdemeanours perpetrated by members of police forces in 
France during their time in Algeria, including crimes of desertion. It provided that those 
who were already free or sentenced to less than ten years’ imprisonment for acts 
committed before the 3 July 1962 would benefit from its application immediately. 
Article 5 gave the amnesty a potentially an extended scope: it granted the President of 
the Republic the power to make further decrees.445 The amnesties were designed to 
encourage the surrender of the insurgent groups and as a tool to pressure those who did 
not want to come forward. Indeed, de Gaulle used this latitude to free and amnesty 86 
individuals convicted of crimes. It was used to free the ‘celebrities of the war’: General 
Zeller, for example, was set free on Bastille Day, 14 July 1966 and General Jouhaud 
received a Christmas amnesty on 25 December 1966. Salan was the last of the four 
generals of the coup to be released. 
                                                 
442 Loi no 66-396 du 17 juin 1966 (n 54). Article 1: […] si les auteurs de ces infractions ont été punis 
d’une peine d’amende avec ou sans sursis ou d’une peine d’emprisonnement avec sursis, assortie ou non 
d’une amende, ou si, condamnés à une peine privative de liberté, ils ont été libérés avant la date de 
promulgation de la présente loi [author’s translation]. 
443 Loi no 66-396 du 17 juin 1966 (n 54). Article 2: Sont admises de plein droit au bénéfice de l’amnistie 
les personnes condamnées définitivement, compte tenu des mesures de grâce, soit à une peine d’amende, 
soit à une peine privative de liberté n’excédant pas dix années, assortie ou non d’une peine d’amende, 
pour crimes ou délits commis avant le 3 juillet 1962 en Algérie et en relation directe avec les événements 
d’Algérie, qui étaient âgées de moins de vingt et un ans au temps de l’action et n’ont assumé aucun rôle 
déterminant d’organisation ou de commandement dans une entreprise tendant à empêcher l’exercice de 
l’autorité de l’Etat ou à substituer à cette autorité une autorité illégale. 
444 Loi no 66-396 du 17 juin 1966 (n 54). Article 3: sont amnisties de plein droit les infractions commises 
entre le 1 er novembre 1954 et le 3 juillet 1962 dans le cadre d’operation de police administrative ou 
judiciaire, du rétablissement de l’ordre ou de la lutte contre les entreprises tendant a empecher l’exercice 
de l’autorité de l’Etat ou a substituer à cette autorité une autorité illegale.  
445 Loi no 66-396 du 17 Juin 1966 (n 54). Article 5: Le Président de la République peut admettre par décret 
au bénéfice de l’amnistie les personnes qui sont ou seront condamnées définitivement pour crimes ou 
délits commis avant la promulgation de la présente loi et en relation directe avec les événements d’Algérie 
ou constituant une entreprise individuelle ou collective tendant à empêcher l’exercice de l’autorité de 
l’Etat ou à substituer à cette autorité une autorité illégale, ou en relation directe avec une telle entreprise. 
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The 1966 amnesty law also provides for the rehabilitation of offenders. Article 12 states 
that:  
The grant of amnesty shall result, without ever giving rise to 
restitution, in the remission of all the principal, accessory and 
supplementary penalties, including preventive detention and all 
consequential legal incapacities or disqualifications. It restores to the 
offender the benefit of a stay of enforcement, which could have been 
granted to him at the time of an earlier conviction.446 
By way of ‘amnesia’, Article 15 (as had the earlier decrees and laws) provides as 
follows: 
Any person having learnt, in the exercise of his duties, of criminal 
convictions … erased by the amnesty, shall be prohibited from 
referring to them in any form whatsoever or from allowing any 
indication of them to remain in any document. This prohibition does 
not, however, apply to the original versions of judgments and judicial 
decisions.447 
Alongside the amnesty legislation, Article 17 of the Constitution of 1958 invested the 
president with the power to grant individual pardons. The constitution of 1958 instituted 
a presidential regime, which gives the president complete freedom in the matter of 
pardons. The presidential pardon subscribed to a republican tradition of clemency and 
reincorporation of certain individuals. The grant of individual pardons has operated at 
different stages of France’s post-conflict process of reconstruction. De Gaulle exercised 
this right in a limited fashion, granting his grace only to French prisoners who had not 
participated in the attempted coup of April 1961. In December 1964, 173 former OAS 
                                                 
446 Loi no 66-396 du 17 Juin 1966 (n 54). Article 12. L’amnistie n’entraîne pas la réintégration dans les 
fonctions, emplois, professions, grades, offices publics ou ministériels. En aucun cas elle ne donne lieu à 
reconstitution de carrière. Elle entraîne la réintégration dans les divers droits à pension, à compter de la 
date de promulgation de la présente loi en ce qui concerne l’amnistie de droit, et à compter du jour où 
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confère pas la réintégration dans l’ordre de la Légion d’honneur, dans l’ordre de la Libération, ni dans le 
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intéressé, par décret du Président de la République, pris sur la proposition du grand chan celier compétent, 
après avis conforme du conseil de l’ordre. 
447  Loi no 66-396 du 17 juin 1966 (n 54). Article 15: Il est interdit à toute personne en ayant eu 
connaissance dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, de rappeler sous quelque forme que ce soit ou de laisser 
subsister dans tout document quelconque, les condamnations pénales, les sanctions disciplinaires ou 
professionnelles et les déchéances effacées par l’amnistie. Les minutes des jugements, arrêts et décisions 
échappent toutefois à cette interdiction. 
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members were granted pardon via presidential decree as a Christmas Eve gesture. 
Overall, 1,196 persons were freed by presidential decree. The ‘Gaullean’ exercise of 
pardon highlighted the distinction between the grant of amnesty and the grant of pardon. 
Measures of pardon were granted to individuals already convicted and had the effect that 
they no longer had to serve their sentence Hence those who benefited from a pardon did 
not see their condemnation erased from the records. At the same time, the presidential 
grant of pardon with its symbolic associations with the monarchical jura regalia to 
forgive was a political tool for de Gaulle that let him display his authority and the 
supreme power of the president.  
C. The 1968 Amnesty Law 
By March 1968, mobilisation in favour of the rehabilitation of French ex-combatants 
had grown stronger. De Gaulle’s power faced another crisis during the student uprising 
of May 1968. This student revolt was an opportunity for different political groups to 
attack de Gaulle and weaken his power. Hence, although the movement was led by left-
wing parties, The Association Nationale des Francais d’Afrique du Nord d’Outre mer et 
leurs amis (ANFANOMA), a pieds noir association, compared the student revolt to 
repatriates’ anger and the crisis of May 1958. The Far Right targeted de Gaulle’s failure 
to advance the modernization of France. In an attempt to short-circuit these criticisms 
and attract the support of the ex-colons, de Gaulle agreed to amnesty for the remaining 
OAS officers still imprisoned and sought to secure the coming election by multiple 
symbolic gestures.448 Hence de Gaulle visited OAS General Jacques Massu in his prison 
cell. This exchange between the two men was described as a ‘concordat’ by the press.449 
The goal was to heal the wounds left by the Algerian war in order to be able to deal with 
the social claims of May 1968.450 ‘’ 
July 1968 saw scope extended to constitute a general amnesty. Article 1 of the  Law of 
31, July 1968, provides that: 
                                                 
448 Jean Louis Tixier Vignacour, Des Républiques, Des Justices Et Des Hommes (Paris: Albin Michel 
1976). 
449 Tixier Vignacour, Des Républiques (n 61). 
450  René Capitant, Garde Des Sceaux, 1ere Séance Du 23 Juillet 1968, Journal Officiel, Debats 
Parlementaires (Assemblée Nationale) 24 Juillet 1968 2469. 
 116 
All crimes committed in connection with the events in Algeria are 
amnestied by law.451 
Article 1 further specifies that ‘crimes’ committed by military personnel serving in 
Algeria during the period covered in the first paragraph are deemed to have been 
committed in connection with the events in Algeria’. Articles 3 and 4 of the law lay 
down the effects of the amnesty. 452  Article 3 provides that the amnesty extends to 
disciplinary or professional sanctions (subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 6 
to 8 of the Law of 17 June 1966 on the granting of amnesty in respect of offences 
against the security of the State or committed in connection with the events in Algeria). 
Article 4 extends the pension rights as accorded by the Law of June 1977 (Article 9 to 
16) to all those now covered by the 1968 law.  
Essentially, the 1968 law broadened the scope of the beneficiaries of amnesty such that 
it now included the OAS officers, including those involved in the attempted coup. Raoul 
Salan and Edmond Jouhan, who had been sentenced, respectively, to life imprisonment 
and to death, were hence released, as well as Pierre Fenoglio, who had murdered the 
mayor of Evian. De Gaulle’s amnesty Law of 31 July 31 1968 released former OAS 
members in a bid for electoral success. It put a final seal to the darkest phases of the 
Algerian War.  
Overall, 2,466 individuals benefited from the direct application of the different amnesty 
decrees and laws enacted from 1962 to 1968. Throughout this phase of implementation, 
the issue of amnesty under the ‘regime of de Gaulle’ was discussed under three political 
themes. First, it was framed as a way to reciprocate the amnesty clause included in the 
Evian Accords, which was restricted to Algerian combatants: an executive amnesty 
decree was extended to the French combatants as a reciprocal response. Secondly, 
amnesty contributed to validating de Gaulle’s political legitimacy and showed his 
commitment to restoring national unity. For the most radical deputies, it was the French 
government that was illegitimate, while the campaign to maintain French Algeria had 
been legitimate.453 
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Thirdly, amnesties were granted as a reward for the ‘patriotic commitment’ of the 
French soldiers in trying to keep Algeria French. However, the individuals who had 
attempted to prevent the decolonisation of Algeria had not benefited from the amnesty 
of Decree 62-328 of 22 March 1962. Jurist Henri Mazeau wrote an opinion piece in the 
newspaper Carrefour, drawing his argument from the traditional role of amnesty in the 
aftermath of French crisis. He argued , given that the French government had in the past 
freed those on the side of FLN and, earlier, Nazi collaborators, ‘would it not be only 
justice to apply the same measure to those [OAS terrorists] who did no other crime but 
to continue the struggle?’454 The argument was that the violence was an ‘excessive’ 
expression of a form of patriotism. It was the OAS’s attachment to the idea of France as 
a sovereign power that had led them to attempt to sabotage what they deemed to be a 
betrayal to the ideal of France as a civilising mission.455 The combat undertaken to 
preserve l’Algérie Française had a particular appeal to conservative political groups. A 
right-wing party, Progrès et Démocratie Moderne, claimed that the OAS could not be 
considered a criminal entity and that their actions should instead be likened to the 
French Resistance in World War II led by de Gaulle himself during the occupation 
years. 456  With this rationale, the OAS could only be held accountable for having 
excessively attempted to defend France in Algeria. Hence these demands for amnesty 
centred around acknowledging the ‘selflessness’ of the military and recognizing the 
‘patriotic’ commitment of those who had fought against France. 457  Denouncing the 
double standards of the de Gaulle policy, with the French government freeing those on 
the side of FLN, and the earlier Nazi collaborators, they had demanded that it should 
also liberate those Frenchmen whose only crime was ‘patriotism’ and the ‘wish to 
continue the fight’ to keep Algeria French.458 For these groups, the rehabilitation of the 
OAS, and their struggle to maintain Algeria as part of France epitomised an ideal of the 
French nation and Catholicism under-layered by an anti-Communist sentiment. 
The amnesty process was also characterised by the involvement of collective groups 
representing the interests of the veterans and the repatriated colons. From 1963, this 
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movement became more structured. Different organisations representing repatriates 
lobbied for the amnesty among them, Fédérations d’anciens combattants (UNC-AFN, 
UNACFCI, UFAC, UCCTAM), the FNACA (Federation national des anciens 
combattants d’Algerie, Maroc, Tunisie) represented the interest of veterans in Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia independently of the state.459  
III. 1974-1982: Amnesty as an instrument for France’s political 
reconstruction   
A. The Repatriation of The Pieds Noirs  
After Algeria became independent, 90% of the Europeans living in Algeria, 
approximately 650,000 people, were repatriated to France.460  The repatriation of the 
colons was considered a threat to the economic stability of France. The pieds noirs were 
confronted with housing and employment issues, which affected their integration into 
French society.461 The repatriates lived their return in France as a forced ‘exile’. Images 
of families with suitcases epitomised the pieds noirs as refugees. As one Gaullist deputy 
urged, ‘it is necessary for those who returned, with pain in their souls, with bitterness on 
their lips, who are somewhat maladroit because they have suffered, to be welcomed like 
distressed members of the same family’.462  The following section explores how the 
debate on the amnesty shifted from the issue of forgiveness to a symbol of reparation. 
B. Compensation of the Pieds Noirs  
In theory, the property rights acquired by the European settlers throughout the period of 
colonisation were secure despite the modality of their acquisition being illegal. Article 
12 of the Evian Accords provides that: 
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Algeria will ensure without any discrimination the free and peaceful 
enjoyment of patrimonial rights acquired on its territory before self-
determination. No one will be deprived of these rights without fair 
compensation previously determined.463 
While this provision had been negotiated by both parties, the Algerian state began to 
reclaim French assets and, especially, to nationalise agricultural and industrial 
possessions.  
The pieds noirs set up several associations to formulate demands for compensation from 
the French state. William Cohen counted 275 different organisations in France 
representing the repatriates from the colonies. 464  Among them, three organisations, 
FNACA, ANFANOMA and the Rassemblement et coordination unitaire des rapatries et 
spolies (RECOURS), brought together the demands of the repatriated and campaigned 
for indemnification for the loss of property as a result of decolonisation. These 
associations worked obliquely, putting electoral pressures on French political affairs. 
Although they constituted only 2% of the French population, they had a great regional 
impact, notably in the South of France, where they constituted a significant electoral 
group.465 In cities such as Avignon, Montpellier, Sète, Toulon and Marseilles, the pieds 
noirs constituted 10% of the population.  
During the presidential election of 1969, the repatriates’ pressure groups and 
organisations expressed their grievances to the main candidates. The newly elected 
Gaullist president Georges Pompidou began to put together a compensation law. A year 
later, on 3 June 1970, draft legislation was presented to parliament. But even though the 
legislation was formally declared ‘of immediate importance’ by a déclaration d’urgence 
on 12 June, the parliamentary debates quickly dismissed the project. The text of the 
legislation was unanimously criticised in the National Assembly. By March 1968, 
mobilisation in favour of the rehabilitation of French ex-combatants had grown stronger. 
De Gaulle’s power faced another crisis during the student uprising of May 1968. This 
student revolt was an opportunity for different political groups to attack de Gaulle and 
weaken his power. Hence, although the movement was led by left wing parties, The 
Association Nationale des Francais d’Afrique du Nord d’Outre mer et leurs amis 
(ANFANOMA), a pieds noir association, compared the student revolt to repatriates’ 
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anger and the crisis of May 1958. The Far Right targeted de Gaulle’s failure to advance 
the modernisation of France. In an attempt to short circuit these criticisms and attract the 
support of the ex-colons, de Gaulle agreed to amnesty for the remaining OAS officers 
still imprisoned and sought to secure the coming election by multiple symbolic 
gestures.466 Hence de Gaulle visited OAS General Jacques Massu in his prison cell. This 
exchange between the two men was described as a ‘concordat’ by the press.467 The goal 
was to heal the wounds left by the Algerian war in order to be able to deal with the 
social claims of May 1968.468 ‘’ 
July 1968 saw scope extended to constitute a general amnesty. Article 1 of the  Law of 
31 July 1968 provides that: 
All crimes committed in connection with the events in Algeria are 
amnestied by law.469 
Article 1 further specifies that ‘crimes’ committed by military personnel serving in 
Algeria during the period covered in the first paragraph are deemed to have been 
committed in connection with the events in Algeria’. Articles 3 and 4 of the law lay 
down the effects of the amnesty. 470  Article 3 provides that the amnesty extends to 
disciplinary or professional sanctions (subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 6 
to 8 of the Law of 17 June 1966 on the granting of amnesty in respect of offences 
against the security of the State or committed in connection with the events in Algeria). 
Article 4 extends the pension rights as accorded by the Law of June 1977 (Article 9 to 
16) to all those now covered by the 1968 law.  
Essentially, the 1968 law broadened the scope of the beneficiaries of amnesty such that 
it now included the OAS officers, including those involved in the attempted coup. Raoul 
Salan and Edmond Jouhan, who had been sentenced, respectively, to life imprisonment 
and to death, were hence released, as well as Pierre Fenoglio, who had murdered the 
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mayor of Evian. De Gaulle’s amnesty Law of 31 July 31 1968 released former OAS 
members in a bid for electoral success. It put a final seal to the darkest phases of the 
Algerian War.  
Overall, 2,466 individuals benefited from the direct application of the different amnesty 
decrees and laws enacted from 1962 to 1968. Throughout this phase of implementation, 
the issue of amnesty under the ‘regime of de Gaulle’ was discussed under three political 
themes. First, it was framed as a way to reciprocate the amnesty clause included in the 
Evian Accords, which was restricted to Algerian combatants: an executive amnesty 
decree was extended to the French combatants as a reciprocal response. Secondly, 
amnesty contributed to validating de Gaulle’s political legitimacy and showed his 
commitment to restoring national unity. For the most radical deputies, it was the French 
government that was illegitimate, while the campaign to maintain French Algeria had 
been legitimate.471 
Thirdly, amnesties were granted as a reward for the ‘patriotic commitment’ of the 
French soldiers in trying to keep Algeria French. However, the individuals who had 
attempted to prevent the decolonisation of Algeria had  not benefited from the amnesty 
of Decree 62-328 of 22 March 1962. Jurist Henri Mazeau wrote an opinion piece in the 
newspaper Carrefour, drawing his argument from the traditional role of amnesty in the 
aftermath of French crisis. He argued , given that the French government had in the past 
freed those on the side of FLN and, earlier, Nazi collaborators, ‘would it not be only 
justice to apply the same measure to those [OAS terrorists] who did no other crime but 
to continue the struggle?’472 The argument was that the violence was an ‘excessive’ 
expression of a form of patriotism. It was the OAS’s attachment to the idea of France as 
a sovereign power that had led them to attempt to sabotage what they deemed to be a 
betrayal to the ideal of France as a civilising mission.473 The combat undertaken to 
preserve l’Algérie Française had a particular appeal to conservative political groups. A 
right-wing party, Progrès et Démocratie Moderne, claimed that the OAS could not be 
considered a criminal entity, and that their actions should instead be likened to the 
French Resistance in World War II led by de Gaulle himself during the occupation 
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years. 474  With this rationale, the OAS could only be held accountable for having 
excessively attempted to defend France in Algeria. Hence these demands for amnesty 
centred around acknowledging the ‘selflessness’ of the military and recognizing the 
‘patriotic’ commitment of those who had fought against France. 475  Denouncing the 
double standards of the de Gaulle policy, with the French government freeing those on 
the side of FLN, and the earlier Nazi collaborators, they had demanded that it should 
also liberate those Frenchmen whose only crime was ‘patriotism’ and the ‘wish to 
continue the fight’ to keep Algeria French.476 For these groups, the rehabilitation of the 
OAS, and their struggle to maintain Algeria as part of France, epitomised an ideal of the 
French nation and Catholicism under-layered by an anti-Communist sentiment. 
The amnesty process was also characterised by the involvement of collective groups 
representing the interests of the veterans and the repatriated colons. From 1963, this 
movement became more structured. Different organisations representing repatriates 
lobbied for the amnesty among them, Fédérations d’anciens combattants (UNC-AFN, 
UNACFCI, UFAC, UCCTAM), the FNACA (Federation national des anciens 
combattants d’Algerie, Maroc, Tunisie) represented the interest of veterans in Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia independently of the state.477  
I. 1974-1982: Amnesty as an instrument for France’s political 
reconstruction   
A. The Repatriation of The Pieds Noirs  
After Algeria became independent, 90% of the Europeans living in Algeria, 
approximately 650,000 people, were repatriated to France.478  The repatriation of the 
colons was considered a threat to the economic stability of France. The pieds noirs were 
confronted with housing and employment issues, which affected their integration into 
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French society.479 The repatriates lived their return in France as a forced ‘exile’. Images 
of families with suitcases epitomised the pieds noirs as refugees. As one Gaullist deputy 
urged, ‘it is necessary for those who returned, with pain in their souls, with bitterness on 
their lips, who are somewhat maladroit because they have suffered, to be welcomed like 
distressed members of the same family’.480  The following section explores how the 
debate on the amnesty shifted from the issue of forgiveness to a symbol of reparation. 
B. Compensation of the Pieds Noirs  
In theory the property rights acquired by the European settlers throughout the period of 
colonisation were secure despite the modality of their acquisition being illegal. Article 
12 of the Evian Accords provides that: 
Algeria will ensure without any discrimination the free and peaceful 
enjoyment of patrimonial rights acquired on its territory before self-
determination. No one will be deprived of these rights without fair 
compensation previously determined.481 
While this provision had been negotiated by both parties, the Algerian state began to 
reclaim French assets and, especially, to nationalise agricultural and industrial 
possessions.  
The pieds noirs set up several associations to formulate demands for compensation from 
the French state. William Cohen counted 275 different organisations in France 
representing the repatriates from the colonies. 482  Among them, three organisations, 
FNACA, ANFANOMA and the Rassemblement et coordination unitaire des rapatries et 
spolies (RECOURS), brought together the demands of the repatriated and campaigned 
for indemnification for the loss of property as a result of decolonisation. These 
associations worked obliquely, putting electoral pressures on French political affairs. 
Although they constituted only 2% of the French population, they had a great regional 
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impact, notably in the South of France, where they constituted a significant electoral 
group.483 In cities such as Avignon, Montpellier, Sète, Toulon and Marseilles, the pieds 
noirs constituted 10% of the population.  
During the presidential election of 1969, the repatriates’ pressure groups and 
organisations expressed their grievances to the main candidates. The newly elected 
Gaullist president Georges Pompidou began to put together a compensation law. A year 
later, on 3 June 1970, draft legislation was presented to parliament. But even though the 
legislation was formally declared ‘of immediate importance’ by a déclaration d’urgence 
on 12 June, the parliamentary debates quickly dismissed the project. The text of the 
legislation was unanimously criticised in the National Assembly. It was rejected by the 
Senate on its second reading and it was only because the majority party agreed to 
support the government that it became law on 30 June amidst howls of protest from the 
public gallery. Even before it was officially published in the Journal Officiel on 15 July, 
it was already being dismissed as obsolete. The proposed legislation made it impossible 
to determine exactly what compensation meant as a policy of reintegration.  
The bill had proposed to amend Article 4 of the amnesty Law of 31 July 1968, which 
provided the repatriated with an indemnity between 52,000 and 200,000 francs.484 But 
for the pieds noirs and the veterans, this measure was insufficient. The 1968 amnesty 
law had added the idea of reparations to the grant of criminal immunity. It granted the 
military and civil servants the benefit of retirement pensions. The text also provided 
symbolic reparation with the restitution of military honours (decorations). Hence during 
the parliamentary elections of 1978, several Gaullist MPs emphasised the symbolic 
aspect of the compensation of the repatriated.485  
In 1974, President Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing announced the first new amnesty of the 
Algerian War since de Gaulle’s death in 1970. The Law of 16 July 1974 was a post-
election gesture by which newly elected president thanked the pieds noirs for their 
support in the community.486 He declared: ‘We must enhance our efforts of solidarity 
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towards those who have been torn from this land [Algeria] and who continue to suffer 
from this uprootedness’.487  
This largely ‘symbolic reparation’ restored military decorations and legal fees to those 
convicted of crimes committed in relation to the Algerian war.488 Chapter IV of the 1974 
law concerns the ‘effect of the amnesty on the offences committed in relation to the 
Algerian events and the war in Indochina’.489 Passed by parliament on the 16 July 1974, 
it considered, for the first time, the moral aspect of the amnesty The law enabled the 
reintegration of 800 soldiers, 800 police officers and 400 civil servants who had been 
removed from their positions between 1961 and 1962 due to acts related to the April 
1961 putsch. The law on indemnification was amended in January 1978, with an 
increase from the initial indemnity of 52,000 (852 Euros) to 200,000 francs (3277 euros) 
.490 It also restored their decorations such as the Légion d’honneur.  
C. The Courrière Law: Grant of Pensions to the 
Veterans   
In the 1980s, the debates on reparations and symbols of reintegration focused on the 
status of ex-soldiers. Socialist President François Mitterand sought to continue the 
project of rehabilitation and to alleviate the remaining tensions. Significantly, he 
addressed the issue of the pieds noirs and the veterans by framing it in terms of ‘national 
reconciliation’ and demanded that the French people ‘have more perspective on their 
responsibility for one another in times of civil crisis’.491  
The first law, passed on 4 August 1981, revised the reference to the criminal offences 
committed in Algeria with the new formulation of ‘criminal offences in relation of the 
defence of the rights and interests of the overseas French’.492 A year and a half after 
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Mitterand’s election, Prime Minister Pierre Mouroy presented parliament with a 
proposed bill related to some of the consequences of the Algerian War focused on the 
process of rehabilitation of the colonial administration. The French Parliament approved 
the financial rehabilitation of civil servants, military officers convicted for acts of 
subversion.493 The so-called Courrière Law was enacted, which retroactively reinstated 
the payment of pensions to all military and public officials who served during the 
Algerian war.494 2,000 to 3,000 individuals benefited from this law and it had a great 
political impact. It also reintegrated the OAS generals into the corps de reserve (reserve 
corps) of the army. The law benefited two putschist generals who were still alive at the 
time of its enactment, Raoul Salan and Edmond Jouhaud, as well as six other generals 
who had participated in the activities of the OAS.  
The aftermath of the independence of Algeria saw a complex dynamic of internal social 
conflict between different actors in the conflict. The war had deeply scarred French 
society and marked a significant divide between contested narratives over the actions of 
the French troops in Algeria. Such gestures have been perceived as strategic political 
moves carefully orchestrated before or post elections. The process of reparations for the 
repatriated and veterans reflects a transition ‘from a political and material recognition to 
a normative interpretation of the past’.495 
Since the 1960s, symbolic manifestations commemorating the Algerian war of 
decolonisation in France have evolved in a sporadic fashion. Memory groups have 
gathered to create their own process of recognition in which ideal myths of the French 
colonial enterprise are promoted. As the next chapter shows, from the 1990s onwards, 
France’s politics of memory underwent a significant shift. The issue of memory 
regarding the Algerian war opened up debates about French identity and what it means 
to be French in the aftermath of the colonial age. Failure to address the roots of the 
                                                                                                                                                
Article 2 (11): Délits commis en relation avec la défense des droits et intérêts des Français rapatriés 
d’outre-mer. 
Available at:  
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000517004&categorieLien=id [ last visited 
May 2014] 
493  Amendement No 13, 3e Séance du 21 Octobre 1982, Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires  
(Assemblée Nationale) 22 October 1982 6138 And 6141. 
494 Loi N° 82-4 du 6 Janvier 1982, Relative A L’aménagement Des Prêts De Réinstallation Qui S’s’inscrit 
Dans Le Cadre De L’indemnisation Des Rapatries, JORF 7 Janvier 1982 195 Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000704433 [last visited April 2013] 
495 Henry Rousso, ‘History of Memory, Policies of the Past: What for?’ in Konrad H. Jarausch and 
Thomas Lindenberger, Conflicted Memories Europeanizing Contemporary Histories (New York: 
Berghahn Books 2007) 31-32. 
 127 
violence in the Algerian War resulted in the fragmentation of memories and the risk of 
manipulating memory. The next chapter further explores the issue of memory and 
examines how the Algerian past is enshrined in national rituals of commemoration.  
The Senate on its second reading rejected it and it was only because the majority party 
agreed to support the government that it became law on 30 June amidst howls of protest 
from the public gallery. Even before it was officially published in the Journal Officiel on 
15 July, it was already being dismissed as obsolete. The proposed legislation made it 
impossible to determine exactly what compensation meant as a policy of reintegration.  
The bill had proposed to amend Article 4 of the amnesty Law of 31 July 1968, which 
provided the repatriated with an indemnity between 52,000 and 200,000 francs.496 But 
for the pieds noirs and the veterans, this measure was insufficient. The 1968 amnesty 
law had added the idea of reparations to the grant of criminal immunity. It granted the 
military and civil servants the benefit of retirement pensions. The text also provided 
symbolic reparation with the restitution of military honours (decorations). Hence during 
the parliamentary elections of 1978, several Gaullist MPs emphasised the symbolic 
aspect of the compensation of the repatriated.497  
In 1974, President Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing announced the first new amnesty of the 
Algerian War since de Gaulle’s death in 1970. The Law of 16 July 1974 was a post-
election gesture by which newly elected president thanked the pieds noirs for their 
support in the community.498 He declared: ‘We must enhance our efforts of solidarity 
towards those who have been torn from this land [Algeria] and who continue to suffer 
from this uprootedness’.499  
This largely ‘symbolic reparation’ restored military decorations and legal fees to those 
convicted of crimes committed in relation to the Algerian war.500 Chapter IV of the 1974 
law concerns the ‘effect of the amnesty on the offences committed in relation to the 
Algerian events and the war in Indochina’.501 Passed by parliament on the 16 July 1974, 
it considered, for the first time, the moral aspect of the amnesty The law enabled the 
                                                 
496 Gacon, L’amnistie (n 3)  287, 309. 
497 Gacon, L’amnistie (n 3) 287, 309. 
498 Loi no74-643 du 16 juillet 1974 portant amnistie, JORF 17 juillet 7445. Available at:  
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000333537 [last visited May 2014] 
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500 Loi n°74-643 du 16 juillet 1974 (n 82). 
501 Loi no74-643 du 16 juillet 1974 (n 82). 
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reintegration of 800 soldiers, 800 police officers and 400 civil servants who had been 
removed from their positions between 1961 and 1962 due to acts related to the April 
1961 putsch. The law on indemnification was amended in January 1978, with an 
increase from the initial indemnity of 52,000 (852 euros) to 200,000 francs (3277 
euros).502 It also restored their decorations such as the Légion d’honneur.  
C. The Courrière Law: Grant of Pensions to the 
Veterans   
In the 1980s, the debates on reparations and symbols of reintegration focused on the 
status of ex-soldiers. Socialist President François Mitterand sought to continue the 
project of rehabilitation and to alleviate the remaining tensions. Significantly, he 
addressed the issue of the pieds noirs and the veterans by framing it in terms of ‘national 
reconciliation’ and demanded that the French people ‘have more perspective on their 
responsibility for one another in times of civil crisis’.503  
The first law, passed on 4 August 1981, revised the reference to the criminal offences 
committed in Algeria with the new formulation of ‘criminal offences in relation of the 
defence of the rights and interests of the overseas French’.504 A year and a half after 
Mitterand’s election, Prime Minister Pierre Mouroy presented parliament with a 
proposed bill related to some of the consequences of the Algerian War focused on the 
process of rehabilitation of the colonial administration. The French Parliament approved 
the financial rehabilitation of civil servants, military officers convicted for acts of 
subversion.505 The so-called Courrière Law was enacted, which retroactively reinstated 
the payment of pensions to all military and public officials who served during the 
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(Assemblée Nationale) 22 October 1982 6138 And 6141. 
 129 
Algerian war.506 2,000 to 3,000 individuals benefited from this law and it had a great 
political impact. It also reintegrated the OAS generals into the corps de reserve (reserve 
corps) of the army. The law benefited two putschist generals who were still alive at the 
time of its enactment, Raoul Salan and Edmond Jouhaud, as well as six other generals 
who had participated in the activities of the OAS.  
The aftermath of the independence of Algeria saw a complex dynamic of internal social 
conflict between different actors in the conflict. The war had deeply scarred French 
society and marked a significant divide between contested narratives over the actions of 
the French troops in Algeria. Such gestures have been perceived as strategic political 
moves carefully orchestrated before or post elections. The process of reparations for the 
repatriated and veterans reflects a transition ‘from a political and material recognition to 
a normative interpretation of the past’.507 
Since the 1960s, symbolic manifestations commemorating the Algerian war of 
decolonisation in France have evolved in a sporadic fashion. Memory groups have 
gathered to create their own process of recognition in which ideal myths of the French 
colonial enterprise are promoted. As the next chapter shows, from the 1990s onwards, 
France’s politics of memory underwent a significant shift. The issue of memory 
regarding the Algerian war opened up debates about French identity and what it means 
to be French in the aftermath of the colonial age. Failure to address the roots of the 
violence in the Algerian War resulted in the fragmentation of memories and the risk of 
manipulating memory. The next chapter further explores the issue of memory and 
examines how the Algerian past is enshrined in national rituals of commemoration.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a contextual analysis to understand the process of 
implementation of amnesty and the evolution of its scope of application. De Gaulle’s 
concern to restore national cohesion turned the granting of amnesty into a politically 
staged process. In the first phase of the debate on amnesty laws, the issues centred on the 
release of political prisoners, civil and military. As the debate on the amnesty grew, de 
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Gaulle introduced three further laws to deal with the fate of the OAS members in 1964, 
1966 and 1968. The internal divisions over the issue of decolonization of Algeria 
necessitated a reassertion of the unity of the nation. These debates culminated in the 
introduction of the 1968 law and the full grant of amnesty to all French citizen who had 
participated in the conflict. From 1972, the amnesty debate shifted into a more symbolic, 
yet also material, dimension. The deployment of amnesty as a political tool was 
completed in combination with a process of compensation of the veterans, civil 
personnel and the repatriated colons.  
The use of amnesties for the rehabilitation of former combatants has sometimes been 
seen as a way to secure redemption from the past. Stèphane Gacon explains that 
recourse to amnesties has historically sought to re-integrate those who might have been 
‘excluded’ and hence as a means to restore national cohesion.508 This was notably the 
case after the violence of 1870-1871 and the Paris Commune when amnesty was used as 
a symbol of national cohesion. In the case of the Algerian war, the rehabilitation of the 
OAS members went a step further, as their demands shifted towards the recognition of 
their patriotic commitment. They desired recognition that their actions were a 
demonstration of their strong commitment to France. Considering themselves to be the 
forgotten of the Republic, les oubliés de la Republique, 509  the French presence in 
Algeria had not been criminal but was rather a demonstration of patriotism.510   
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Chapter 5 : Judicial Capacity of the French Courts to 
Prosecute War Crimes and the amnesty following the 
Algerian war 
 
 
This chapter explores further the implementation of the amnesty and examines how the 
amnesty influenced the French judges in their interpretation and application of criminal 
law. It is particularly interested in exploring the application of the amnesty to alleged 
crimes against humanity and war crimes perpetrated in Algeria by the French army. This 
chapter seeks to highlight the challenges confronted by victims urging the prosecution of 
French soldiers who perpetrated torture or attempting other sorts of legal action in the 
courts. One of the principal challenges facing victims seeking recognition and reparation 
is to counter the constraint that the Algerian amnesties impose on the possibility of 
investigating crimes perpetrated during the Algerian war. 
The cases of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Algeria did 
not emerge immediately. Rather, the years following the end of the war were marked by 
the silence of victims and the resolute will of the French state to move on. However, in 
the 1980s, the prosecutions of Nazi criminals opened up an important opportunity for 
Algerian victims to make claims against prominent French officers. Indeed, the ‘Vichy 
trials’ were a decisive moment in France and led to important developments in criminal 
accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecution of Klaus 
Barbie was the culmination of the efforts of many individuals to bring to justice this 
Nazi officer on the run. His prosecution was only made possible by the French judges’ 
to take very wide stance on the law on crimes against humanity. Yet as it will be 
explored below the French definition of crimes against humanity is restricted to acts 
perpetrated during World War II. Despite the revision of French criminal code in 1994 
the prosecution and investigation of acts perpetrated during the Algerian war remain 
impossible. In 2001 the Algerian war controversy was reactivated when Paul 
Aussaresses a retired general who served in Algeria notably revived the controversy 
over the responsibility of the French state in perpetrating alleged crimes against 
humanity by admitting having perpetrated torture on Algerians. Despite the detailed 
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depiction of the acts perpetrated, the judges dismissed the demand to prosecute on the 
basis that the alleged acts were covered by the amnesty. 
Through the exploration of the Aussaresses affair, this chapter analyses the French legal 
position on acts of torture perpetrated during the Algerian war. It seeks to answer two 
distinct questions. First, what prevents acts reported by victims (or even perpetrators) 
from being classified as crimes against humanity? Second, how do judges justify 
applying the amnesties to acts that could allegedly be constitutive of crimes against 
humanity? This chapter argues that amnesty acts as a ‘constraining norm’ on the basis of 
which judges have interpreted the law on crimes against humanity and war crimes. As 
the following analysis of the French jurisprudence demonstrates, the amnesties do not 
deny that crimes may have been perpetrated. Instead, judicial reasoning leads to an 
ambiguous situation: whereby the restrictive definition of crimes against humanity 
creates a ‘legal contradiction’ in which amnesty covers acts of torture and bars the 
possibility of prosecution.  
After introducing the context of the debate on torture during the Algerian war, this 
chapter explores how the amnesty has influenced the application of criminal law. Next, 
it examines the strategies used to circumvent this influence and reach a recognition of 
accountability. 
I.  The Aussaresses Affair: Torture and the French Army 
‘I quickly became convinced that those circumstances explained and 
justified their methods. As surprising as it may appear, the use of this kind of 
violence which is inacceptable under normal circumstances, could become 
inevitable in a situation that clearly defies every rule.’ 
Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah511 
The quote above refers to the use of torture during the Algerian war by Paul 
Aussaresses, a retired member of the 10th Parachute Division. Aussaresses was a famous 
figure of the French army. Deputy to General Massu in the 10th Parachute Division, the 
‘paras’, Aussaresses had participated in the Battle of Algiers. He holds the Resistance 
Medal for his action with the Free French Forces in World War II. During the Algerian 
war, he acted as counterintelligence officer and paratrooper. In his book Services 
Spéciaux, Algérie 1955-1962, published in 2001, Aussaresses gives an account of the 
                                                 
511  Paul Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux: Algérie, 1955–1957 (Paris: Éditions Perrin 2001), English 
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Algerian war and the practices undertaken by the French army. He notably described 
how he had recourse to the torture of Algerian prisoners and acknowledged for the first 
time that he had murdered two Algerian liberation leaders, whose deaths had until then 
been described officially as suicides. They were Ali Boumendjel and Larbi Ben M’Hidi. 
In 2001, whose sister announced in Algiers that she intended to take legal action against 
General Aussaresses.  
 
This section examines the impact of the emergence of historical accounts on past crimes 
on legal proceedings. It explores this question through the analysis of the proceedings 
following Aussaresses’ account and contextualises it with regard to the contemporary 
debate on the legacy of the Colonial past it triggered. This section also seeks to locate 
Aussaresses’ disclosures in the French legal context. It highlights the historical 
significance of this revelation decades after the end of the conflict. 
 
Aussaresses’ book holds a historical significance for the construction of the official 
narrative on the Algerian War for three main reasons.  
Firstly, the book has the value of a testimony from a direct actor of the conflict. For 
decades, silence has characterized the telling of the Algerian war (see Chapter 7 for 
further details). The publication of Aussaresses’ account addressed one of the most 
disturbing taboos of the war, namely the use of torture by the French army. In his book, 
Aussaresses provides evidence that the French army used torture against the Algerian 
population and that these acts were known by the French leadership. Aussaresses 
describes the holding of torture sessions in secret locations, such as villas, wine caves, or 
Turkish baths, and by specific military units. Notably, Aussaresses admits that in 1957 
torture and murder were an integral part of France’s war policy. He boasts that the 
torture methods employed were not covered by the conventions of war, that he had 
given his subordinates orders to kill and had personally liquidated 24 FLN members, 
telling Le Monde, ‘I do not regret it’.512 Paul Aussaresses borrows the same arguments 
used to rationalize the granting of ‘special powers’ to the French military in Algeria in 
March 1956 in the first place. Indeed, he spoke of the need to fight the terrorism of the 
Algerian independence fighters, at all costs and by all means. The policemen were 
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neither torturers nor monsters but ordinary men devoted to their country. Further, he 
continues, ‘I consider I did my difficult duty of a soldier implicated in a difficult 
mission’.513  The tone, coupled with the absence of remorse or regret, added to the 
controversial nature of Aussaresses account and expressions of revulsion in French 
public opinion.  
Secondly, the publication of the book brought out the responsibility of the judiciary 
during the Algerian war. He describes how torture became part of the counter-
insurgency strategy of France and implicates the structure of the judicial functions 
during the conflict. The participation of the judiciary during the war was first facilitated 
by the particularities of the structure of the courts. Algeria formed part of the French 
territory and was divided in three departments: Oran, Constantine and Algiers. During 
the war, courts of law were functioning under the same framework as the one in the 
Metropole. The presidency of the courts was strictly reserved for the French (Français 
de souche) and only rarely would an Algerian Muslim hold a high position in a court of 
law. Unlike the metropolitan jurisdictions, judges were appointed on the basis of their 
race. Secondly the state of emergency shared the judicial power between civil judges 
and elected judges and the military. The Cour de Cassation, which was located in the 
Metropole, could also be used to hear cases concerning the detention of prisoners and 
abuses. This particular legal framework made it possible to for French military 
operations to bypass legal limits without departing from formal constitutional rule. Until 
1960, civil (i.e. non-military) judges were in charge of délits (minor crimes), and the 
military judges of crimes proper. As such, ordinary courts were in charge of thousands 
of matters while the military courts were dealing with hundreds of cases each month. In 
1960, procureurs militaires (military prosecutors) were introduced to ease the task of the 
judges.514 Further, judges would investigate and prosecute on behalf of the military. 
Since the end of the war, there were few attempts to prosecute French soldiers. Historian 
Raphaëlle Branche explains that evidence of torture being perpetrated was difficult to 
present.515 In most instances, the victims could only describe their suffering as they 
could not present a doctor’s report. If they were able to provide information about the 
units that arrested them, or bring witnesses, they would have to fear reprisals. 
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Furthermore, witnesses could only testify to hearing screams and the condition of 
detainees after being interrogated. Even after the war, the atmosphere was not more 
favourable to legal action. Indeed, as Chapter 4 explained, amnesty was granted to all 
French soldiers despite the crimes they could have committed. The amnesties were the 
response to the demands to rehabilitate the French soldiers and were used as a political 
tool to appease the tension and settle accounts on the Algerian war. Essentially, amnesty 
legitimated a system of impunity for perpetrators of torture and gave them immunity 
against prosecution. Consequently, those who called for the prosecution of the French 
soldiers were seen as sabotaging this collective will to forget the past. Ultimately this 
muted them into silence. Section II of this chapter explores in more detail the political 
context that discouraged support for victims in their attempts to have prosecutions 
brought against French soldiers. In a Note de service (memorandum), General Massu 
wrote that he was satisfied by the jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, which was to 
him ‘quite liberal’. Closer examination of the jurisprudence of the courts reveals that the 
judges adopted a wide approach to interpreting facts that would incriminate the military. 
As the Argane decision illustrates, prisoners could be held in custody indefinitely.516 The 
Cour de Cassation ruled that investigation by the military prosecutor started the day the 
individual was presented to him. The court also rejected the demand to recognize 
detention in centres de triage (internment camps) as custody, which was governed by 
strict procedural rules. In the Boucetta case, the court declined to look into the 
justification (motifs) for extending the interrogation of a suspect.517 In two judgments in 
August and November 1959, the Cour de Cassation refused to examine lower courts’ 
judgments based on confessions allegedly obtained by torture, on the grounds that 
torture was a ‘political problem’. In January 1962, a tribunal acquitted three army 
officers who had allegedly tortured to death an Algerian woman. In addition, the 
verdicts and sentences rendered by the military courts were soft. In May 1960, the 
Military Tribunal of Bordeaux discharged six members of a raiding party accused of 
homicide and grievous bodily harm of Algerian suspects. In December 1961, three 
police officers were sentenced to pay a fine for torturing Algerians held in custody. In 
September 1958, 1,315 ‘crimes’ were instructed and 816 ‘délits’ for acts perpetrated in 
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connection with the events in Algeria.518 On the other hand, the numerous attempts to 
prosecute the practices of the French army were dismissed with a non-lieux (dismissal) 
or minor sentences.519  In 1957, a group of lawyers and human rights activists made 
great efforts in denouncing the inhuman treatment of Algerian detainees. As they 
succeeded in to publicising cases of injustice and alert public opinion, the Mollet 
government created the Commission to Safeguard Individual Rights and Liberties 
(Commission de Sauvegarde des Droits et Libertés Individuelles), an independent body 
given the responsibility of reporting on human rights infractions by the military. The 
Commission was made up of 12 highly accredited individuals with varied political 
horizons – but without real power. Several of its members, who had gathered 
overwhelming evidence of torture, resigned in September 1957 to protest a situation that 
made them the hostages of a government that was a party to the repression. 
 
Thirdly, it created an opportunity to revise the Algerian war. When Paul Aussaresses 
published Services Spéciaux in 2001 the French public already knew that the French 
army had resorted to torture during the Algerian war. Since the beginning of the conflict, 
human rights activists had alerted public opinion to the French practices in Algeria. 
Frequently, army veterans would speak to the press about their past action, admitting to 
torture. General Jacques Massu, a leader of the paratroopers, had made important and 
controversial revelations about torture in the 1970s. However, the amnesty decrees and 
laws enacted at the end of the war prevented any possibility of investigating and 
prosecuting acts of torture by the French army. Article 1 of the amnesty Law of 31 July 
1968 states that:  
All crimes committed in connection with the events in Algeria are 
amnestied by law. Crimes committed by military personnel serving in 
Algeria during the period covered in the first paragraph of this Article 
are deemed to have been committed in connection with the events in 
Algeria.520 
After the publication of Aussaresses’ book, the official reactions reflected the 
ambivalence of the French state to the practices of the French army during the war. 
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While the descriptions in Aussaresses’ book prompted condemnation, the French 
government refused to endorse these crimes and yet rejected calls for a formal apology 
over France’s use of torture during the Algerian war of independence. In a television 
interview, French President Jacques Chirac said that he would do nothing to detract from 
the honour of those French soldiers who had fought in the conflict.521 Nevertheless, in a 
symbolic gesture, President Chirac withdrew General Aussaresses’ status and medal as 
Commander of the Légion d’honneur. But, again, this gesture was marked by ambiguity. 
It was not clear whether it was the torture that was repudiated or, rather, as many have 
commented, that Aussaresses was dishonoured for having broken the silence on torture. 
For journalist Alain Genestar the attitude of the French government seemed to suggest 
that the reason why Aussaresses had provoked a stir of indignation was because he 
publicly announced what French society had taken so long to hear. Lacking a clear 
condemnation, the Aussaresses affair provoked the question whether it was not revulsion 
at the torture that triggered the government’s indignation, but rather its revelation.522  
Following the book’s publication, a grouping of human rights organizations, the 
Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP), pressed for 
charges against Aussaresses for crimes against humanity. The Association des Chrétiens 
pour l’Abolition de la Torture (ACAT) and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) 
launched constitutional law proceedings as civil petitioners (partie civile) seeking to 
require the prosecutor to indict Aussaresses for crimes against humanity. In a parallel 
action the public prosecutor filed charges against Aussaresses and his publishers for 
condoning war crimes (apologie de crimes de guerre), in which LDH joined as partie 
civile.  
After two years of court proceedings, in 2003 the Cour de Cassation upheld the decision 
of the lower courts to dismiss the demand for prosecution of crimes against humanity.523 
However, in the other case (aplogie de crime), the judges of the Cour de Cassation 
upheld the sentencing of Paul Aussaresses to a fine 7,500 euros for justifying the use of 
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torture as legitimate.524 His publishers, Olivier Orban and Xavier Bartillat, directors of 
Éditions Perrin and its parent company Éditions Plon, were fined 15,000 euros each.525 
On appeal to the Cour de Cassation, this was confirmed. 
The offence of apologie de crimes de guerre (condoning of war crimes) is attached to 
French anti-hate speech law.526 The indictment relied on Article 24 of 1881 Law of the 
Press;527 apologie de crime also has a possible criminal law element528 and is broadly 
seen as associated with incitement to: 
racial discrimination, hatred, or violence on the basis of one’s origin or 
membership (or non-membership) in an ethnic, national, racial, or religious 
group. A criminal code provision likewise makes it an offence to engage in 
similar conduct via private communication.529 
Earlier, in a high court (Tribunale de grande instance) judgment, the offence of apologie 
des crimes guerre was defined as ‘discourse which justifies war crimes in a way that 
incites the reader to consider such crime as justified and erases the moral reprobation 
attached to this crime under the law’.530  
The condoning of war crimes constitutes an offence because it indirectly incites others 
to perpetrate similar crimes. As the Cour de Cassation affirmed: 
[F]reedom of speech must be exercised within limits established by 
law, in particular, the rules that prohibit the condoning of war crimes, 
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discours qui présente un crime de guerre de telle sorte que le lecteur est incité à porter sur ce crime un 
jugement de valeur favorable effaçant la réprobation morale qui, de par la loi s’attache à ce crime. Elle est 
incriminée en ce qu'elle constitue une provocation indirecte à commettre de semblables crimes.’ Available 
at:  
legipresse.com/011-41424-Constitution-du-delit-d-apologie-de-crimes-de-guerre-par-le-recit-et-la-
justification-de-tortures-pendant-la-guerre-d-Algerie.html. 
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and, beyond its testimonial value, this book, as was rightly ruled by 
the tribunal includes a condoning of war crimes.531 
In his defence, Aussaresses had sought to explain that the position taken in the book was 
that torture was justified in combatting the terrorism of the Algerian independence 
fighters, at all costs and by all means.532 During the proceedings Maître Leclerc probed 
his stance about torture: ‘Do you confirm that your only regret is to not have been able 
to make this man talk?’ ‘Yes’, responded Aussaresses. To which Maître Leclerc 
pursued: ‘I would have appreciated it if you would have given me a different answer.’ 
The court noted that ‘while the [Aussaresses] had claimed to be aware that this had been 
a “difficult task”, he had nonetheless not repudiated his past’.533 On the contrary, he 
explained that he had “acted out of his duty as a paratrooper and that, while he had had 
no choice in the matter, he expressed the hope that young army officers would never 
have to do what he had been obliged to do for his country in Algeria”. 534   Hence 
Aussaresses was condemned because he provided a justification for his actions and 
showed no remorse or regret.  
However, the Aussaresses affair holds deeper implications. Indeed, his defence of the 
use of torture borrows the same arguments used to rationalize the granting of “special 
powers” to the French military in Algeria in March 1956 in the first place. As the above 
exchange shows, Aussaresses maintained that he was ‘acting in accordance with the 
mission he was assigned’. 535  Aussaresses made it clear that he did not seek to distance 
himself from the acts he had committed. 
The publishers, in their turn, were held liable for the dissemination of words deemed to 
be inciting hatred.536 The reasoning of the judges in the high court highlighted a short 
avertissement (warning) that the directors did not take any distance vis-à-vis the text. ‘It 
presents Aussaresses as a “living legend”; the directors glorify the general and describe 
                                                 
531 Cass. crim. (Aussaresses) (n 14): ‘[…] la liberté d’expression doit s’exercer dans le cadre des limites 
fixées par la loi, notamment dans le respect des dispositions qui interdisent l’apologie de crimes de guerre; 
qu’au-delà du témoignage, le livre comporte, comme l’a jugé à juste titre le tribunal, une apologie de 
crimes de guerre’ [author’s translation]. 
532 Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux (n 476) 15.  
533 ECtHR Orban and Others v France, 15 January 2009, Appl no. 20985/05 
534 ECtHR Orban and Others v France, 15 January 2009, Appl no. 20985/05 
535 ECtHR Orban and Others v France, 15 January 2009, Appl no. 20985/05 
536 ‘Aussaresses’ [2002] Diplomatie Juridique, 25 January 2002. Available at: 
diplomatiejudiciaire.com/France/Aussaresses. 
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his experience as “the most painful mission”,537announcing the book as a unique direct 
testimony which contributes to explaining the ‘deep complexity of an era which still 
inhabits our present’.538  
In 2007, Aussaresses’s publishers, Olivier Orban and Xavier de Bartillat, raised the issue 
of the memoirs as a matter of freedom of speech in front of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR found that France had violated Article 10 
(Freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.539 It found that 
the action of sanctioning the publishers for having participated in the dissemination of 
the testimony of a third person concerning events belonging to the past of a particular 
nation had significantly hindered the public discussion of a matter of public interest. 
(See Chapter 6 for further analysis.)  
The Aussaresses trial resuscitated a public debate on torture and the role of the French 
state in rendering it permissible. The question arises as to why Aussaresses’ testimony 
took on such a prominent place in the public debate? It was not the first time that a 
veteran had described the brutality of the conflict and the centrality of torture in the 
French operations. However, unlike past testimony, Aussaresses’s book was published 
in a political time more favourable to discussion and debate on such practices. The 
official recognition of the war in 1999 and the greater access to archives left no more 
doubt about the brutality, extent and systematic use of torture in Algeria.540 
 
II.  Influence of the Amnesty on the Interpretation of the French 
Provisions on Crimes Against Humanity  
This section examines the reasoning of the decision of 17 June 2003 to reject the 
demand to prosecute the acts perpetrated by Aussaresses. 541  It shows how the 
application of the French amnesty provisions on crimes against humanity cannot be 
applied to colonial wars in general and the Algerian war in particular. It analyses the 
                                                 
537 Quoted in TGI (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et autres c/ Aussaresses et Orban) (n 485): ‘la mission la 
plus douloureuse’ [ author’s translation].  
538 Quoted in TGI Ligue des Droits de l’Homme et autres c/ Aussaresses et Orban) (n 485) : ‘contribue à 
faire comprendre la terrible complexité d’une époque qui continue d’habiter notre present’[author’s 
translation].  
539 ECtHR Orban and Others v France, 15 January 2009, Appl no. 20985/05.  
540 See notably Raphaëlle Branche, La Torture et l’Armée Pendant la Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-1962 (Paris: 
Gallimard 2001). 
541 Cass. crim. (Aussaresses) (n 476). 
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trajectory of French provisions on crimes against humanity as they were variously 
interpreted in French jurisprudence to exclude acts perpetrated during the colonial war. 
This case is particularly useful to examine as it demonstrates the rationale of the 
applicability of the amnesty after the recognition of the war, which occurred in 1999. 
A. Non Prosecution on the Basis of French Provision on Crimes 
Against Humanity 
In the Aussaresses case of 17 June 2003, the civil petitioners sought to rely on two 
international law sources prohibiting crimes against humanity: Article 6 (c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter and international customary law. With respect to the first, the judges 
of the Cour de Cassation first found that the 1964 French law, which prescribes that 
crimes against humanity are not subject to any statute of limitations, could not be 
applied to crimes committed outside the context of the World War II. Secondly, it found 
that international customary law could not be used to make up for the absence of 
domestic law prohibiting acts of torture perpetrated by the French army during the 
Algerian war. The court refused to extend the application of these provisions. Instead, 
the judges restated the ‘minimal reading’ of the definition of crimes against humanity as 
it was found in its previous French jurisprudence.  
A first prong of the argumentation of the judges relied on the restrictive interpretation of 
French provisions on crimes against humanity. The judges considered that these only 
covered crimes perpetrated on behalf of the Axis powers during the Second World War. 
French provisions on crimes against humanity refer to the list of crimes identified as 
crimes against humanity in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Article 6 
of the Nuremberg Charter constitutes the cornerstone of French provisions on the 
definition of crimes against humanity. It provides that: 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 
hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish 
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, 
whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any 
of the following crimes […] ; (a) crimes against peace: [...]; (b) war 
crimes: [...] ; (c) crimes against humanity: namely, murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
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committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or 
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
The French legal definition of crimes against humanity mirrors the definition in IMT 
Article 6 (c), adopting many of its terms: 
Deportation, enslavement, or massive and systematic summary 
executions, kidnapping of persons followed by their disappearance, 
torture or inhuman acts, inspired by political, philosophical, racial or 
religious reasons, and organized according to a concerted plan against 
a group within the civilian population.542 
Then, on 26 December 1964, the French Parliament enacted a law providing that crimes 
against humanity were not subject to any statute of limitation. As such, it introduced the 
concept of imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity into French law.543  However, 
this was itself narrowly defined in respect to international law. As the Dalloz 
commentary on the French Criminal Code notes: 
                                                 
542  Code Pénal Article 212-1: ‘La déportation, la réduction en esclavage ou la pratique massive et 
systématique d'exécutions sommaires, d'enlèvements de personnes suivis de leur disparition, de la torture 
ou d’actes inhumains, inspirées par des motifs politiques, philosophiques, raciaux ou religieux et 
organisées en exécution d'un plan concerté à l'encontre d'un groupe de population civile […]’. Available 
at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=ADEB1A74FC474237CCE70D26FDAC5907.tpdila10
v_1?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006417534&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&categorieLien=id&date
Texte=20040806 
543 Loi N°64-1326 Du 26 Décembre 1964 les crimes contre l'humanite, tels qu'ils sont definis par la 
resolution des nations unies du 13 février 1946, prenant acte de la definition des crimes contre l'humanite, 
telle qu’elle figure dans la charte du tribunal international du 8 août 1945, sont imprescriptibles par leur 
nature.  JORF 29 décembre 1964 11788. Available at:  
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000684761&categorieLien=id 
[last visited June 2013] 
Article 1 (article unique): Les crimes contre l'humanité, tels qu'ils sont définis par la résolution des 
Nations Unies du 13 février 1946, prenant acte de la définition des crimes contre l'humanité, telle qu'elle 
figure dans la charte du tribunal international du 8 août 1945, sont imprescriptibles par leur nature. Loi no 
64-1326 du 26 décembre 1964 tendant à constater l’imprescriptibilité des crimes contre l’humanité, JORF 
du 29décembre 1964 11788 (‘Crimes against humanity, asdefined by the resolution of the United Nations 
of 13 February 1946, taking legalcognizance of the definition of crimes against humanity, as it figures in 
the Charter ofthe International Tribunal of 8 August 1945, are imprescriptible by their nature’). It consists 
of simply one article, Article 1: ‘Les crimes contre l'humanité, tels qu'ils sont définis par la résolution des 
Nations Unies du 13 février 1946, prenant acte de la définition des crimes contre l'humanité, telle qu'elle 
figure dans la charte du tribunal international du 8 août 1945, sont imprescriptibles par leur nature.’ 
Available at:  
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Crimes against humanity […] are, ‘by nature’, not subject to a statute 
of limitations. [… T]heir imprescriptibility is inferred as much from 
general principles of law recognized by the assembly of nations as 
from the statute of the International Military Tribunal appended to the 
London Charter of 8 August 1945; the [French national] law of 
December 26, 1964, limited itself to confirming that this 
imprescriptibility already was acquired, in internal law, by the effect 
of the international texts to which France had adhered.
544
 
An earlier decision (1 April 1993) the Court de Cassation stated that: 
No constitutional principle, nor any principle of international law, 
allows an affirmation according to which a category of offences would 
be, by nature, removed from the power of amnesty of the national 
legislator. The legislator may modulate the range and modalities of 
each law of amnesty. He can choose to erase not only venial offences 
[...] but also the gravest offences, such as crimes, and even crimes 
against humanity [...]. The principle of imprescriptibility of these 
crimes constituting an exceptional derogation to the rules of ordinary 
procedures must be interpreted restrictively.545 
A closer analysis of French provisions on crimes against humanity permits two 
observations. The first one is that its scope of application is limited to individuals who 
have acted on behalf of the Axis. Secondly, it is not clear whether the ‘jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal’ refers to territorial jurisdiction (crimes committed in the Axis countries) or 
personal jurisdiction (individual acting on the behalf of Axis countries). 546  In her 
commentary on the Aussaresses decision, Lelieur-Fischer asks, further, whether the term 
‘jurisdiction’ ‘should be taken in a material sense and, by requiring that the crime 
against humanity be committed “in execution of or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, did the drafters of the Charter have in mind crimes 
against peace as defined in paragraph (a) and war crimes as defined in paragraph (b)?  
                                                 
544 As cited and discussed in Vivian G. Curran, ‘Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity: The French 
Example’ [2003] 78 Notre Dame Law Review 686-7. 
545As quoted in Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Crimes and Torture: French Justice and International 
Criminal Tribunals and Commissions (1940-2005) (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 10. 
546 Juliette Lelieur-Fischer, ‘Prosecuting the Crimes against Humanity Committed During the Algerian 
War: An Impossible Endeavour?: The 2003 Decision of the French Court of Cassation in Aussaresses’ 
[2004] 2(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 239. 
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Elements of answers to these questions may be found in the jurisprudential application 
of the French provisions on crimes against humanity. In the Barbie judgement, the Cour 
de Cassation defined the contours of application of IMT Article 6 (c) in terms of the 
existence of a ‘hegemonic political ideology’:  
[I]nhumane acts and persecutions committed in a systematic manner, 
in the name of a state practising a hegemonic political ideology […] 
committed in a systematic fashion not only on the basis of 
membership in a particular racial or religious group, but also against 
those who oppose this policy, regardless of the nature of their 
opposition.547 
However, in the 1990s this definition underwent a substantive change with the Touvier 
decision. Shortly after the Barbie decision, the French court was confronted with the 
limitation of its own reasoning with the prosecution of Paul Touvier, a Frenchman who 
had collaborated with the Nazi Regime and worked for the Milice548 during the Vichy 
period. The lower court initially dismissed the charges against Touvier on a variety of 
grounds, notably that the acts in question did not meet the judicial requirement of the 
definition of crimes against humanity, in particular (following Barbie), the requirement 
of that they be carried out in the name of a state practising a ‘hegemonic political 
ideology’.549 
Reviewed by the Cour de Cassation, the judges ruled that the authors or accomplices of 
crimes against humanity are punishable only if they acted on behalf of an Axis 
country.550 It was on the basis of this interpretation that, in a later case concerning acts 
perpetrated in Indochina, the Boudarel case, the judges dismissed the demand of 
application for crimes perpetrated outside the context of World War II. 551 They 
                                                 
547  Cass. Crim. 20 decembre 1985 Bull. Crim. 1985 n°407 (Barbie): ‘Les actes inhumains et les 
persécutions qui, on au nom d’un état pratiquant une politique d’hégémonie ideologique ont été commis 
d’une façon systématique non seulement contre les personnes en raison de leur appartenance à une 
collectivité raciale ou religieuse, mais aussi contre les adversaires de cette politique, quelle que soit la 
forme de leur opposition’ (at 1053) [author’s translation]. 
548 The Milice was a Gestapo-like paramilitary organization created by the Vichy regime. 
549 Leila Sadat Wexler, ‘The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: 
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again’ [1994] 32(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 350. 
550 Cass. Crim. 27 novembre 1992, Bull. crim. n° 394: ‘[…] les auteurs ou complices de crimes contre 
l’humanité ne sont punis que s’ils ont agi pour le compte d’un pays européen de l’Axe’ [author’s 
translation].  
551 Cass. Crim. 1 avril 1993, n° 92-82.273, Bull. crim., n°143 (Boudarel). Available at:  
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007065738&dateTexte [last visited March 
2014] 
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considered that the provisions of the Law of 26 December 1964 and the Nuremberg 
Charter were only applicable for crimes perpetrated on behalf of Axis countries.552 It 
ruled that:  
[T]he provisions of the 1964 law and of the Charter of the 
International Military tribunal at Nuremberg [...] only cover acts 
committed on behalf of European Axis countries; [...] and therefore, 
the acts denounced by the civil petitioners, committed after the Second 
World War, cannot be characterized as crimes against humanity within 
the meaning of these provisions.553  
As such, the judges of the supreme court in the Boudarel case narrowed the 
interpretation even further, in abandoning the element of ‘hegemonic political ideology’ 
while retaining that the crimes must have been perpetrated on the behalf of Axis 
countries. 
The retroactive recognition of crimes against humanity by the judges in the Barbie trial 
should have had the effect of integrating the crimes perpetrated during the Algerian war 
into the scope of prosecution of crimes against humanity. However, the restrictive 
interpretation of the definition of crimes against humanity in Touvier undid this 
potential. It has been explained as the outcome of a stratégie politique juridique 
(political-legal strategy) to avoid dealing with the political question of the legacy of the 
Vichy regime.554 By this move, the judges pre-empted having to answer the factual 
question whether the Vichy regime practised a hegemonic political ideology. As was 
commented in the press: ‘dans la chaine des responsabilités, le maillon de la France de 
Vichy a-t-il sauté, l’argumentation juridique se focalisant plus commodément sur la 
seule Allemagne nazie’.555 The Touvier decision created a legal fiction whereby crimes 
perpetrated by French people on behalf of France cannot be prosecuted under the 
                                                 
552 Cass. crim. 1 avril 1993 (Boudarel) (n 38): ‘[L]es dispositions de la loi du 26 décembre 1964, et du 
statut du Tribunal international de Nuremberg […] ne concernent que les faits commis pour le compte des 
pays européens de l’Axe […] qu'ainsi, les faits dénoncés par les parties civiles, postérieurs à la seconde 
guerre mondiale, n'étaient pas susceptibles de recevoir la qualification de crimes contre l'humanité au sens 
des textes précités’ [author’s translation]. 
553 Cass. Crim. 1 avril 1993 (Boudarel) (n 38): ‘[L]es dispositions de la loi du 26 décembre 1964, et du 
statut du Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg […]ne concernent que les faits commis pour le 
compte des pays européens de l'Axe […] qu'ainsi, les faits dénoncés par les parties civiles, postérieurs à la 
seconde guerre mondiale, n'étaient pas susceptibles de recevoir la qualification de crimes contre 
l'humanité au sens des textes précités.’ 
554 See in particular Olivier Cayla, ‘La Qualification. Ouverture: la Qualification ou la Vérité du Droit’, 
[1993] 18 Droits, revue française de théorie juridique, 9-10. 
555  Roger Koering-Joulin and Pierre Wachsmann, ‘Hégémonie Idéologique’, Le Monde (Paris, 19 
December 1992) 2. 
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provisions of crimes against humanity. Vichy was not France; therefore Vichy was not a 
state practising a hegemonic political ideology.  
In 1994 the Criminal Code was revised, making crimes against humanity part of French 
national law. Specifically, Article 213-4 states:  
The perpetrator or the accomplice to a felony under the present title 
[crimes against humanity] is not exonerated from his responsibility on 
the sole basis that he performed an act prescribed or authorized by 
statutory or regulatory provisions, or an act ordered by legitimate 
authority.556  
However, this provision is applicable only to crimes perpetrated after 1 November 1994 
and as a result could not be applied in the Aussaresses case. Taken together with 
Touvier, this juridical configuration led to the question of the impunity of authors of 
crimes perpetrated outside the context of World War II and before 1 November 1994. 
Based on this interpretation, subsequent attempts to investigate and prosecute acts 
perpetrated during the Algerian War were dismissed.557 
The second prong of the reasoning of the judges of the Cour de Cassation in the 
Aussaresses case held that international customary law could not make up for the 
absence of domestic prohibition. 
[C]’est tout aussi vainement que la partie civile invoque une ‘coutume 
internationale’ qui ne peut pas pallier l’absence de convention pour 
créer ab initio une incrimination pénale, sachant qu’au demeurant, si 
tel était le cas, cette coutume, à supposer reconnue de manière 
universelle, ne pourrait avoir pour effet que d’imposer des obligations 
aux  États qui se sentent liés par elle, sans pour autant avoir d’autre 
effet contraignant, dans un corpus de droit interne; qu’il importe donc 
de rechercher si les faits poursuivis sont et étaient susceptibles 
d’incrimination et de sanction en droit pénal français.558 
                                                 
556 Code Pénal Article 213-4: ‘L’auteur ou le complice d’un crime visé par le present titre ne peut être 
exonéré de sa responsabilité du seul fait qu’il a accompli un acte prescrit ou autoris par des dispositions 
legislatives ou reglementaires ou un acte commandé par l’autorité legitime.’ 
557 See, for example, Cass. crim. 30 mai 2000, Bull. Crim. 2000 no99-84024 (Papon). 
558 Cass. crim. (Aussaresses) (n 14). 
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The judges’ interpretation made it a matter of French law independent of international 
law.559 The international law prohibition on amnesty covering crimes against humanity 
finds a timid echo in the French jurisprudence. While Article 212-1 of the new code 
removed the requirement of a nexus between the perpetrator and a European Axis 
powers, however, these provisions cannot be applied to crimes perpetrated before 
1994.560  Strictly applied in Aussaresses, many commentators were surprised by this 
interpretation. In other circumstances, the court had upheld the prosecution of 
individuals despite the absence of domestic prohibition and on the basis of the existence 
of an international customary law. 
B. Application of the Amnesty Laws  
The contemporary application of the amnesty comes as a result of the reasoning 
explored above. Despite the fact that the Geneva Conventions bound France since 1951, 
the acts of torture perpetrated in Algeria were not considered as crimes against humanity 
under French law and as a result, the French judge can apply the amnesty to the acts 
described in the book by Paul Aussaresses.  
In 1968, an action was lodged in the supreme administrative court, the Conseil d’ État, 
against the second amnesty decree implementing the Evian Accords, on the ground of 
‘excess of powers’. The action was brought in relation to the disappearance of Maurice 
Audin, young French communist. 561  Maurice Audin was a student of mathematics 
arrested on 11 June 1957 by the French paratroopers. He was questioned about his 
relationship with two members of the Algerian Communist Party whom the Army 
suspected of terrorist activity. When, after several days he failed to return home, family 
and friends made inquiries about him. On 21 June 1957, the military authorities reported 
that he had escaped their custody and made his way to Tunisia. Mme Audin lodged a 
complaint of homicide by an unknown person with an examining magistrate on 4 July. 
The Court of Cassation made une ordonnance de non-lieu and dismissed the case for 
insufficient charges.562 
                                                 
559 Jean-Francois Roulot, ‘Note: un état peut-il amnistier des actes constitutifs de crimes internationaux’ [4 
July 2001] 27 La Semaine Juridique 1329. 
560 Yann Jurovics, ‘Crimes de guerre, crimes contre l’humanité’, [sept 2003] 410 Juris-Classeurs P, Droit 
International, Fascicule. 
561 Pierre Vidal Naquet, L’affaire Audin, 1957-1978 (Paris: Minuit 1989) 169. 
562 Cass. Crim. 22 Décembre 1966, no 66-93052. Available at:  
 148 
Barbie’s defence lawyer Jacques Vergès, developing his strategie de rupture (defence of 
diversion), called to the bar one witness, a 50-year-old man named Eddine Lakdar-
Toumi. Vergès goal was to prove that France had been inconsistent in applying the laws 
regarding crimes against humanity. Lakdar-Toumi's father was killed after being 
arrested by French Army officers during the Algerian war. Yet charges of crimes against 
humanity for his father's death were dismissed, on the grounds that amnesty had been 
granted in 1962 for Algerian war crimes. As such Vergès’ argument was that, if charges 
of crimes against humanity committed in Algeria can be dismissed, so should similar 
charges against Barbie. This argument was countered by a lawyer for civil plaintiffs in 
the case who said Lakdar-Toumi’s suit had been dismissed not because of the amnesty 
but because it was unclear whether his father had been killed by French forces or by 
rebel groups who suspected him of having betrayed secrets. Furthermore, the court 
rejected this argument and considered that the Algerian war jurisprudence could not 
apply to crimes perpetrated during World War II: 
[T]he provisions of these documents [the two statutory orders of 22 March 1962 
and the statute of 31 July 1968] are general and absolute; they make clear that 
the amnesty which they promulgate applies to all transgressions without reserve 
or distinction as to their nature, their legal quality, or their degree of seriousness, 
so long as their authors shall have acted within the particular circumstances 
defined by the law; that the documents referred to above apply in particular to 
those transgressions which have been called crimes against humanity which are 
common law crimes, committed under particular circumstances and for reasons 
which are specified in the texts which define them. 
In 1993, in the case of Boudarel, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the 
principle of imprescriptibility or temporal limitation of acts perpetrated in relation to the 
Vietnamese ‘insurrection’.563 Therefore it ruled that the amnesty could be applied:  
[…] the appealed decision is not to be overruled insofar as the Court of Cassation 
can ascertain that the acts allegedly committed by Georges Boudarel, irrespective 
of the ordinary prohibitions they may fall under, would necessarily be included 
in the scope of application of Article 30 of the law granting amnesty for any 
                                                                                                                                                
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007059594 
563 Article 30, amnesty law no 66-396, 17 June 1966.  
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crimes committed in relation to events pursuant to the Vietnamese 
insurrection.564 
In 2003 in Aussaresses, the judges were much more explicit in their reasoning. They 
upheld the application of the amnesty Law of 31 July 1968 on the basis that the acts 
allegedly perpetrated could not be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. A contrario 
reading of this decision shows that if the acts had been recognized as crimes against 
humanity, the amnesty would not be applicable. The international law obligation to 
prosecute crimes against humanity is explicitly referred in the 1994 French penal code 
provisions on crimes against humanity. However, the court rejected this possibility and 
relied on the fact that the acts referred to in Aussaresses’ book were committed before 
the entry into force of the 1994 new penal code. While they could potentially be 
prosecuted under other criminal law, by the same token they were covered by the 
amnesty. 
In a decision of 23 December 2002, the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Montpellier 
rendered a judgment that went towards the opposite direction when it ruled that:  
Whatever the legitimacy of such an amnesty [the Mauritanian amnesty 
of 14 June 1993] in the context of local attempts to foster 
reconciliation, such a law can only have application upon the territory 
of the State in question, and cannot be held to stand in the way of the 
application of international law in third-party states. The law has, as a 
result, no bearing on the public authority for the application of the law 
in France.565 
That decision, which passed with relatively little comment, is important even though it 
relates primarily to the (non) effect of amnesty on third-party states and does not bear 
directly upon on restricting the effects of amnesty within the specific territory itself.566  
Had the crimes revealed by General Aussaresses not been perpetrated during the war of 
decolonization, it would have been possible to prosecute him in two ways: first by using 
the provisions of the new penal code, thus considering the crimes as crimes against 
humanity or, second, by referring to an international basis for prosecution. 
                                                 
564 Cass. crim. 1 avril 1993 (Boudarel) (n 38).  
565 Case of Ely Ould Dah, Montpellier Assize Court (Court of Appeal) (France) Indictment and Partial 
Dismissal no99-14445 (2001). 
566 Code Pénal, Articles 133-9 to 11.  
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The twist and turns of French jurisprudence on the definition of crimes against humanity 
provides a vivid illustration of the challenges of investigating and prosecuting offences 
related to past crimes. In the Aussaresses case, the Court of Cassation developed a 
discursive approach whereby it avoided addressing the issue of amnesties and instead 
focused on the nature of the violations. In respect to the subsequent case, on other 
charges, Damocles Network issued a statement remarking that the decision to uphold the 
conviction of Paul Aussaresses and his publishers on the ground of the Law of the Press 
was, to say the least, at odds with France’s commitment to the international duty to 
prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecutions undertaken in 
France against remaining Nazi criminals were an important jurisprudential contribution 
to contouring the provisions on crimes against humanity. The trials of Klaus Barbie and 
Paul Touvier, and Maurice Papon (see Chapter 7), potentially made it possible to resolve 
crucial issues in relation to the incorporation of crimes against humanity in French 
criminal law. The revolution of the IMT, in addition to establishing the shape of the 
definition of crimes against humanity, also allowed the recognition that particularly 
grave crimes are not committed by abstract entities but by men.567 Through trials that 
relive a piece of a bigger ‘trauma’, other pieces of the war were revived, as Kaplan 
explains, and such ‘abreaction’ produces a catharsis and can provide a cure.568 However, 
between the origin of the crimes and the Barbie trial, France lived many other traumas. 
The Aussaresses case highlights the challenges to investigating and prosecuting past 
crimes. Up to this day, it is not possible to prosecute acts of torture perpetrated by the 
French army during the Algerian war under the French legal provisions on crimes 
against humanity. These cases raise the question of the potential of courts to deal with 
demands of prosecution of past offences. 
The 17 June 2003 decision on Aussaresses also shows that the amnesty laws not only 
give immunity against prosecution, and hence attribution of individual responsibility, 
but also removes acts from being classified as criminal. The amnesty’s principal effect is 
to extinguish the legal punishment of crimes or offences perpetrated in connection with 
the Algerian war before 1962.  
                                                 
567 Eduardo Greppi, ‘The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under international law’ [1999] 
835 International Review of the Red Cross. Available at:  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq2x.htm [last visited November 2011]. 
568  Alice Y. Kaplan, ‘On Alain Finkielkraut’s “Remembering in Vain”: The Klaus Barbie Trial and 
Crimes against Humanity’ [1992] 19(1) Critical Inquiry 70-86. 
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III.  Contemporary Challenges of Investigating and Prosecuting 
Historical Crimes 
This section argues that the potential for courts to escape the influence of the amnesty in 
order to deal with past crimes is affected by the phenomenon of the ‘politicisation of 
crimes’. The critical challenge for the courts is to find a balance between the formal 
limitations of juridical proceedings and the expectations of a public eager to achieve a 
form of truth about the past.  
A. Attempt to Prosecute Acts of Torture after 1994 
One of the principal challenges for the judges investigating crimes covered by the 
amnesty is to manage the public expectation of recognition of collective responsibility. 
Liberal legalism privileges individual autonomy and individual responsibility. As the 
famous Nuremberg maxim posits, crimes are committed by individuals and not by 
abstract entities. The issue of individual criminal responsibility for crimes amounting to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity nonetheless raises the question of the role of the 
state apparatus.  
The fieldwork conducted for this research sought to interview some of the individuals 
who have attempted to prosecute past perpetrators. While none of these attempts 
succeeded in the conviction of French soldiers, they did nonetheless manage to influence 
the collective discourse on the recognition that torture was indeed perpetrated and the 
responsibility of the French army. The case of Mohammed Garne provides an example 
of an attempt to have crimes of torture adjudicated after the passing of the 1994 law. He 
challenged the amnesty and sought to confront the judges’ past position on the basis of 
the recognition of the rape of his mother by French soldiers. During the research 
interview, he explained how he gathered evidence proving that his mother was raped by 
French soldiers during her detention and how she had then been repeatedly tortured. 
Investigating his family history, he had discovered that his mother was arrested by the 
French military and held in a camp in Kenchela. It was during her detention at this camp 
that Mohammed Garne was conceived as a result of rape.569  
                                                 
569 See Mohamed Garne’s homepage. Available at:  
garnemohamed.org/lecombatcontinue.html. 
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The testimony of Mohammed Garne highlights the difficulty for victims of torture in 
pressing charges for acts of torture perpetrated during the Algerian war. He reports how 
difficult it was for him to find out exactly what has happened to his mother. His story 
took him to Algeria where his mother had been tortured. It was a complex task of 
finding information and access documents, which would enable him to know where his 
mother was. When he was researching about his mother in Algeria, people would not 
speak freely about her ordeal. As he explains, the war and torture was still a vivid wound 
in Algeria and people would not easily talk about it. Moreover, where rape is still seen 
as a taboo, it was difficult to bring people to talk about what had happened to his 
mother. Seeking to know the truth about his mother took Garne on a long investigative 
journey between France and Algeria which lasted more than 20 years. For years, he 
attempted to gain access to these archives and find which detention centres his mother 
had been held in, the name of the guards who were detaining her and the doctor who 
examined her. He wrote to different ministers asking for exceptional authorisation to 
bypass the statute of limitation preventing access to the archives. All these attempts were 
in vain. Equally, as he explains, he received little support from local associations: when 
he tried to contact a veteran and victims’ association, they were unresponsive to his 
requests. Garne’s efforts to gather evidence reflect the lack of a structured system that 
could respond to the demands of victims to make a claim of justice. As Mohammed 
Garne stresses, their interest did not lie in condemning an individual but condemning a 
whole system of injustice occurring during the colonial period.570 
In another research interview, Josette Audin explained that her attempt to prosecute 
those who had killed her husband was meet with hostility from some veterans. At the 
time her case was gaining media exposure, she was receiving letters threatening her if 
she went further.571 
As such, victims can be rapidly discouraged from engaging in a long and exhausting 
legal process for which the outcome is by no means guaranteed. While, for Josette 
Audin and Lakdar-Toumi, the court dismissed their demands, Garne succeeded in 
having his case heard. The long judicial battle of the Garne affair started in Algeria in 
the 1980s and ended before a minor court, the Cour Regionale des Pensions Militaires 
(Regional Court of Military Pensions). The verdict of the court recognized the links 
between the severe conditions of her detention and her pregnancy. It also recognized the 
                                                 
570 Research interview, Mohammed Garne (Paris, March 2013). 
571 Research interview, Josette Audin (Paris, January 2013). 
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causal link between her treatment by the soldiers and Mohammed Garne’s disability.572 
The court awarded him a three-year partial invalidity pension for his ‘suffering as a 
foetus’, connected to acts of torture committed by French soldiers involving his 
mother.573 As a result of the proceedings, he was also awarded compensation amounting 
to a pension of 400 euros per month for three years and a free travel card.  
Unlike the other cases, Garne’s lawyer did not seek to bring criminal charges (based on 
prosecuting unknown offenders). Instead, the focus of his case was the recognition of 
Garne’s disability. The fact that the disability was due to the act of torture perpetrated on 
his mother when she was pregnant was incidental to the case. Furthermore, requesting 
reparation in before the Cour Regional des Pensions Militaire raised less of a political 
stake. As Garne’s lawyer explained, his strategy was to find some way to reach the 
French judge.574 However, this strategy also had a number of limitations. First, it did not 
provide a forum to raise the issue of the validity of the amnesty. Second, as in previous 
instances, the judges did not discuss all the facts but focused on Garne’s disability. No 
witness was called testify about torture nor were those who could have been responsible 
for Garne’s suffering be contacted. Third, it is debatable as to whether this strategy can 
satisfy the victims. The time and means engaged in the long judicial proceedings 
trivialized the suffering of his mother.575 Mohammed Garne explains that ultimately his 
goal was to confront the French state with the crimes specifically perpetrated against 
women during the war. He expressed his disappointment with the judgement of the Cour 
des pensions, explaining that ultimately justice for him would mean that France 
officially recognizes its responsibility for the suffering endured by his mother and its 
responsibility for the ‘painful silence’ imposed by the amnesty law. 576  In 2006, he 
attempted to appeal his case before the Conseil d’État, the supreme administrative court, 
to challenge the amnesty Law of July 1968. However, his demand was rejected.577 The 
Conseil d’ État commented that it was ‘conscious of the fact that no material form of 
compensation could repair the odious colonial crimes’.578 The Garne decision remains a 
unique case up to this day. It is the only instance of reparation to a victim of the war. It 
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574 Research interview with Garne’s lawyer Serge Halimi (Paris, October 2012) 
575 Research interview, Mohammed Garne (Paris, March 2013) 
576 Research interview, Mohammed Garne (Paris, March 2013) 
577 Decision of 28 of June 2006, Conseil d’État.  
578 Decision of 28 of June 2006, Conseil d’État.  
 154 
has not enabled others to break through France’s non-recognition of crimes against 
humanity perpetrated during the war. At the same time, the condemnation of 
Aussaresses and his publishers on the ground of Article 24 of the Law of the Press did 
enable some sort of conviction despite the bar imposed by the criminal amnesty. It also 
constituted a form of recognition of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the 
French army.579 
The attempt to expose the responsibility of the French army was also very much present 
in the Aussaresses proceedings. By pressing charges against Aussaresses and his 
publishers for crimes against humanity the Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour 
l’Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP), the Association des Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la 
Torture (ACAT) and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) also sought to also 
engage a debate on the responsibility of the French state in accepting and covering acts 
of torture. The crimes of Paul Aussaresses are part of a wider system of oppression. 
Indeed, international crimes such as crimes against humanity, including genocide, and 
other violations of humanitarian law hold the presumption that individuals were able to 
commit these crimes through the support of state apparatus.580 
So-called administrative crimes involve several layers of agents in the planning and 
execution of the crime. In de-personified administrations several people in various levels 
make decisions. Aussaresses makes it quite clear that he was acting under the direct 
orders of his immediate superior (General Massu), who, in turn, was acting under the 
direct orders of the French Government, which included Francois Mitterand (Interior 
Minister). ‘No French army officer would have engaged in torture or any other kind of 
violence against the enemy had it not been approved and even encouraged by higher up, 
meaning superior officers and cabinet ministers’.581 He notably writes that ‘draconian 
measures were authorized for wiping out the rebellion’.582 ‘Ordinary police and judicial 
measures were ineffective against urban terrorism, so it was demanded of the 
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parachutists to substitute such measures as they judged needed.’583 He confirmed the 
participation of state institutions in the war effort and that the army was given free hand 
to carry out their operations. During the war, the dilution of the rule of law in the state of 
war resulted in a situation whereby civil justice contributed to the actions of the military 
justice: the primary mission of the justice system during the Algerian war was to 
facilitate the actions of the military. Indeed, the non-recognition of the belligerency 
status of the conflict allowed Algerian nationalists to be considered outlaws, i.e. 
criminals.  
With the development of individual accountability, the ‘just following orders’ defence 
finds little justification. However, it has been argued that crimes that take place under 
explicit instructions from the authorities should be conceptualized in the context of the 
policy process that gave rise to them. Herbert Kelman explains that for individuals to 
engage in these acts, it requires the existence of an environment in which such acts are 
implicitly sponsored, expected, or at least tolerated by the authorities.584 
As a way to conclude this section, it may be said that recourse to criminal law to 
challenge the amnesty inevitably led to disappointing results Not only is the judicial 
process long and potentially exhausting for the claimants, but the verdicts achieved tend 
to trivialize the suffering of victims. Further, where criminal responsibility and 
punishment focus on the individuals, it displaces public attention from the general to the 
particular, and in the process, the broader political issues surrounding the war have been 
lost sight of. For its part, the French government defended the Aussaresses verdict for of 
war crimes (apologie de crimes de guerre) on the basis that it contributed to the goals of 
justice, peace and the pre-eminence of law, all fundamental values of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
B. The Risk of ‘Politicization’ of the Trial 
Legal proceedings ‘produce’ various symbolic messages. When crimes perpetrated by 
an individual are part of a wider political criminality, there is a risk of turning a trial into 
a ‘show trial’. As Klaus Gunther expresses it, ‘legal attribution focuses on the individual 
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person and abstracts from the circumstances of the situation, especially if these are seen 
as rather remote from the concrete illegal act in question’.585  Criminal proceedings 
concerning crimes committed in the past raise the complex question of the relationship 
between law and history. The rendition of justice is charged with the task of actively re-
imposing norms into spaces in which rule-based legality has been either radically 
evacuated or perverted.586 Trials on crimes against humanity open a forum to investigate 
and verify narratives located at the margins or even outside collective memory. 
Unlike the Vichy prosecutions, the adjudication of crimes perpetrated during the 
Algerian conflict did not allow historians to play a role in the recognition of the past. 
Osiel stressed “ the interpretation of history before domestic tribunals has proved to be a 
politically delicate matter”.587 The use of trials to fix the attribution of guilt depends on 
the judges’ interpretation of the law and the juridical ‘qualification’ 588  – legal 
classification589 – of the facts of past events. By establishing facts in an authoritative 
way, the past becomes rationalized. But the production of a historiographical 
interpretation of past events through legal proceedings may lead to oversimplification or 
even in some cases distortion. Henry Rousso explains that the risk to the 
historiographical interpretation of past events is that it is not adapted to the 
contingencies pertaining to rules of juridical proceedings (this is explored further in 
Chapter 6). To him, historical trials ‘should remain open for revision.’590 By its very 
nature, the interpretation of history in courts is contingent to both a restrictive procedure 
and and the ‘ultimate goal’ that of reaching a verdict. 591  He notably provides the 
example of a ‘distortion of truth’ in the trial of Paul Touvier. In this example, judging 
Touvier required adjusting the concept of crimes against humanity. Touvier was 
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declared on the basis of which he acted on behalf of the Nazis in the massacre of seven 
Jewish hostages at Rillieux. Nevertheless, for many historians, Touvier, in fact, acted as 
an official of the Vichy regime. 
During the debates, the definition of the responsibility of the French government of the 
time was of a great concern. In the appeal proceedings, prosecutor Pierre Truche relied 
on the Nuremberg definition and highlighted that a distinction could be made between:  
[…] the Resistance fighter who knew of the consequences of an arrest 
to his physical well being […] and who courageously accepted the 
dangers being incurred […]. On the other hand, there is a two-year old 
Jewish child like the one who was deported August 11 on the last train, 
who does not really know what it means to be Jewish.592  
But for the Cour de Cassation this distinction was irrelevant. The judgments in Barbie, 
followed by Touvier, expanded the definition of victims of crimes against humanity to 
include the ‘adversaries of a politics of ideological hegemony in whose name inhuman 
acts and persecutions were committed’. Besides, attempts to elevate the rendition of 
Justice as a political ‘moment’ are not always successful because of the procedural 
limitation of trials in establishing a historical judgment.593 Demands for revealing the 
practice of torture reflected the expectation that a legal decision would ensue. However, 
it is not only that the French amnesty laws prevent criminal prosecutions but the 
possibility of recognizing the acts themselves as crimes against humanity has also been 
ruled out. Pursuing a different route of recognition, the Garne decision was presented in 
the press as a ‘victory’ and it could have opened up a strong jurisprudence on reparation 
for the crimes imputable to the French army committed in Algeria.  
Trials dealing with particularly serious offences offer a didactic potential. The 
recognition of a right to access information by the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Aussaresses proceedings (see also Chapter 6) relies on the freedom of publishers to 
publish historical accounts. Historical crimes bridge the gap between constructed 
narratives on the past and historical facts. The condemnation of criminals for past acts 
can provide important historical lessons, even despite the ultimate verdicts of the court. 
The publicity around the Vichy trials contradicted the myth of a French nation united 
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behind the French resistance.594 In the press, the Touvier trials were covered as the ‘trial 
of the Vichy government’ and thereby the judgment was seen as a history lesson. It has 
been argued that it permitted the establishment of the Vichy government itself to be seen 
as ‘illegitimate’ and that the Fourth and Fifth Republics considered themselves as not 
responsible for the previous regime’s oppressive policies, refusing to apologise for 
Vichy’s crimes. 595  This claim regarding the historical impact of the Touvier trial 
provides a version of history that contradicts the official claim made by Charles de 
Gaulle: namely that Vichy was a pawn of Germany and was carried out with the 
complicity of a few men.596  Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy openly spoke about the 
pedagogic value of a trial which would ‘enable French justice to do its work, and [...] 
honour the memory of that time of grieving and struggle by which France preserved her 
honour’. 597  In the words of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, the trial of Klaus Barbie 
provided France with ‘‘an enormous national psychodrama; a psychotherapy on a 
nationwide scale’.598 For Henry Rousso, the launch of proceedings on crimes against 
humanity for past conflict reflects a European trend. 
However, such a conclusion cannot always be inferred from the judgment itself. 
Certainly, the lessons of Vichy were to be observed in the debates that accompanied the 
trials, with increasing interest in this period of French history. The ruling skirted around 
the issue of the attribution of crimes to the Vichy government.599 It was, as the public 
prosecutor stated, ‘the trial of a man and not of a regime’. Alice Kaplan commented that 
the Vichy trials were an ‘abreaction’ to the trauma of the Vichy regime. 600  The 
prosecution of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier were possible because of the synergy 
between the activism of the judges and the judicial reforms undertaken by the French 
government.  
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The process of adjudication of crimes illuminates the significance of the state’s response 
to past crimes.601 As Curran explains, French jurist Patrick Maistre du Chambon ‘refers 
to the ‘social appeasement’ involved in statutes of limitation in French law and 
underscores the potential of legal proceedings to affect substantive law.’602 As such, the 
purpose of statutes of limitation is to sanction the ‘prosecutorial inertia’ of courts. 
With regard to the Algerian war, the army’s acts against the Algerian insurrection form 
part of a ‘‘burning national debate that the judges clearly have not wanted to enter’.603 
During the Barbie trial, Barbie’s defence lawyer Jacques Vergès attempted to challenged 
France’s self-image.604 He called an Algerian victim to testify on the perpetration of 
crimes by the French in Algeria and he portrayed the actions of the French government 
as a colonial force comparable to the German regime. He sought to contest the 
indictment of Barbie by confronting the French judges with the amnesty covering the 
crimes that were committed in Algeria. 605  He first challenged the judges on the 
definition of crimes against humanity.606 Then Vergès addressed the question of the 
amnesty in those terms:  
I am not against the amnesty, but I would admit its legitimacy under 
the condition that we renounce a statute of limitations to prosecute 
crimes against humanity. Similarly, if I am for the renunciation of the 
statute of limitation it is on the condition that we renounce the 
amnesty.607 
Vergès considered that his approach was a ‘strike at the heart of France’s polished 
image’.608 He posed the question whether the French colonial project was about wanting 
to bring enlightenment to the world or was it about legitimating power and 
domination?609 His goal was to use public interest in the Barbie trial as a reminder that, 
                                                 
601 Curran, ‘Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity’ (n 31). 
602 Curran, ‘Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity’ (n 31), referring at 704 fn 128 to Patrick Maistre du 
Chambon: ‘L’hostilité de la Cour de Cassation à l’égard de la Prescription de l’Action Publique, [May 22 
2002] J.C.P., II, 10075, at 934 .’ 
603 Roulot, ‘Note: un etat peut-il amnistier?’ (n 46) 1330: ‘[U]n debat national brulant dans lequel les juges 
n’ont manifestement pas voulu entrer’ [author’s translation]. 
604 David Fraser, Law after Auschwitz: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Holocaust (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press 2005) 189ff.  
605 Cass. Crim., 29 November 1988 unpublished judgment, see Receuil Dalloz (1991).  
606 Paul Gauthier, Chronique du Procès Barbie pour Servir la Mémoire (Paris, Le Cerf, 1988). 
607 See Fraser, Law after Auschwitz (n 89). 
608 Research interview, Jacques Vergès (Paris, 13 September 2012).  
609 Research interview, Jacques Vergès (Paris, 13 September 2012). 
 160 
while the crimes of Nazism were being judged, no investigation had been undertaken for 
the crimes committed by the French troops in the colonies.610 When Vergès made the 
analogy between the crimes perpetrated during the Nazi occupation and those committed 
by the French army during the Algerian war, the judicial response short-cut such 
analogy by stating that crimes against humanity are defined by the requirement of a 
‘policy of ideological hegemony’. Many have commented that this strategy was a way to 
remove public attention from the general to the particular.611  
The very same legal cases can be interpreted, and thus politically ‘used’, by different 
actors differently for various purposes. The Aussaresses affaire confronted the judges 
with the challenge to find a balance between society’s expectations and standard 
objectives of the  criminal law, such as retribution, deterrence, and the rehabilitation of 
past offenders. The media’s buzzing interest in the trials related to the Algerian war 
illustrates the inevitable expectation of truth. The condemnation of Aussaresses and his 
publishers for vindicating war crimes (apologie de crimes de guerre) dissociated the 
substantive demands for justice from the historical meaning of the trial.612 Hence it can 
hardly be contended that the Aussaresses trials constitute a ‘Procès sur l’Algérie’ 
(Algeria on Trial). After the judgment, historian Raphaëlle Branche commented that the 
2003 ruling could be perceived as ‘censorship’ and that it could impede the progress of 
writings on the history of the Algerian war: it could deter other soldiers from publishing 
on the Algerian conflict.  
The Vichy prosecutions were a consequence of the Nuremberg trials, which provided an 
outstanding staged exercise of collective pedagogy. They provided a detailed and 
accurate representation of the system that resulted in acts of mass atrocity.613 Besides, 
where punishment focuses on the individuals it also displaces public attention to broader 
political issues which are not necessarily linked to the trial. The French courts’ response 
to demands for prosecution of acts perpetrated in Algeria has a legal basis in as much as 
they rely on past jurisprudence on crimes against humanity. However, if one accepts the 
French ‘creative legalism’ of the Vichy prosecutions, the judges can be seen as 
contributing to the progression of ‘the social continuum’.614  Although the judgment 
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recognizes the existence of torture and the fact that the conflict was a war, the judges did 
not assess the value of Paul Aussaresses’s book as a historical testimony but as a public 
statement. It was important ‘not to push for an anachronistic assessment of the acts 
described by Aussaresses’.615 By focusing on the nature of the terms used to discuss the 
crimes, the judges relegated the historical question to the legislator.616 As one legal 
commentator concluded: ‘if there is to be a debate, it should not be decided by judges 
alone, however eminent they may be, but before elected assemblies.’617  
Amnesty is a manifestation of a state’s sovereignty over its territory.618 The blocking of 
attempts to apply a Nuremberg-inspired logic to crimes perpetrated outside the context 
of World War II illustrates how ‘politicisation has altered the French national concept of 
the crime against humanity until today it has become so circumscribed as to have lost 
much of its bite and original purpose’.619 The elevation of the Nuremberg legacy as 
political judgment 620  has permitted the development of a jurisprudence aiming at 
persuading French society to accept its findings as establishing a historical judgment of 
the Nazi regime. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the influence of the amnesty on the application of criminal 
law. The analysis of the position of French judges undertaken in this chapter has shown 
how their interpretations contributed to drawing limits on the force of international law 
on the State’s sovereign rights to grant amnesties. It has explained that, as a result of this 
influence, it is not possible for individuals to prosecute French soldiers on the ground of 
the French provisions on crimes against humanity. The application of the amnesty 
narrows the judges’ interpretation of the definition of crimes against humanity. It has 
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tranché par les seuls juges, aussi eminents soient-ils, mais devant les assemblées élus’ [author’s 
translation]. 
618 Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale en Echec: prescription, amnistie, immunités’ in 
Antonio Cassese and Mireille Delmas-Marty (eds), Juridictions Nationales et Crimes Internationaux 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2002) 630. 
619 Curran, ‘Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity’ (n 31) 680. 
620 Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence (n 80). 
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also discussed a series of cases that highlight that French criminal law does not consider 
the acts perpetrated outside the Axis countries, or not committed on behalf of them, as 
crimes against humanity and that it does not recognize international customary law as 
permitting the extension of these provisions to acts perpetrated in Algeria by French 
nationals before 1994. The chapter has also explored further the influence of the 
amnesty by examining the interaction between the amnesty decrees and legislation and 
demands for investigation and prosecution of past offences. It has explained that this 
interaction influenced judges’ interpretation of past acts, resulting in a ‘legal fiction’. 
The Aussaresses judgement notably demonstrates that, although the acts of torture 
cannot be prosecuted, it was nonetheless possible to achieve a form of condemnation, 
albeit limited, of past offenders by focusing on the discourse justifying the use of torture. 
For many commentators, such reading of the provisions on crimes against humanity is 
paradoxical in view of France’s commitment to a duty to prosecute war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. However, it cannot be concluded that the French amnesties 
reflect a deficiency in France democratic functioning. The persistence of amnesties is the 
result of a political bargain, which was made necessary by the context in which they 
were implemented. Hence their legitimacy should be weighed in relation to the context 
and the defined objectives of the political community. The contemporary position of the 
French courts on the issue of torture in Algeria needs to be considered in terms of its 
diachronic significance.  
Debating history in the courtroom raises fundamental questions about the role of legal 
proceedings in dealing with past events. This issue is analysed in detail in the next 
chapter with regard to the admission of evidence for facts covered by an amnesty. The 
following chapter also discusses the didactic outcomes of legal proceedings in relation to 
claims of justice based on access to information.  
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Chapter 6:  
Investigating the past:  
access to information on the Algerian war 
 
 
Examining the influence of amnesty on judges’ interpretative role points to the gap 
between collective narratives constructed by society on past crimes and historical facts 
since the official recognition of the war in 1999. The previous chapter has shown how 
the amnesty influenced the judicial interpretation of criminal law. Generally, French law 
and international law do not permit the application of amnesty to crimes against 
humanity. Yet, in the case of the Algerian war, the exclusion of crimes perpetrated 
during the colonial wars from the French provisions on crimes against humanity inscribe 
the torture in Algeria in a situation of legal exception. While the use of torture by the 
French army was clearly established, the French judges were confronted by an 
ambiguous legal situation. After the revision of the French criminal code in 1994, the 
French judges relied on the principle of the non-retroactivity of criminal law to exclude 
the crimes perpetrated during the Algerian war from the scope of the provisions on 
crimes against humanity. However, while the crimes themselves could not be 
prosecuted, they nonetheless received a form of acknowledgement in the conviction and 
sentencing of Aussaresses and his publishers for apology for war crimes. Subsequently, 
though, Aussaresses’ publishers managed to have their position vindicated by taking 
their case to the European Court of Human Rights, who recognised the legitimate rights 
of the publishers to publish controversial material. 
This chapter seeks to develop further analysis of the dynamic of the relation between 
judicial decisions and the collective memory of society. In particular, it explores a series 
of cases involving veterans of the Algerians war who resorted to defamation proceedings 
to discredit historians’ and journalists’ exposures of their past, notably that they had 
perpetrated torture. This chapter argues that the restrictions amnesty imposes on the 
prosecution of crimes does not completely prevent legal proceedings from providing 
public knowledge of past crimes.  
Defamation proceedings in the context of a quest for accountability for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity perpetrated during the Algerian war open up discussion of how 
claims made by historians affect the collective narrative. Analysis of the French 
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jurisprudence on defamation in this context highlights three main findings. First, 
defamation proceedings can extend the reach of judges to admit evidence that would 
establish that crimes were perpetrated. Secondly, that a legal venue with lower political 
stakes, such as defamation trials, can constitute a political opportunity to hear hidden 
accounts and shape the content of history. Thirdly, it argues that that the success of 
defamation proceedings from this perspective lies more in providing a public space to 
discuss and record the memory of past victims and survivors and historian accounts than 
in their direct outcome. 
I. The Einaudi Affaire  
The ‘Einaudi affaire’ refers to the defamation claim brought by Maurice Papon against 
Jean-Luc Einaudi. Papon’s role during the Algerian war had already been brought up in 
court in the course of his trial for complicity in crimes against humanity for his role in 
the deportation of Jews from the Gironde region in 1942–44. The prosecution of 
Maurice Papon prompted revelations about his responsibilities as Prefect of Police for 
Paris in the repression of the protest by Algerians on 17 October 1961.621 
Despite the limited potential for history to be written in the courtroom, the impact of 
the Papon trial extended beyond the individual responsibility of Maurice Papon but 
touched upon the history of France itself. Although the trial was primarily about the 
Vichy period, the Algerian war became relevant by calling historian Jean-Luc 
Einaudi to testify on Maurice Papon. Indeed lawyer Gerard Boulanger representing the 
27 victims of accused Nazi collaborator wanted to amplify the question of the 
responsibility of the state in sponsoring violence
 
by bringing to light the part Maurice 
Papon had played as Prefect of the Paris police in the repression of 17 October 
1961.622 
A. Prologue: The Battle of Paris, 17 October 1961 
The Battle of Paris, as it is commonly called, refers to a police repression that occurred 
six months before the end of the War of Independence of Algeria. On the night of 17 
October 1961, 200 to 300 people mostly French Algerians, were killed by the French 
                                                 
621 Cours d’Assises de la Gironde.  
622 Richard J. Golsan, The Papon Affair: Memory and Justice on Trial. (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
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police during a demonstration. The crowd was protesting against the curfew and the 
demonstration was also an opportunity to show their solidarity with the independence 
movement and support for the nationalists fighting against the French army in Algeria. 
At the time, France was still under a state of emergency and a curfew was ordered for 
Algerians/ French Muslims prohibiting them from being out on the streets between 8:30 
pm and 5:30 am. The curfew was severely disruptive to FLN organisation and 
fundraising. As the Algerian nationalist movement was growing, the presence of French 
colonial subjects in metropolitan France was viewed as a potential threat to the stability 
of the regime and the decolonisation negotiations that were under way. More generally, 
the curfew was widely regarded by the Algerian community as a racist administrative 
measure.623  
Full police powers were granted to the Maurice Papon, Prefect of the Paris police.
 
He 
ordered a major deployment of police personnel, assembling 7,000 policemen, 
1,400 CRS (Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité) riot police supported by further riot 
police from the gendarmes mobiles to block the demonstration. The disproportionate 
police response turned a peaceful demonstration into a violent repression that shocked 
public opinion.624 In the following days, the press was not allowed to publish any reports 
that compromised the official account of three deaths.625 
To this day, the number of Algerians killed that night is disputed. The background 
police perspective may be gauged by a police report dated May 1947: ‘[...] the North 
African problem is not an issue of prevention any more, but has turned into a question 
of repression.’626 Judicial enquiry into the deaths was blocked from leading any criminal 
investigations.627  
                                                 
623 Although the Algerians living at the time in Paris were officially considered French and possessed a 
French identity card, they were nonetheless bound by rules applying to foreigners.  
624 The Mandelkern Report ordered by the Ministry of the Interior in 1997 (released May 1988) stated there 
were most likely at least 32 victims. Dieudonné Mandelkern, André Wiehn and Jean Mireille, ‘Rapport sur 
les archives de la Préfecture de police relatives à la manifestation organisée par le FLN le 17 octobre 
1961’ (Paris: Ministère de l’Intérieur 1998). Available at: 
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/984000823/ [last accessed March 2013]  
See also the response of Prime Minister, JORF, Débats (Sénat), 19 March 1998 893. The number of 
injured was in the thousands (Michel Levine, Les Ratonnades d’Octobre: un meurtre collectif a Paris en 
1961 (Paris, Ramsay 1985); Jean-Luc Einaudi La Bataille de Paris: 17 Octobre 1961 (Paris: Editions 
Seuil 1991). 
625 Sylvie Thénault, ‘Le 17 Octobre en Question’ 1998 148 Cahiers Jean Jaurès Semestriels, 89–104. 
626  Directeur Général de la Sûreté Générale to Directeur des Affaires Générales, Sous-Direction de 
l’Algérie, 10 May 1947, AN F1a 5061: ‘Le problème nord-africain dans la Métropole est devenu non plus 
une question de prévention mais une question de répression’ [author’s translation]. 
627 Einaudi, La Bataille de Paris (n 6). 
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Despite the lack of prosecutions or official recognition of the events, civil society groups 
undertook to commemorate the dead of 17 October 1961. The movement was joined by 
anti-racist organisation the MRAP (Mouvement contre le racism et pour l’amitié entre 
les peoples). In 1991, 10,000 demonstrators followed the symbolic route from the Canal 
Saint Martin to the Rex Cinema under the banner ‘No to Racism, no to forgetting, for a 
right to memory’.628 At the same time, a colloquium at the Sorbonne was organised to 
discuss Mehdi Lallaoui and Agnès Denis’s documentary Le silence du fleuve. The 
publication of Jean-Luc Einaudi’s La bataille de Paris that same year ensured that the 
17 October 1961 resurfaced as a major theme of public debate. Jean-Luc Einaudi 
maintained, contrary to the official police version, that there were over 200 deaths 
during the relevant period.629 His investigative research was based on the collection of 
testimonies of witnesses and survivors, and confrontation of archives repudiated the 
official version of the police.  
 
B. Einaudi’s Testimony Trial of Papon for Crimes 
Against Humanity 
Well before the recognition of the Algerian war in 1999, the French public had come to 
know Maurice Papon for his role during the Vichy regime during the protracted process 
that eventually led to the highly mediatised trial in 1997-98 where he was prosecuted for 
complicity in crimes against humanity. The Papon affair started when Michel Slitinsky, 
a French Jewish Holocaust survivor, passed on to the French left-wing newspaper, Le 
Canard Enchainé, evidence about the collaborationist past of Maurice Papon. The 
newspaper published a document signed by Papon, which implicated him in the 
deportation of Jews in Bordeaux. The matter was of major significance as by that time 
Papon was Budget Minister. The evidence revealed that Papon had arranged for the 
arrest and deportation of more than 1,600 Jews when he was second in command of the 
police for the Gironde region during the Vichy period. A jury d’honneur was assembled 
in December 1981 composed of former members of the Resistance630 Although the jury 
                                                 
628 Le Monde (19 Octobre 1991). 
629 Einaudi, La Bataille de Paris (n 6). 
630 The jury d’honneur was created in 1945 to hear quasi-criminal charges of ‘national indignity’ against 
Vichy-appointed officials. For more on this institution, see Mark Gibney, ‘Decommunication: Human 
Rights Lessons from that Past and Present, and Prospects for the Future,’ [1994] 23 Denver Journal of 
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exonerated him of crimes against humanity,631 the public prosecutor then opened in 
investigations; seven complaints had been laid against Papon by May 1982 and in 1983 
the trial against him began, which continued for some four years until, in February 1987, 
the Cour de Cassation dismissed the proceedings because of a procedural error. In July 
1988 a second investigation was undertaken. In response to Papon’s appeal against the 
indictment, a decision on January 1997 by the Cour de Cassation found no reason to 
doubt the Indictment Department’s view that Papon was ‘fully cognizant of the Vichy 
government’s anti-Semitic policies’.632 Papon had also argued, among other points, that 
he could not be found guilty because he did no more than follow the orders of the then-
legitimate government. This legal defence, also proffered by defendants at the 
Nuremberg trials, is known in France as ‘the order of law and command of the 
legitimate authority’. The Papon trial is inscribed in a foundational jurisprudence against 
the Vichy regime that had started in the 1980s. The Court de Cassation rejected this 
argument, relying on Article 213-4 of the French Criminal Code, according to which, for 
crimes against humanity, ‘the perpetrator or accomplice to a felony under the present 
title [crimes against humanity] is not exonerated from his responsibility on the sole basis 
that he performed an act prescribed or authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions 
or an act ordered by legitimate authority.’ 633  On April 1998, Maurice Papon was 
convicted for complicity in crimes against humanity for his participation in the arrest, 
and detention of French Jews.634  
The prosecution of Maurice Papon not only re-awakened the ghosts of Vichy, it also 
offered an opportunity to confront Maurice Papon with the misdeeds of 17 October 
                                                                                                                                                
International Law and Policy 87-133; Peter Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy: The Purge of 
Collaborators in Vichy France (London: Chatto & Windus 1968) 94-155. 
631 The jury considered that Maurice Papon ordered operations that were contrary to the principle held by 
the French Resistance. Further, it considered that Maurice Papon should have resigned from his position 
of General secretary of the Prefecture of Gironde in July 1942. However the accusation of crimes against 
humanity was dismissted as the jury also recognized the real contribution it provided to the Resistance. 
Pascale Nivelle, ‘Maurice Papon devant ses juges. J -5. 1981, première fêlure dans la défense 
de Papon. Un jury d'honneur de cinq personnalités le certifie résistant, mais estime qu'il 
aurait dû démissionner de ses fonctions en juillet 1942’ Libération 3 October 1997, Paris.  
632 Cour de Cassation, Cass Crim., 23 January 1997 no. 502, 32 Bull. Crim. 1997.  
available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007066186  
633 Code Pénal Art. 213-4: L’auteur ou le complice d’un crime visé par le present titre [Des crimes contre 
l’humanité] ne peut être exoneré de sa responsabilité du seul fait qu’il a accompli un acte prescrit ou 
autoris par des dispositions legislatives ou réglementaires ou un acte commandé par l’autorité légitime. . 
English translation from: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/Liste-des-traductions-Legifrance 
634 Cours d’Assises de la Gironde, Judgment of 2 April 1998.  
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1961 and to bring out his role in the police repression. 635  The issue of Papon’s 
responsibility in the police repression against the Algerian nationalists in Paris was 
discussed in six sessions of the proceedings. Papon declared that ‘the repression 
consisted in merely asking the Algerians to get in the buses […] the police did not shoot 
at anyone, but Algerians were shot by the FLN groups’.636 While admitting that 15 to 20 
bodies were thrown in the Seine River, he puts the responsibility on fratricide rivalries 
between the FLN and the members of the MNA.637Jean-Luc Einaudi confronted this 
version and declared that: ‘according to the research I undertook, I believe that there was 
at least two hundred death during that period’.638In his testimony, Einaudi explains how 
Papon proceeded to the round up of North African. Notably highlighting that Algerians 
were detained internment camps that were used by the Vichy Regime.639 He accounts 
that 11,000 persons were arrested, and transported in a public transport company 
RATP bus, to the Parc des Expositions in Vincennes where they were held in a 
detention centre. Others were beaten and tortured. Many were drowned in the Seine or 
canals, in both central Paris and the outskirts, their corpses dumped or placed in 
anonymous graves.  
Soon after Einaudi’s testimony in the Papon trial, in October 1997 the Minister of the 
Interior, Jean Pierre Chevènement, mandated Dieudonné Mandelkern to conduct an 
investigation into what was available in police archives concerning the events of 17 
October 1962. 640  The report was, in fact intended merely to provide a survey of 
materials in the archives of the prefecture and to stop unauthorised leaks. However, the 
Mandelkern report went on to make a number of observations. Concerning the sequence 
of the events that led to the police operations, it notably discloses that, from 1959, 
                                                 
635 L’ordre de la Loi et le Commandement de L’autorité Legitime’. Cass. Crim. 23 January 1997 (n12). 
See Also the Commentary by Jacques-Henri Robert, ‘Affaire Papon: Éléments Constitutifs De La 
Complicité’ [1997, 2 April] 14 la Semaine Juridique, Edition Générale. 
636 ‘La repression s’est réduite à prier les Algériens de monter dans les cars et les autobus […] Il n’y a pas 
eu de mort par arme à feu par la police, mais par les groups d’assaut du FLN […]’ [author’s translation]. 
Cours d’Assises de la Gironde, judgment of 2 April 1998. 
637 ‘Quinze ou vingt Nord-Africains jetés dans la Seine à la suite de règlements de comptes entre tenants 
du MNA et dissidents du FLN. On a fait de ce 17 octobre un tableau polémique, poursuit-il. Il n’y a pas eu 
de débordements. La répression s’est réduite à faire monter les Nord-Africains dans les autobus. Ils ne se 
sont pas fait prier.’ cited in Beatrice Valley ‘Seine Macabre’ Libération, 15 October, 2011 
638 ‘Je pense, après les recherches que j’ai pu faire, qu’il y a eut durant cette periode un minimum de 200 
morts vraisemblablement environs 300’ [author’s translation]. Cours d’Assises de la Gironde, judgment of 
2 April 1998. 
639  Michael Rothberg Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonization, (Stanford University Press, 2009) 286. 
640 Mandelkern Report (n 6).  
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internment camps established in the outskirts of Paris, notably at Vincennes, had 
detained hundreds of Algerians without due process. In fact, as pointed out by Einaudi, 
it was Maurice Papon himself who had ordered the use of these camps that had 
previously been used during the Vichy regime to intern Jews. Further, based on the 
numbers of detainees registered in the Mandelkern Report, it characterises the police 
operations as ‘une repression dure’ (stiff repression). At the same time, the report notes 
the contradictory reports on the number of deaths. In the aftermath of the repression, the 
police had acknowledged the deaths of seven detainees. However, the report stresses that 
this number may not be accurate: ‘an assessment of the victims of this “stiff repression” 
cannot be given with any assurance’. While it refers to the official count of seven deaths 
and 136 wounded, the report also highlights that more victims could be accounted for 
from the archives of the morgue (Institut Medico-Legal).641  Indeed, 88 bodies were 
brought to the morgue between 17 October 1962 and 31 December 1962.642 Of these, the 
report considered that 25 could possibly be the victims of police repression.643 
Nonetheless, as a way to mitigate the contradictory accounts, the Mandelkern Report 
states that: 
[S]upposing that a total of twenty-five cases were added to the official number of 
seven dead […] and allowing that uncertain factors, especially those pertaining 
to the geographical limits of this study, warrant a certain increase in numbers, we 
are still at the level of ten to twenties, which is considerable but fewer than the 
several hundreds sometimes claimed.644 
In another example, where the Mandelkern Report refers to hundreds of ‘Algerians’ 
‘neutralised’, it does not however say what happened to them. 
The report’s true importance lies in the number of ‘gaps’ in the archives it underscores, 
noting that many of the archives that could have been useful had been destroyed. Among 
the missing documents, the records of the Brigade fluviale (River Authority Police), 
which could have shed light on the bodies thrown in the Seine, have been destroyed 
‘several years ago’. It also states that a report that Papon had prepared for the Minister 
                                                 
641 Mandelkern Report (n 6). 
642 Mandelkern Report (n 6). 
643 Mandelkern Report (n 6). 
644 ‘Parmi ces chiffres, celui des morts serait le plus significatif s’il pouvait être donné avec assurance. Tel 
n’est pas le cas. Mais à supposer même que l’on ajoute au bilan officiel de sept morts la totalité des vingt-
cinq cas figurant à l’annexe III, et que l’on considère que les facteurs d’incertitude, et notamment ceux qui 
tiennent aux limites géographiques de l’étude, justifient une certaine majoration, on reste au niveau des 
dizaines, ce qui est considérable, mais très inférieur aux quelques centaines de victimes dont il a parfois 
été question.’ [author’s translation] Mandelkern Report (n 6). 
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of the Interior, the Prime Minister and the Office of the President could not be consulted. 
Mandelkern notes that there is no copy of the report in the Archives de la prefecture de 
police (Archives of the Prefecture of Police) or in the Archives of the Direction Générale 
de la Police Nationale (Archives of the National Police).  
The Madelkern evaluation was published on 4 May 1998 in the newspaper the Le 
Figaro, just after the conclusion of the Papon trial in April 1998.645 On 8 May 1998 
Jean-Luc Einaudi published an opinion piece, ‘Octobre 1961, pour la vérité, enfin’ 
(October 1961, for the truth at last) in Le Monde contesting some of the findings of the 
Mandelkern Report.646 Einaudi underlined the inadequacies of the Mandelkern report 
and disputed the official toll as recognised in the Report (32 deaths).647 Einaudi also 
pointed to the failure of the report to examine what happened in the courtyard of the 
police Prefecture, where some of the worst atrocities were reported at the time. 648 
Einaudi demanded an investigation as to why some of the archives of the River 
Authority Police had been destroyed in 1990.649 He concluded his article by declaring 
that ‘But for the moment I persist and sign. On the night of 17 October 1961 a massacre 
took place perpetrated by the police forces acting under the orders of Maurice Papon’.650 
This assertion led Papon to bring a claim against Einaudi for ‘defamation of a 
government functionary’. From accused Papon became accuser. After days of hearings, 
the Court concluded that, although Einaudi’s statement was defamatory, it was made in 
good faith based on a body of serious and well-documented research.651  
II.  Hearing the Evidences: the Good Faith of the Historian  
By bringing a historian to court for accusing him of personal responsibility for a 
‘massacre’ of Algerians on 17 October 1961 Maurice Papon sought to shut down the 
                                                 
645 Eric Pelletier, ‘Les Vrai Chiffres d’une Nuit Sauvage’, Figaro, 4 May 1998.  
646 Jean-Luc Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961, pour la Verité, Enfin’ Le Monde (20 May 1998). 
647 Mandelkern Report (n 6). 
648 Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961’ (n 26). 
649 Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961’ (n 26). 
650 ‘Mais, pour le moment, je persiste et signe. En octobre 1961, il y eut à Paris un massacre perpétré par 
des forces de police agissant sous les ordres de Maurice Papon’, Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961’ (n 23). 
651 ‘Cette assertion est à l’évidence, diffamatoire, en ce qu’elle impute à un ancien haut fonctionnaire de 
l’Etat d’avoir gravement manqué aux devoirs de sa charge, et d’avoir suscité, approuvé ou couvert des 
comportements constitutifs d’infractions pénales particulièrement révoltantes’Judgment, 26 March 1999, 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 17th chamber. 
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claims made by Einaudi. However, the Einaudi defamation trial highlights the potential 
role of legal proceedings to revise official narratives on past events.  
 
As previously explored, the amnesty prevented any possibility of prosecuting Papon or 
his officers. In a decision of May 2000, the judges dismissed the demand of prosecution 
for crimes against humanity on the basis that the acts occurred outside the context of 
World War II and before 1 November 1994.  Indeed the police operations were covered 
by Decree no 62-328 of 22 March 1962, concerning infractions perpetrated during public 
order operations against the Algerian insurrection before the 20 March 1962, but the 
question remained as to whether a historian could investigate and publicly challenge 
one’s past. As a matter of fact defamation proceedings can carry significant legal 
implications. Indeed, it is both a criminal and civil offence that pitches freedom of 
speech against the offence of defamation and draw the line between attempt to disclose 
one’s past and statement made to injure someone’s reputation. This section explores the 
unfolding of the Einaudi affair and how the judges ruled on the claim of defamation 
brought by Maurice Papon in February 1999 against Jean-Luc Einaudi.  
 
The 1968 amnesty law prevented from the possibility to investigate on the acts.652 Until 
1999, Papon has benefited from the immunity granted by the amnesty to avoid any 
prosecution on his responsibility for the repression of October 1961. By engaging an 
action for criminal defamation (with Papon as the civil party), Papon’s concern was that 
Einaudi’s statement attacked his honour.  
The offence of defamation is defined by the 1881 Law of the Press as ‘any allegation or 
imputation of an act affecting the honour or reputation of the person or body against 
whom it is made.653 It is a form of legal action that seeks to protect the sphere of a 
person’s public or private life.654 Article 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure related 
to the Law on the Press provides that anyone alleging to have been harmed by a crime 
may file a complaint and become a ‘civil party’ in a criminal case. 655  Typically, 
defamation proceedings concern publication of a presumptively untrue statement that 
tends to harm another person’s reputation or standing.  
                                                 
652 Cass. crim. 30 Mai 2000, Bull. Crim. (2000) no99-84024. 
653 Loi du 29 Juillet 1881 (n 488). Article 29: …toute allégation ou imputation d'un fait qui porte atteinte à 
l'honneur ou à la considération de la personne ou du corps auquel le fait est imputé.. 
654 Tim Crook, Comparative Media Law and Ethics (London: Routledge 2010) 336. 
655 See Code de Procédure Pénal Art. 85 (Dalloz, 1988-89). 
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The proceedings launched against historian Jean-Luc Einaudi by Maurice Papon to 
avoid his past being unveiled raises fundamental questions about the admissibility of 
historical evidence. Unlike most other criminal trials, defamation proceedings in French 
law reverse the burden of proof to demonstrate that the statement made is deemed untrue 
and that there is a malicious intention. It is up to the defence to show otherwise. There 
are two main defences, both of which involve examining and cross-examining the author 
of the statement in question and probing his claim. First, article 35 of the Law of the 
Press of 1881 provides that truth is always a defence. The burden of proof in 
establishing truth falls on the accused. This provision, commonly called the exceptio 
veritatis (truth exception) refers to the principle according to which an individual can 
defend himself against claims of defamation by proving that the statement is true.656 
However, the same article provides that the truth exception cannot be invoked in three 
circumstances: where the defamatory assertion concerns a person’s private life – 
evidently not relevant in this case –; where it concerns matters that occurred more than 
ten years earlier or where the acts in question are covered by an amnesty or are 
prescribed [by law], or relate to a ‘rehabilitated’ conviction.657 Seondly, in cases where 
the truth defence is not available, defendants can rely on a different defence and present 
evidence of their ‘good faith’ in making the statement in question.  The jurisprudence 
developed the cumulative criteria to assess the ‘good faith’ based on the legitimacy of 
the goal (légitimité du but poursuivi), absence of personal animosity (l’absence 
d’animosité personnelle).658 A good faith defence will succeed if four conditions are all 
fulfilled: the statement concerns a matter of public importance; the tone used in the 
statement is measured and objective; there is no trace of personal hostility in the 
statement; and the statement is based on serious investigation.659 A defence based on 
‘good faith’ is defeated by the claimant showing that the publisher was malicious i.e. 
they wished to injure the claimant or were reckless as to the truth of the allegation.  
                                                 
656 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 (n 488) Article 35: La vérité des faits diffamatoires peut toujours être prouvée 
[…]. 
657 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 (n 488) Article 35: […] sauf: a) Lorsque l'imputation concerne la vie privée de la 
personne; b) Lorsque l'imputation se réfère à des faits qui remontent à plus de dix années ;c) Lorsque 
l’imputation se réfère à un fait constituant une infraction amnistiée ou prescrite, ou qui a donné lieu à une 
condamnation effacée par la réhabilitation ou la revision.  
658 Dalloz Actualité ‘Bonne foi et exception de vérité : distinction et conditions d’application’ 28 March 
2011, (available at http://www.dalloz-actualite.fr) 
659 ‘Admission de la bonne foi est traditionnellement soumise , par la jurisprudence , à la réunion de quatre 
critères légitimité du but poursuivi, absence d’animosité personnelle , sérieux de l’enquête et fiabilité des 
sources, prudence et modération dans l’expression.’Judgment, 26 March 1999, Tribunal de Grande 
instance de Paris, 17th chamber. p10.  
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Where the acts are covered by an amnesty, a way out is to demonstrate the good faith of 
the authors of the statement. This particular provision of French freedom of speech 
jurisprudence has permitted to historians and journalists to avoid civil and criminal 
action when they revealed the Algerian past of retired French officers. In the case of the 
defamation trial against Jean Luc Einaudi, the judge dismissed Papon’s suit on the basis 
that Einaudi’s statement was made in good faith. In another case involving an ex-
officer’s past, the judge ruled on the good faith of the author’s claims, in the action 
brought by Le Pen in May 2005. Jean-Marie Le Pen initiated the action for defamation 
against journalist Florence Beaugé after she published two articles claiming that he had 
tortured Algerian civilians during his military years in Algeria. Beaugé’s investigation 
was published in two parts. The first part was published on 4 May 2002.660 It recounts 
the ordeal of Ahmed Moulay, an Algerian nationalist murdered by the French troopers 
on 3 May 1957. Ahmed Moulay was tortured in front of his wife and children. When the 
paras left Moulay’s house, they left behind them the sheath of a dagger on which was 
engraved ‘J. M Le Pen, 1er Rep’. The second part of Beaugé’s investigation was 
published on 4 June 2002. 661  It gave the testimonies of Mustapha Merouane, 
Muhammad Abdellaoui and Abdelkader Ammour, identifying Jean-Marie Le Pen as one 
of the 20 French soldiers who burst into their home in the casbah of Algiers. Abdelbaker 
Ammour told how he was forced to lie naked on the floor with his hands bound. ‘Then, 
they connected up electric wires directly to the plug and moved them about all over on 
my body,’ he said. ‘I was screaming. They took dirty water from the toilets and made 
me swallow it through a floor cloth held over my face. Le Pen was sitting on me. He 
held the cloth while someone else poured the water.’ Le Pen sat on me and held the cloth 
while another person poured water. I can hear him shouting, "Get on with it, don't stop.' 
" 662 In a ruling in 2005 the Cour de Cassation confirmed the ‘good faith’ defence 
offered by Florence Beaugé to justify her revelations about this ex-soldier’s past in 
Algeria. 663  
                                                 
660 Florence Beaugé, ‘Guerre d'Algérie: le Poignard de Le Pen’, Le Monde [reprinted 16 March 2012]. 
Available at: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/03/16/le-grand-blond-au-poignard_1669337_3212.html 
661 Florence Beaugé, ‘Guerre d'Algérie: le Poignard de Le Pen’, Le Monde 
662 Giles Tremlett and Paul Webster ‘Battle of Algiers returns to haunt Le Pen as claims of torture focus 
on far-right leader: Wartime role of NF leader risks far-right vote in Sunday's election’ Guardian 4 june 
2002 available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/04/france.thefarright [ last visited October 
2016] 
663 Cass. Crim. 27 September 2005, 04-85.956. Available at: 
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This was not the first time that Jean-Marie Le Pen had brought an action against 
journalists for disclosing his Algerian past.  
For Einaudi and his supporters, the defamation trial was a chance to bring forth 
additional evidence that enabled him to back up his claims. The defamation proceedings 
indeed offered an opportunity to defend his claims that ‘on the night of 17 October 1961 
a massacre took place perpetrated by the police forces acting under the orders of 
Maurice Papon’.664 To some extent, it can be argued that defamation proceedings are a 
way of circumventing the amnesty law barring from the possibility of directly 
investigating acts perpetrated before 1962 in connection with the Algerian war. However, 
the other effect of the amnesty was to rule out the option of a truth defence in the 
defamation action. In assessing the ‘good faith’ of the author’s claims, judges are not 
required to investigate the substance of the claim as would occur if the truth defence 
were available. Thus success in the case did not have the effect of a legal vindication of 
the truth of the facts. 
A. Epilogue to the Einaudi Affair: The Responsibility of the 
Archivists 
The government having announced that access to the archives would be eased, Jean Luc 
Einaudi made a request to the national Archives de Paris for access to the Registre 
d’Information du Parquet (archives of the Prosecutor’s Office). Einaudi was looking for 
judicial evidence on the police operations related to the demonstration of 17 October 
1961 while Papon was head of the police. Two archivists Brigitte Laîné and Philippe 
Grand allowed him to consult documents that would enable him to defend himself in the 
defamation case. The two archivists were working on the archives of the police from the 
period of 1944 to 1962. In their oral (Laîné) and written (Grande) testimony given 
during the Einaudi’s trial, the two archivists confirmed the existence of records 
substantiating Einaudi’s statement. 
 
With the Einaudi affaire the question of justice moved beyond the individual person, 
Maurice Papon, as a polemic sprang up around two questions: were the legal archives 
consulted by Jean-Luc Einaudi accessible? Can (and should) an archivist speak about the 
                                                                                                                                                
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007607564 
664 Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961’ (n 26). 
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existence and the content of archives not accessible to the public, or is it a violation of 
secrecy and professional obligations? In December 1998, Einaudi’s request for access to 
the archives was refused.665   
The military archives on the Algerian war first became accessible to the public in 1992 
after the ending of the initial 30-year restricted access period. The Law of 3 January 
1979 provides that official documents remain classified for a fixed period that limits 
their availability to the public. Article 1 of the 1979 law states that: ‘Conservation of 
public archives is in the public interest’.666 Public archives, including documents of 
National Police, ‘which concern the lives of private persons or affect national security 
and defence’ are accessible ‘after a period of sixty years’.667 The law can restrict access 
to the archives by a further time limit that can extend to 150 years. It also provides a 
système dérogatoire by which the access to some documents can only be authorised by a 
commission on access to administrative documents the Commission d’accès aux 
documents administratifs (CADA). In case of a request being refused, an appeal may be 
made to the administrative judge on the basis of state ‘excess of powers’ (recours pour 
excès de pouvoirs).668 
 
By granting Einaudi access to restricted archives still covered by the time limitation, the 
two archivists violated the internal regulations of the archives (Archives de Paris) and 
the archivists’ professional code of ethics. After giving their testimony in Einaudi’s case, 
they were sanctioned for misconduct by the Director of the Paris archives and 
disapproved by the French Association of Archivists (Association des archivistes 
français (AAF). On 3 March 1999 the AAF released a press statement stating that the 
association did not condone the behaviour of Brigitte Laîné and Philippe Grand,669 
                                                 
665 Jim House, Neil MacMaster Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 313.  
666 Article 1: ‘La conservation de ces documents est organisée dans l’intérêt public’ [author’s translation]. 
Loi no 79-18 du 3 Janvier  sur les archives, JORF 5 Janvier 1979 43; DSL, 62 1979.  Here after [1979  law 
on the archives]  Available at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000322519&categorieLien=id 
667 1979 Law on the Archives  (n 633) Article 7(5). 
668 1979 Law on the Archives  (n 633). 
669  3 March 1999.Available at: 
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-
francais&month=9903&week=b&msg=ZvTD7jm8gPVVyvtT6pbsrA&user=&pw= 
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which, it stated, breached the ethical and juridical principles of the profession.670 In May 
1999, the Archives de France called Brigitte Laîné and Philippe Grand for a disciplinary 
hearing. Brigitte Laîné justified her actions by the fact the Jean-Luc Einaudi had not 
received a response to his derogation request to access the archives a year before and 
that he now needed to defend himself. Following this hearing, the Director of the 
Archives de Paris, Francois Gasnault, sanctioned the misconduct of the archivists 
administratively for having failed in their devoir de reserve (duty of confidentiality).671 
The official position of the Director of the Archives de Paris and the AAF was that 
Laîné had no right to divulge secret documents. According to their professional Code of 
Ethics and the Law of 3 January 1979, archivists have no individual discretion to decide 
to communicate classified documents or their contents. Article 2 of the Law of 3 January 
1979 clearly states that an agent in charge of the archives is bound by professional 
secrecy with regards to documentswhich are not made publicly available.672 In addition, 
the Code of Ethics for archivists prevents the communication of documents from the 
public archive without authorisation by the government. The AAF statement on Laîné 
and Grande cited Article 7 of the Code of Ethics of the International Council on 
Archives (ICA): ‘Archivists should respect both access and privacy, and act within the 
boundaries of relevant legislation’. Article 8 includes: They should not reveal or use 
information gained through work with holdings towhich access is restricted’. It also 
referred to Article 26 of the Statut Général de la Fonction Publique, by which public 
servants are bound by a confidentiality clause on revealing the facts or information 
contained in documents that he comes to know in the course of exercising his 
functions.673 
The statement concludes that: 
                                                 
670  ‘Elle ne se reconnait pas dans un comportement qu’elle juge contraire au principe juridique et 
déontologique de la profession’ [author’s translation]. The Association cited provisions of the 1996 Code 
of Ethics of the International Council on Archives. 
671  Antoon De Baets, Censorship of Historical Thought: A World Guide, 1945-2000 (Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing Group 2002) 208-9. 
672 1979 Law on the Archives, Article 2: Tout fonctionnaire ou agent chargé de la collecte ou de la 
conservation d’archives en application des dispositions de la présente loi est tenu au secret professionnel 
en ce qui concerne tout document qui ne peut être légalement mis a la disposition du public.’  
673  Statut General de la Fonction Publique, Loi n° 83-634 du 13 Juillet 1983. Article 26 Secret 
professionnel: Les fonctionnaires sont tenus au secret professionnel dans le cadre des règles instituées 
dans le code pénal. Les fonctionnaires sont donc tenus au secret professionnel visé par le code pénal en 
tant que dépositaires de renseignements concernant ou intéressant des particuliers à moins que les 
nécessités du service ou des obligations légales ne leur imposent la communication des informations dont 
ils ont eu connaissance dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l'exercice de leur fonction. Available at: 
http://www.fonction-publique.gouv.fr/droits-et-obligations#secret_professionnel 
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The archivist has an absolute duty of integrity. It is not to help M. Papon to 
remind him of the republican principles of equality and continuity of public 
service. It is to highlight the responsibility of the Archivist to preserve 
documents. Archives are sacred and, contrary to what can be argued, they are not 
the truth, despite being evidence.674 
In fact, the archivists did not reveal the content of any restricted documents to Einaudi. 
Indeed the contested information was presented their audition in front of the court. 
Ultimately, any demand to prosecute the archivists was dropped and it was accepted that 
answering the questions of a judge in a legal proceeding did not breach the duty of 
confidentiality. The law of 1983 however details the exception to confidentiality. It is 
notably stated that archivist can disclose information. Nonetheless, Laîné and Grand 
were relocated. Philippe Grand was sent to work in the prison archives and Brigitte 
Laîné to work on tax archives. 
In its turn, the sanctioning of the archivists created an affair within the affair. Many 
stood by the archivists and did not consider that their whistle blowing should be 
punished. Laîné and Grand had acted within their professional domain and according 
to the law. Indeed, had they not told the court about the existence of the files, they would 
have violated Article 8 of the ICA Code of Ethics, which prescribes that ‘Archivists 
should use the special trust given to them in the general interest and avoid using their 
position to unfairly benefit themselves or others.’ Many argued that the archivists should 
not be considered to having breached their duty of confidentiality. A movement of 
support was spontaneously organised online in social forums where it was notably 
commented that Laîné and Grand had a ‘civic duty’ to act.675 If Brigitte Laîné and 
                                                 
674  AAF Press release, 3 March 1999:  ‘L’archiviste a un devoir absolu de neutralité. Ce n’est pas voler au 
secours de M. Papon que de rappeler ces principes republicains d’égalite et de continuité du service 
public. Il s’agit seulement de souligner l’étendue de la responsabilité de l’archiviste, conservateur de 
documents qui, en depit de leur valeur probante, ne sont pas le receptacle de la vérité pure comme on est 
aujourd’hui trop enclin a le faire croire en les sacralisant’ [author’s translation]. Available at  http://h 
net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h 
francais&month=9903&week=b&msg=ZvTD7jm8gPVVyvtT6pbsrA&user=&pw  
[last accessed March 2015] 
675 Internet forum of the AAF, discussion  
available at http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-
bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=hfrancais&month=9903&week=b&msg=ZvTD7jm8gPVVyvtT6pbsrA&us
er=&pw= [last visited March 2015] 
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Philippe Grand had not disclosed to the tribunal the existence of the archival material, 
they would have violated Article 9 of the Code of Ethics approved by the CIA.676   
The Association au Nom de la Mémoire (ANM), interviewed in March 2013, stressed 
that there was a real political stake in access to the archives. Preventing historians from 
accessing the archives despite the public demands to know the ‘truth about the Algerian 
war’ was a political choice. It was only then that victims would be able to know what 
happened to their relatives. As one member of the association explained, ‘Ultimately the 
objective is not to put people in prison. Families are beyond that. What matters today is 
to be able to publicly say: I was a victim of the French army. It should be recognised as 
such.’677 Indeed, France has from very early on sought to keep control on the archives. 
Following the end of the war, the Chef d’Etat Major (defence Minister) ordered the 
Chief Commandant in Algeria to bring the archives concerning the colonization of 
Algeria located in the Bureau des Archives at Blida, near Algiers.678 It is reported that 
the Minister expressly spoke of the need to avoid ‘compromising documents’ falling into 
the hands of the FLN and so an initial tranche of documents was destroyed in Algeria 
before the transfer. 679  However, any serious examination of the Algerian War of 
Independence became impossible after the adoption of the Law of January 1979 law 
with its 60-year restriction on documents, including documents of the National Police, 
concerning the lives of private persons or that affect national security or defence. As a 
partial remedy to the situation, the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (SHAT) in 
1990 had published a collection of documents on the Algerian war, 680  La guerre 
                                                 
676  1979 Law on the Archives, Article 9: Archivists should pursue professional excellence by 
systematically and continuously updating their archival knowledge, and sharing the results of their 
research and experience. Archivists should endeavour to develop their professional understanding and 
expertise, to contribute to the body of professional knowledge, and to ensure that those whose training or 
activities they supervise are equipped to carry out their tasks in a competent manner. They notably 
defended their action by considering that they had to contribute to the effort to disclose a state crime. ‘Par 
notre témoignage au procès Einaudi-Papon, nous nous sommes conformés a la déontologie archivistique, 
en contribuant a faire la lumière sur ce qui n'est pas un secret mais un crime d'Etat.’ Commentaries of 
Lainé and Grand on the forum of the AAF.  
677 Research interview with Houria Bouteldja (Paris March 2013).  
678 Lettre du ministre des Armées au général commandant en chef en Algérie, Paris, 1 Decembre 1959, no 
4841/EMA/1.0. (SHAT, 50 T 50) quoted in Thierry Sarmant, Archives ‘secrètes’, secrets d’archives? 
Historiens et archivistes face aux archives sensibles (Paris: CNRS Editions 2013).  
679  Lettre from Général Le Puloch, Chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre, to général commandant 
supérieur des forces en Algérie, Paris, 3 August 1962, no12539/EMA/2/OM. The General wished to 
‘éviter la divulgation de certains documents dont une exploitation tendancieuse pourrait être nuisible aux 
intérêts de la France’ ; quoted in Sarmant, Archives ‘secrètes’, secrets d’archives? (n 73). 
680 Initially, the year of release was planned for 1992; for reasons unknown it was published in 1990. See 
Charles Robert Ageron, ‘A propos des archives militaires sur la guerre d’Algérie’ [1999] 63(1) Vingtième 
siècle, revue d’histoire 127-129. 
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d’Algérie par les documents, in two volumes. The first, titled L’Avertissement (the 
warning), covers the period of 1943-1946 and the Second volume covering the period of 
1945 to 1954 untitled Les Portes de la Guerre (the doors of the war) .681  
Following the archivists’ polemic, Culture Minister Catherine Trautmann ordered a new 
administrative investigation of the archives concerning the events of 17 October 1961, 
this time looking at the judicial archives. However, Einaudi then explained that despite 
repeated demands his requests to access archives were dimissed or simply ignored.682 
On 5 May 1999, another report, the Géronimi report, 683 was submitted to Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin.684 This report reproduced documents from the archives, indicating that 
the government at the time was informed of these higher numbers.found. It notably 
reports that 48 people had died during the night of 17 October 1961, 18 deaths 
attributable to police action. However, it highlighted that this number was most probably 
lower than the actual death toll. A memo from the head of the office of the Minister of 
Justice to the director of the office of the Prime Minister, dated 27 October 1961, 
indicates that a hundred bodies were found and that for very many of them, according to 
some indicators, these murders could be attributable to actions of the police.685 Another 
memo, sent directly to Prime Minister Michel Debré, informed the prime minister on the 
disappearance and assassination.686 The Géronimi report was a way of showing that 
some efforts were being undertaken and even that police officers might be prosecuted. 
However, the proceedings were dismissed pursuant the enactement of the 1968 amnesty. 
Although the numbers and identity of the dead are still unclear, Papon’s claim of only 
three deaths on 17 October has been refuted by both the official reports, the Mandelkern 
Report published in 1998 on the police archives, and the Géronimi Report of 1999 on 
the judicial archives. The ‘other Papon affair’ revealed the extent of the tension about 
the memory of the Algerian war. The trial was both indicative of a progressive 
                                                 
681 Jean Charles Jauffret (ed), La guerre d’Algérie par les Documents. Vol 1: L’Avertissement Vol 2: Les 
Portes de la Guerre, 1946-1954 (Vincennes: Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre 1990). 
682 Jean-Luc Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961, pour la Verité, eEfin’, in Le Monde, May 20 1998. 
683 Jean Géronimi, Rapport de mission: Recensement des archives judiciaires relatives d la manifestation 
organisée par le FLN le 17 octobre 1961 et, plus généralement, aux faits commis à Paris à l’encontre des 
Français Musulmans d'Algerie durant l'année 1961, 5 May 1999. 
684 Philippe Bernard, ‘Un rapport propose de faciliter l’accès aux archives de la guerre d’Algérie’, Le 
Monde (17 October 2001) 13. 
685 ‘Une note du directeur du cabinet du garde des sceaux au directeur du cabinet du premier ministre, 
datée du 27 octobre 1961, mentionne la découverte d’une centaine de cadavres et ajoute que le plus 
souvent, selon certains indices, les meurtres pourraient être imputables à des actions policière’ [ author’s 
translation]. See Geronomi Report (n 650) 15. 
686 Nathaniel Herzberg ‘Trente-Cinq ans de Mensonge Officiel sur les Crimes Policiers de 1961’, Le 
Mond (13 August 1999) Referring to Geronimi Report (n 650)16 And 29. 
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resurgence of interest in the colonial period and the source of renewed debate over the 
underlying political consensus by which the war was terminated. Archives are a way to 
access to the ‘truth’ and even to shift the ‘accountability bargain’ on past violations.  
B. Reactivating Silenced Memories 
Since the 1990s France has undergone a resurgence of interest in the Algerian war. 
Historians’ involvement in the debate on state responsibility for the violence of the 
Algerian war raised important ethical questions. As explored in Chapter 5, French 
amnesty law makes it impossible to establish the criminal accountability of the state 
agents involved in acts of violence of the Algerian war. Yet, the intervention of 
historians allowed new aspects of the war to come to light that until then had been 
ignored. This section has explored the implications of such intervention in the 
construction of a collective narrative of the past and the limitations of using trials as a 
venue of recognition for victims. 
1. Historians as Instigators of Debates  
Defamation claims brought against historians draw attention to the role of civil society 
actors in launching a truth-telling process when the state has not. In parallel to the public 
interest in knowing about the colonial period, the ‘other’ Papon trial created a 
‘momentum’ to press the government to review access to the archives documenting the 
police repressions of 17 October 1961 as well as the way these events are remembered.  
Much earlier, in 1972, a colloquium was organised by the Court of Cassation to debate 
human rights violations during the French repression in Algeria. Historian Pierre Vidal-
Naquet presented a report in which he stressed the state of impunity covering the 
torturers.687 Rapidly, the discussions on torture turned the debate into an informal trial 
on the responsibility of the criminal justice system. Maurice Aydalot, chair of the 
session, left the room as torture was being described as perpetrated under orders. Was 
the judiciary accountable? Jean Reliquet, ex-prosecutor in Algeria, declared, ‘I could not 
do anything.’ Twenty years after this first attempt at truth telling, another colloquium 
was organised, at the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature (National School for the 
                                                 
687 Pierre Vidal Naquet ‘Rapport sur l’Algérie’ in Pierre Vidal Naquet, Face à la Raison d’Etat. Un 
Historien dans la Guerre D’Algérie, (Paris La Découverte, 1989). 
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Judiciary).688 However the presentation of testimonies by judges in service in Algeria 
raised more questions than it answered. In 1988 an international scientific colloquium on 
the theme of ‘France in the Algerian war’ was held in Paris,689 organised under the 
direction of the historians Jean Pierre Rioux and Charles Robert Ageron. The conference 
discussed the question of the Algerian conflict only from a French perspective. This 
exclusion of the Algerian experience of the war and of colonialism meant that the 
military operations in Algeria, and notably the use of torture, were not discussed.  
 
The historical impact of the Papon trial was to enable the recognition of a version of 
history that contradicted the official claim forwarded by Charles de Gaulle; namely that 
Vichy was a pawn of Germany and that abuses were carried out with the complicity of a 
few men.690 However, the judgment itself did not permit such conclusions to be inferred. 
Instead, the lessons of the Vichy past can be observed in the debates that accompanied 
the proceedings and the increased interest in this period of French history. Yet, in the 
end, the court skirted the issue of attributing responsibility for crime to the Vichy 
government. It was, as the public prosecutor stated, ‘the trial of a man and not of a 
regime’. The Papon trial played an important role in the construction of the historical 
narrative of World War II in France. It marked a significant shift in the historiography of 
the Vichy regime and the Resistance.691 The press covered the trial as if it were the trial 
of the Vichy government itself and the court’s judgment would stand as a history lesson. 
Simultaneously, however, that the trial established the Vichy government as illegitimate, 
allowing the Fourth and Fifth Republics to distance themselves as not responsible for the 
previous regime’s oppressive policies, refusing to apologize for Vichy’s crimes.692  
2. Public Disclosure of the Past of French Soldiers  
The defamation action brought against Jean-Luc Einaudi provided an opportunity to 
discuss access to the archives and the role of historian in the writing of a national 
                                                 
688 Published as a special issue of Le Genre Humain, Juger sous Vichy [1994] 28 and as a book edited by 
Maurice Olender (ed), Juger sous Vichy (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1994). 
689  ‘La France en guerre d’Algérie’, Colloquium of the Institut d’histoire du temps présent (IHTP), 
published as Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed), La guerre d’Algérie et les Français (Paris: Fayard 1990). 
690 Dominique Rousseau, Vichy a-t-il Existé?, in Olender Juger sous Vichy (n 85), 97, 103. 
691 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer. (n595) 201.  
692 From De Gaulle to Mitterrand Presidency, no official responsibility for the mistreatment of Jews during 
World War II was recognized.  
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history. As Sylvie Thenault puts it, the trial was an unprecedented opportunity for the 
historian to enter the courtroom.693 However, she nuances the potential impact of this 
intervention and stresses that the relationship between historians and judges does not 
extend to the possibility of rewriting history.694 Indeed, defamation proceedings can only 
have a limited impact on the recognition of a hidden historical past.  
 
Defamation litigations can be a part of a process of truth recovery. However, they are 
individual claims and their effect on the collective is limited. The cases explored above 
concern Frenchmen in high political positions. Thus the question was asked in terms of 
how far the divulging of an ex-combatant’s past may affect his reputation. This question 
particularly was in issue in the different charges by Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the 
far right party the Front National against those who dislosed his Algerian past. The 
revelations that had been published during his electoral campaign and it is the revealing 
of these actions at that particular moment that was at the heart of the trial.  
 
In 1989, the magistrate’s court considered two newspapers, Le Canard Enchainé and 
Libération, which had published interviews with victims who, claimed to have 
witnessed or suffered torture at the hands of Jean-Marie Le Pen.695 The first article, titled 
‘Tortionnaire et Candidat’ (torturer and [election] candidate) spurred the writing of 
another article titled ‘Oui, Le Pen a torturé’ (Yes, Le Pen tortured). 696 An ex-legionnaire 
told how he had seen Jean-Marie Le Pen ‘in action’ in the Villa des Roses, a place 
notorious for being an interrogation centre.697 In an interview in 1963, and published in 
the far right newspaper Combat, Jean-Marie Le Pen had in fact admitted to using torture 
in Algeria during his service from 1956-1957.698 Algerians accused Le Pen to have 
tortured and summary executed civilians. The Tribunal correctionel relaxed the 
journalist considering that the defamation could not be constituted. The Court de 
Cassation confirmed the argument of the defence and acknowledged the argument that 
                                                 
693 Research interview, Sylvie Thénault, March 2013, Paris.  
694 See also Lawrence Douglas, ‘The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom’ 
[2006] 14(4) European Review 516. 
695 Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle, du 7 Novembre 1989, n°86-90.811 [hereafter Canard Enchainé 
Case, 1989] , available at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007064354 
696 4 April 1984, it was also the eve of the presidential elections to which Le Pen was candidate.  
697 Libération Le Pen, Villa Rose . 
698 Combat, November 1962. 
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Le Pen himself admitted having practiced torture during his service in Algeria in 1957. 
699 Hence the French court dismissed le Pen’s claim on the basis that one cannot invoke 
a violation of the articles, because he does not admit to have committed those acts and 
affirm that this endorsement is dishonouring.700 It relied on the defence argument that Le 
Pen has admitted having practiced torture during his service in Algeria in 1957 in a press 
article published in 1962 in which he declared: 
I have nothing to hide. I tortured because it was necessary. When 
someone is brought to you who has planted 20 bombs that could 
explode at any moment and who will not talk, you use all the methods 
at your disposal to make him talk.701 
Hence the court dismissed le Pen’s claim on the basis that one cannot claim to have had 
one’s honour brought into disrepute in relation to practices (of torture) that one has 
endorsed elsewhere.702  
In 1992, the Le Pen’s controversy was reactivated by Michel Rocard on the TV 
show ‘7/7’ during a televised debate where each candidate was presenting their 
programs for the upcoming elections. Rocard said of Le Pen, among other things, ‘He 
then went to Algeria. He tortured’ (Il est ensuite allé en Algérie, il a torturé.) After a 
long battle that lasted almost ten years, in 2000 the Cour de Cassation rendered its 
judgment and ruled that Michel Rocard had pursued a ‘legitimate goal in making this 
information public’ and accepted his good faith defense. 703  
In another case, this time brought against historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen invoked a different aspect of defamation law, concerning insults.704 What was in 
issue was the insulting nature in being called ‘torturer’. It was notably ruled that the use 
of the term ‘torturer’ needed to be discussed not within the contact of a libel trial but 
                                                 
699 Canard Enchainé Case, 1989.  
700 Canard Enchainé Case, 1989  
701 Canard Enchainé Case, 1989. See also Cass. Crim.  n° 00-84622, 19 June 2001 [hereafter  Cass. Crim 
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702 Cass. Crim Vidal Naquet v. Le Pen , 19 June 2001 (n 50).  
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Cour de Cassation, Chambre mixte 24 November 2000 97-81.554., Bulletin 2000 CH. M. 4 5  
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rather in the broader context of ‘ethics, the debate of ideas, political discussion that 
should be permitted in a democratic society’.705 However as French law provides that in 
case of claims related to the insulting character of the statement, in the case of libel, the 
claimant does not have to prove that he or she has suffered loss or damage as a result of 
the publication. In contrast, in claims for slander, the claimant must prove actual 
prejudice. Conversely the judgment recognises the fact that torture was perpetrated:  
Torture during the Algerian conflict, is today as it is a historical fact 
that nobody questions, except those who consider that the term 
‘torture’ is pejorative and should not be used.706 
Disclosing his involvement in the repression perpetrated against civilians could have a 
detrimental impact on his political career. The disclosure of his past could tarnish his 
reputation as a politician. In the case of Florence Beaugé the court found, however, in 
Florence Beaugé’s favour, that her disclosures of his past were devoid of any 
‘manifestation of personal animosity against’ his electoral ambitions’.707 However, it is 
difficult to elevate this effect to a collective level. In Einaudi’s case, during the hearing 
he attempted to divert the discussion in the proceedings beyond the question of the 
dishonouring character of statement he had made and towards its historical significance. 
He sought to use the proceedings to highlight the inaccuracies of the official version and 
notably the failure of the Mandelkern Report to examine what happened in the courtyard 
of the police Prefecture (where some of the worst atrocities were reported to have been 
committed). He also asked why the archives of the River Authority were destroyed in 
1990.708 But it was in relation to Einaudi’s affaire the judges considered the evidence 
brought by an historian.709 While ruling in favour of the good faith of the historian or the 
journalists instead of relying on the defence of truth, the court is unwilling to take 
responsibility for making a historical judgment.  
Further, it has to be underlined that victims’ expectations of truth recovery from civil 
and criminal litigations should be mitigated. Firstly, even if a case is successful for those 
who tried to disclose a hidden past, the proceedings can take much time. Secondly, the 
                                                 
705 Le Monde, 1 September 1999.  
706 Cass. Crim Vidal Naquet v. Le Pen , 19 June 2001 (n50) 
707 The lower court’s judgment, stated: the judges find that the disputed writings are devoid of any 
manifestation of personal animosity towards the civil party 
708 Jean-Luc Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961, pour la Verité, enfin’, in Le Monde, May 20 1998. 
709 Jean-Luc Einaudi, ‘Octobre 1961, pour la Verité, enfin’, in Le Monde, May 20 1998. 
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public nature of the claim can also work to trivialize the suffering of victims. Although 
the Le Pen against Beaugé affaire of 2005 enabled victims to testify to having seen Le 
Pen perpetrate acts of torture, his responses to their claims were provocative.710 As he 
wrote in Le Monde, ‘I do not know if these people suffered what they say they did, but 
they certainly didn’t because of any action of mine’.711  He also averred that ‘these 
witness statements are lies. Perhaps these people were persuaded to talk. Someone said 
to them: ‘You know the guy you saw? That was Le Pen.’ But how would they have 
known? It’s ridiculous’. This kind of public response can offend the victims and deter 
those whose wounds are still open from taking part in any trial proceedings.712 
Secondly, although the intervention of the courts makes it possible to request access to 
archives, defamation proceedings do not, however, allow investigation of the crimes 
themselves. Nonetheless, these trials did enable a public affirmation of what was already 
known by the society, while the ensuing transcripts of trials and written opinions of 
judges produce a ‘legal memory’.713  
C. Society’s Right to Information  
Demands for a ‘belated rendition of justice’ are often constrained by the political impact 
a prosecution would have.714  Indeed, the terms of disengagement at the end of the 
conflict often reflect political bargaining between the opposing parties. The prosecution 
of offenders who were once forgiven may seem a revision of this bargain and trigger 
further tensions. The cases explored in this chapter shows that the role of the judge has 
not been to deliver a ‘truth’ on the Algerian war but, rather, to domesticate the narratives 
and discourses on the Algerian war.  
The role of the judge was notably observable in the European Court of Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) 2009 proceedings launched by Aussaresses’s publishers against their 
conviction and sentencing by the French court for complicity in apologie de crimes de 
                                                 
710 Benjamin Stora, 290. 
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712 Alan Cowell Le Pen Accused of Torturing Prisoners During Algerian War New york Times, JUNE 4, 
2002. 
713 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (eds), The Rhetoric of Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
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guerre. In its decision, the ECtHR ruled that by sanctioning the publishers for having 
participated in the dissemination of the witness’s account of a third person concerning 
events belonging to the past of a particular nation significantly hindered public 
discussion of problems of general (public) interest. 715 Aussaresses’s publishers, Olivier 
Orban and Xavier de Bartillat, had raised the issue of the memoirs as a matter of 
freedom of speech before the ECtHR. After two years of proceedings, the Court held 
that France had violated Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. During the debates in court the publishers had argued that 
the book contributed to establishing the ‘historical truth’ regarding a traumatising page 
of French history. As was held by the court:  
The publication of this type of witness account was undoubtedly part 
of a debate of general [public] interest and of singular importance for 
collective memory, namely not only that such practices were current, 
but more importantly [that they occurred] with the approval of the 
French authorities. 716 
The ECtHR recognised the French courts “legitimate goal” in sanctioning Aussaresses’ 
memoirs. 717  The Court recalled that Article 10 protects not only “information” or 
“ideas” that are ‘favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or indifference but also 
those that offend, shock or disturb and considered that the distance of time would 
mitigate the troubling effects on those who had suffered or witnessed the torture’. 718 
However it ruled that the French court response was disproportionate and that it was not 
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‘necessary in a democratic society’. 719  There was insufficient reason to condemn 
someone for providing a witness account, no matter how shocking or troubling, four 
decades after the acts in question. The European Court judges emphasized the 
significance of the debate in in deciding whether the actions of the French courts were 
justified and concluded:  
… taking account specifically the singular importance of the debate of general 
[public] interest of which the publication of Services Spéciaux Algérie 1955-1957 
forms a part, the reasons of the domestic court are not sufficient to convince the 
Court that the conviction of the applicants was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
Thus the Court finds that this was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.720  
In particular, the Court highlighted that guaranteeing the freedom of speech of the 
publishers was all the more necessary in a context in which the witness account 
testimony was participating in the efforts that all countries must make to ‘debate their 
past frankly and dispassionately’.721 
 
The 2009 ECtHR ruling relates to a broader trend occurring within Europe whereby 
memory of past violent event is integrated in a wider policy to combat racism and 
discrimination 722  Principle 3 of the UN Sets of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity (1997) to recognise a 
State’s need to preserve memory: 
 A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, 
as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s 
duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such 
measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction 
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722 See notably European debates on Documents of the European Conference against Racism, Strasbourg, 
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and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and 
negationist arguments. (Principle 3: Duty to Memory)723 
The recognition of a right to access information about past events bridges the gap 
between constructed narratives on the past and historical facts. The European Court of 
Human Rights considers that it has a role in regulating historical dialogue in order to 
promote democratic values. In the earlier case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France, a case 
concerned with publications on the collaboration of the Petain regime during the Second 
World War, the ECtHR spoke of ‘the efforts that every country must make to debate its 
own history openly and dispassionately’. 724  This same sentence was paraphrased in 
Orban and others with regard to statements justifying war crimes such as torture or 
summary executions.725 Denial of certain historical events is considered as contradicting 
fundamental values of the Convention and of democracy, namely justice and peace. In 
previous jurisprudence, the Court affirmed its position concerning the denial of crimes 
against humanity, notably the Holocaust.726 However, in Lehideux and Isorni it was held 
by a majority that certain statements praising Petain’s collaborationist policies were part 
of a historical debate about the interpretation of facts and ‘as such [did] not belong to the 
category of clearly established historical facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation 
or revision would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17’.727 The 
jurisprudence of ECtHR identifies a broader purpose to the publication of testimony on 
past events. This role is not to establish ‘historical truth’ as such but to protect a public 
space for a society to debate on controversial issues of a country’s past. The Court of 
Cassation had dismissed the historical interest of Aussaresses’ memoirs, emphasizing 
that freedom of expression must be exercised ‘within the limits of the law’ as permitted 
by Article 10(2). 728As the European Court saw it, the punishment of the publishers was 
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disproportionate, especially as no incitement or expressions of hatred were involved. 
The Court found that a society’s right to information and a democratic society’s need to 
be able to debate its past was fundamental arising from Article 10(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Right on Freedom of Expression.  
Conclusion  
The analysis of the Papon-Einaudi cases here has traced the evolution of the judicial 
debate that resulted in the public recognition of Maurice Papon’s responsibility in the 
killing of Algerian demonstrators on 17 October 1961. The Vichy proceedings created a 
momentum and an opportunity to discuss the Algerian war and the responsibility of the 
French army. As the military practices of torture were increasingly exposed, amnesty 
still impeded the demonstration of truth before the courts. There is a natural expectation 
that ‘truth’ will emerge from criminal prosecutions. However, as this chapter 
demonstrated the role of trials dealing with serious crimes fail to satisfy the victims and 
help them to overcome their wounds but are also directed to a larger community. 
Amnesty laws bring a complex relationship with accountability and memory that 
extends beyond the realm of a courtroom. How these relationships develop over time 
and what constitutes the tenor of demands for justice call for further investigation. The 
next chapter examines the implications of amnesty in the construction of an official 
narrative of past events and its manifestation through the commemorative process.  
The examination of the defamation proceedings more widely illuminated the influence 
of amnesty on the public airing of evidence. In particular, it has shown how individual 
circumstances of alleged perpetrators of torture bringing defamation suits allowed the 
public to hear evidence about past abuses through ‘good faith’ defences. Indeed by 
relying on the ‘good faith’ of the author’s claims about a past torturer, the French courts 
apply the reverse burden of proof such that individuals have to provide sufficient 
evidence. However, while French jurisprudence protect the right of historians and 
journalists to disclosing the past in this way, it offers little satisfaction for the victims 
who cannot be officially recognised as such.  
                                                                                                                                                
 (2) of the European Court of Human rights : ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
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Chapter 7:  
Dealing with the legacy of past conflict and amnesty 
 
We pass through the present with our eyes blindfolded. We are permitted merely 
to sense and guess at what we are actually experiencing. Only later when the 
cloth is untied can we glance at the past and find out what we have experienced 
and what meaning it has. 
Milan Kundera, Laughable Loves729 
 
 
Up to this point, this thesis has examined judicial attitude towards the application of the 
amnesties. It has explored a series of cases and sought to frame the possibility for 
individuals to investigate and prosecute past crimes. This chapter turns to exploring the 
impact of amnesty legislation on the construction of a national narrative of past events. 
Given the influence of political variables, what is the likelihood of accounts established 
in legal proceedings to be recognised officially?  
On 26 March 2012, the start of political recognition could be witnessed when French 
president Francois Holland pledged to atone for the acts of violence perpetrated by the 
French police in Paris on 17 October 1961: 
Truth must be known. It is important to recognize what occurred […] 
Algerians demonstrating for the right to independence were killed in a 
bloody crackdown. The Republic recognises these facts with clarity. 
Fifty-one years after the tragedy, I pay tribute to the memory of the 
victims.730 
“Truth” is undoubtedly ‘one of the most elusive concepts that can be used to address 
what happened during a conflict’. 731  Hollande’s tribute came as the fulfilment of a 
political promise he had made during the campaign for the presidential election. It marks 
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a change of attitude towards dealing with the Algerian past and sends a message to 
groups striving for recognition. 
This chapter examines how and why amnesty laws became the nexus of contested 
narratives about the Algerian past. Amnesty initially restricted the commemoration of 
past events by framing a selective political process of remembrance. The 
implementation of the amnesty affected the political construction of an official narrative 
on the Algerian war, which resulted in forestalling the forgetting of past crimes. 
However, the efforts of individuals to activate marginalised memories and cultivate an 
alternative narrative of past events have enabled revision of the official narrative of 
some episodes of the conflict. 
This chapter first examines the relationship between amnesty and commemoration 
through three forms of dealing with the legacy of past conflict. The first one consists of 
understanding the evolution of a political discourse about past violent events. The 
second one examines the role of law in the writing of an official history. It maps the 
evolution of the political discourse on the official history of the Algerian war. In 
particular, it looks at debates surrounding the official recognition of the war in 1999. It 
also explores further the role of law in the writing of history and examines the French 
concept of memory laws (lois memorielles) in protecting the memory of the past from 
being altered. Finally, it examines how individuals initiated their own commemorative 
actions. This last section seeks to pinpoint the emergence of a movement of resistance to 
the official discourse on the Algerian war as it emerged from civil society and, in 
particular, it examines the effect of contentious actions on the politics of 
commemoration of the events of 17 October 1961. 
I. Official History, Collective Memory and Sites of Memory  
The issue of memory is increasingly becoming a central topic of political contention in 
the present. Contentious actions are both a response to, and an influence on political 
institutions. How States commemorate their past provide a template of the interpretative 
possibilities available. How the event is remembered enlighten on the vocabularies, the 
symbolism and attributions that attribute value. 732  Remembering and forgetting 
traumatizing events embeds crucial foundations for the reconstruction of a society.733 
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Not only does remembering provide a form of recognition for the victims but also it 
ensures that recognition at a state level. By addressing this event publicly, a state may 
seek to explain these acts and release all details necessary to understand them. Impunity 
Watch’s comparative study on the role of memorialisation found that political interests 
frequently drive states narratives.734 
The role of the law in the narration of past events is characterised by a go-between in the 
relation of norms and facts. The presentation of the facts develops in a narration that 
culminates with atonement. The relation between normative and narrative coherence 
reflect the two faces of legal norms. As such, the law is meant to function in a normative 
and a narrative context simultaneously. Norms are in need of a narrative to come to be 
seen as relevant. As Chapter 6 explained, in criminal proceedings this relation serves 
an ambiguous function in the context of historical trials.735  Judges’ use of history serves 
to construct and reinforce particular views of the past, of the legal order, and of the 
relationship between the two. Claims of justice constructed on the establishment of a 
shared ‘truth’ risk engaging in a broader struggle of recognition between narratives 
that may overshadow the demands of victims or their relatives.  
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, this relationship does not make it possible to 
address and resolve the discrepancies that may emerge between official memory and 
individual accounts. It found that legal proceedings inevitably produce a selective 
narrative. For Sociologist Pierre Nora the discrepancy between what is aknowledged and 
what is known reflect the opposition of memory to history. The authorised historu 
produced by state institutions, unself-conscious, commanding and all powerful, clashes 
with the outburst of memories coming from individuals whose voices were 
marginalised.736  Derrida’s conceptualization of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is useful 
here to complete the understanding of the exclusive and inclusive dynamics of memory. 
Oppositions such as ‘good versus bad’, ‘inside versus outside’, ‘true and false’, are 
reflective of a violent hierarchy. Memory is therefore shaped by the frame of reference 
of the one who remembers in the present. Secondly, memory introduces an element of 
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‘undecidability’ between past and present. 737  In this mode of reflection, one can 
understand that there are too many truths and too many memories of past crimes that the 
desire to harmonise them into a single memory appears to be both reductive and wrong. 
Nora develops his argument further, suggesting that official representations of the past 
can eradicate memory. Within this frame of analysis, the concept of sites of memory, as 
defined in Chapter 2, is linked to a dynamic that leads to the consolidation of a heritage 
and the disappearance of memory. As Nora explains, the sites of memory ‘originate with 
the sense that there is no spontaneous memory’. 738  Anniversaries, museums, and 
memorials are deliberately created to make up for the absence of memory.  
To understand these dynamics, the ‘contentious politics’ model presented in Chapter 2 
offers a grid to analyse how conflict may emerge from the silencing of individual 
accounts. Assessing the role of social movement, it is useful to focus on ‘the dynamic 
processes through which political actors, identities and forms of action emerge, interact 
[…] and evolved during complex episodes of contention’.739 Following this suggestion 
Cath Collins proposes that identifying who entered ‘the arena of political contention’ 
offers a wider potential to explore the sites and how these actors interact with the post-
transitional political and legal environment.740 Over time, various types of grievance, 
interests and political aspirations may simultaneously emerge. In a related argument, 
Wimmer Cederman and Min, add that disentangling these intertwined contentious 
demands may be pointless. Instead they suggest focusing on studying the dynamics that 
motive these actors. 741  Collins investigates the question of social mobilization, the 
‘strategic coincidence’, and how these groups may appropriate structures of opportunity 
‘construct interests and goals, innovate in action repertoires.’742 Further, this framework 
makes it possible to understand that struggles over memory’s passage into history are 
shaped within the symbolic environment in which contentious politics take place.  
In the case of the Algerian war, the absence of sites of memory that acknowledge the 
responsibility of French agents in the institutionalisation of torture has fuelled the 
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victims with a sense of continuation of the harm.743 Because legal language is inevitably 
selective, recourse to law to ‘fix’ history overlooks the fragmentation of memory in 
different individual accounts. The emergence of multiple memory groups, and the 
impossibility of a cohesive and collectively accepted narrative, indicate the difficulty for 
law in settling the past. The emergence of counter-memory groups reflects the 
relationship between memory and identity construction. Their intervention in the field of 
memory plays on the struggle for the recognition of a survivors’ identity. 744 Victims 
feeling marginalized and their needs ignored challenge the traditional landmarks of a 
collective memory by refusing their significance as key structures of identification and 
by claiming new hallmarks of recognition. 
 A. Mapping The Political Discourse on the Legacy of Past Conflict 
(1970-1990) 
The memory of the Algerian war is characterised by antagonistic edges stemming from 
the controversial and deeply divisive nature of the Algerian War of Independence. Over 
time, debates over the Algerian War evolved from a discourse about restoration of 
national cohesion to a debate about the assertion of French national identity.  
 
Since the 1990s, the emergence of multiple discourses of accountability and victimhood 
competed with the political project of reunification of the French nation. In The Vichy 
Syndrome, Henry Rousso advances the thesis that Algerian memories need to be 
regarded as part of a continuum with the commemoration of the past of the Vichy 
regime. The commemoration of the Algerian War fed into the memory of the Vichy 
Regime. Henry Rousso notes that such moments of crisis of a society feed into one 
another. Hence memories of past conflict are themselves components of each new 
crisis. 745  The emergence of a counter-discourse on violence has two contextual 
explanations, one at an international level, and the other one at a social level.746  
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Rousso advances the thesis that memories of past conflict are themselves components of 
each new crisis.747 For him the debates on the memory of the Algerian War subscribe to 
a historical narrative of French republicanism. 748 This history of the Algerian War relied 
on previous constructed myth and interpretations. From the beginning of the conflict, 
France refused to label the operations undertaken in Algeria as a ‘war’. De Gaulle’s 
skilful navigation prepared the two countries to end the conflict in a manner that 
resembled more of a strategic economic cooperation than the end of Franco-Algerian 
relations. By taking the helm of the amnesty debate in 1962, De Gaulle was primarily 
concerned to restore the lost national cohesion and facilitate the reunification of groups 
divided by the conflict. However, as explained above, the colons and veterans 
considered they were ‘abandoned’. France developed a narrative of its colonial history, 
which presented decolonisation as a predetermined end point.749 However, as observed 
by Todd Shepard in The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Re-
making of France, this representation of colonisation ‘has allowed France to forget that 
Algeria has been an integral part of France since 1830 and to escape many of the 
implications of this shared past’. 750  The trauma of the territorial separation was 
described as an inevitable momentum in the ‘tide of history’.751  
For historian Benjamin Stora, de Gaulle’s policy yielded more than an attempt to 
safeguard the ideal of Republican values. He contends that, from 1963 to the 1990s 
‘France appeared to be increasingly occupied with erasing the traces of a war she had 
lost’.752 The grant of amnesty prevented the possibility of investigating the repressive 
methods used by the French army.  
In the 1970s, the amnesty debate shifted towards a more symbolic dialogue and was 
used as a way to re-shape the relationship between France as a nation and the ‘lost 
soldiers’ of the Algerian war. The amnesty process permitted the construction of a 
narrative about the French operations in Algeria and the subsequent end of the war based 
on the Republican ethos that the Republic is ‘une et indivisible’ (one and invisible). 
Under colonial rule, this principle was embedded in a civilising mission. This mission 
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consisted in freeing the indigenous population from forms of tyranny and improving 
conditions of life by introducing them to ideas of equality and democratic values. The 
colonial depiction of indigenous societies, particularly in Africa, pictured these societies 
as ‘blinded by obscurantism’, bound by misery, anarchy and barbarism. 
The ideal of unity of the French nation has been the driving force behind the grant of 
amnesty. De Gaulle himself incarnated an idealised vision of national unity. He sought 
continuity between the struggles of the French Resistance and the advent of the Fifth 
Republic. ‘The Republic has never ceased to exist. Free France, fighting France, the 
French Committee of National Liberation has by turn embodied it. Vichy was and is null 
and void.’ 753
 
By this representation of the history of Vichy, de Gaulle sought to 
downplay the internal divisions that characterized World War II.163 The birth of the Fifth 
Republic was the occasion to reassert the republican ethos of the unity of the nation.754 
Driven by a desire to modernise the country’s economic and political institutions, de 
Gaulle’s exercise of power was thus formulated in terms of political independence from 
the United States and a powerful French presence in the developing world. De Gaulle 
undertook a process of restoration of national cohesion centred on the deployment of ex-
colonial personnel. Melissa Byrnes explains that personnel from the colonial 
administrations were placed in government offices for immigration and re-kitted the 
colonial system to regulate the arrival of North African migrants in the Metropole.755 
Linked to the peace agreements, the issue of human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
French army was put aside for the immediate needs for political stability and restoration 
of democratic institutions 
With the achievement of the amnesty process, one of the most immediate issues for the 
colons and ex-combatants was material reparations. As such the assimilationist nature of 
the language used to commemorate the Algerian War has exalted a past expunged from 
the guilt of the violence of the colonial system. In the 1980s President Francois 
Mitterrand pursued this direction and inaugurated his presidential mandate with the 
reintegration of the OAS members in their military ranks and their military pensions. In 
1988 Jacques Chirac, then Prime Minister declared: 
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 [T]he accomplishments of France overseas [were] something great, 
ambitious, generous, and imperishable [...] France has no reason to 
blush over these accomplishments, they are above all a task of 
civilization, progress, liberty and fraternity.756 
The official policy seems to continue the spirit of the amnesty laws and did not address 
the most contentious aspect of the conflict. A first theme of contestation is related to the 
role of the French army and the legitimacy of the French operations during the war. 
Between 1968 and 1974, a veteran’s memory emerged from the publication of personal 
testimonies. From the memory of conscripts, elite paratroopers, four-star generals, OAS 
members, and Gaullist secret police, emerges the ‘embattled self’ of the combatants with 
regard to the issue of violence and loyalty to the Nation. The memoirs of high-ranking 
officers notably reflected on the division within the army on the question of torture and 
the legitimacy of the French counterinsurgency strategy. General Jacques Massu, head 
of the 10th Parachute Division, published La vraie bataille d’Alger (The real battle of 
Algiers). 757 In his book, Massu describes torture as instrumental to the French success in 
the Battle of Algiers.758 In response to Massu, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière 
published Bataille d’Alger, bataille de l’homme (Battle of Algiers, Battle of Man), 
which protested vehemently against Massu’s justification of torture. 759  Conscripts 
portrayed the ordinary combatant as the victim of the hypocrisy of the French 
government. As a way to illustrate this, the writings of Pierre Dominique Giacomoni, a 
civilian claiming to have been the top killer in the OAS, published J’ai tué pour rien (I 
killed for nothing), in which he denounces the hypocritical way in which the French 
government framed combat in the Algerian war.760 In contrast, the memoirs of putschist 
Colonel Argoud portray the figure of the combatant as holding faithfully to his mission, 
but failing because of the hypocrisy of the government.761 Where the French army is 
concerned, responsibility for the escalation of violence is presented as lying with key 
political figures. Caught between the pride associated with having served France and the 
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guilt associated with having practised torture, the veterans of the war expressed various 
kinds of victimhood.762 
At the peripheries of this memory, the experience of Algerian soldiers who fought 
alongside the French soldiers against their fellow countrymen challenged the idea of 
equality. This group of approximately of 180,000 men had a symbolic and military 
function. They represented a group of Algerians who supported the continuation of 
French rule.763 After the war, most of them were disarmed and sent home.764 Because of 
their collaboration with the French army, the Harkis were in the front line of FLN 
retaliations and post conflict purges. 765 However, the government of Charles de Gaulle 
explicitly refused to ‘repatriate’ the bulk of the Harkis population to France.766  He 
declared, ‘We cannot accept all Muslims who claim they are not getting along with their 
government.’ 767  In January 1963, at a cabinet meeting, Prime Minister George 
Pompidou said, ‘We must not let ourselves be invaded by the Algerian labour force, 
even if it pretends to be Harkis. If we are not careful, all the Algerians will settle in 
France.’768  It is estimated that 75,000 to 100,000 Harkis were killed in Algeria. In 
addition, the 25,000 Harkis who could have been repatriated to France between 1962 
and 1967 were considered “inassimilable”.769 Upon their arrival, nearly all of the Harkis 
were taken to internment camps as part of their official processing. Those who were 
housed long-term were considered to be inassimilable: the chronically ill, traumatized, 
aged, and families without male heads of household.770 Demands of recognition of their 
role and for compensation has been one of the most contentious issues in remembering 
the Algerian war. 
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A second theme of contestation emerged from the repatriated colons. Commonly called 
the pieds noirs, 771 this group generally viewed the colonial period as a blessing and 
lived the independence of Algeria as a tragedy. During the war, the French colons were 
vehemently opposed to the decolonisation of Algeria. They developed strong patriotism 
and an attachment to a certain idea of the French nation.772 However their support for the 
terrorist actions of the OAS against the central authority stigmatised the pieds noirs. 
This population, who had grown up in Algeria, felt Algerian, and strongly believed in an 
Algérie-Française.773 However their support for the pro Algérie-Française hardliners 
marked a rupture with French public opinion.774 The left accused the pieds noirs of 
fascist impulses and argued that it was because of them that torture was widespread 
during the war.775  The enactment of the 1974 and 1982 amnesty laws was a clear 
political gesture aimed at the pieds noirs community. 776  But as these efforts 
concentrated on the grandeur of France and the rehabilitation of the veterans, successor 
governments pursued a ‘wilful forgetting’ of its responsibility for the perpetration of 
human rights violation.777 The pieds noirs, although from Algeria, were recognised as 
French. As Shepard expresses it, ‘the war’s close allowed the Gaullist government to 
reaffirm the national boundaries as not only hexagonal but also distinctly 
“European”’. 778  As such, the presence of Algerians on the French territory was a 
reminder of the French defeat in the war. The presence of Algerian workers in France 
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was seen a phenomenon alien to French history.779 Migrants from Algeria bore the mark 
of, at the very least, an old enemy. It was thought to be a temporary phenomenon and the 
image of the ‘single labour migrant ‘epitomised the social profile of migrants.780 Most of 
these workers eventually brought their dependants from their homeland to France. 
Bidonvilles (slums) rapidly proliferated on the French landscape.781 Immigrants were no 
longer a mere economic commodity but a fast growing and increasingly settled 
population.782 From 1965 to the 1970s, Algerian immigration became an increasingly 
contentious issue and their presence was characterised as ‘undesirable’.783 The growing 
hostility towards the North African migrants, coupled with economic crisis, resulted in 
what Yves Gastault describes as the ‘apogee of anti-Arab Racism’.784 Successive French 
governments have continued to insist upon, and disproportionately emphasise to these 
immigrants, the need for them to assimilate into the basic model of secular republican 
citizenship. 785  In December 1971, the yearly quota was reduced from 35,000 to 
25,000.786 From the mid-1970s onwards, the tension between France and Algeria was 
exacerbated to the extent that Algeria suspended all immigration to France in September 
1973 as France toughened its policy on global immigration. The far right political party-
the Front National (FN)- was founded by an ex-soldier and member of the OAS, Jean 
Marie Le Pen in 1972.787 The party ideology was particularly appealing to repatriated 
community. The FN emphasised its political programme on the theme of preservation of 
the French national identity and an anti-north African migrant policy. It considered the 
presence of Algerians in France as an ‘enemy ‘within’.788 Discussions about the failure 
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of the French model of integration became the platform for passionate debate on 
national identity and colonial memory. Algerian migrants are trapped within a binary 
conversation of inclusion or exclusion in the French nation. France’s construction of 
identity rests on the development of an imagined narrative.789  
Another dimension to the memory of the Algerian war can be observed on the 
diplomatic scene. The issue of amnesty has played an important role in defining the 
relation between France and the newly born Algerian state. Since the 1990s France and 
Algerian relations have moved back and forth with a treaty of friendship still pending. 
The frictions between France and Algeria illustrate this. In June 2000, Algerian 
president Abdelaziz Bouteflika addressed the French National Assembly to denounce 
the politics of forgetting concerning the Algerian war. ‘The colonial past cannot be 
ignored’, he said:  
Whether you come out of the limbo of non-dits of the Algerian War, 
by naming it, or that your educational institutions try to rectify in 
school programs the distorted image of some colonial episode, would 
represent a step forward in the achievement of truth in which you have 
engaged for the good of historical knowledge and equity between 
men.’790  
Relations stalled at the point of the recognition of the violence of the colonial regime. 
This reconstitution of the Algerian past did not allow France to question its heritage. 
This policy was to elevate the issue of the commemoration of the Algerian war in a 
political project of self-assertion. Stiina Loytomaki argues that contemporary official 
representations of history which contribute to the definition of the concept of national 
identity of the nation resort to teleological universalism in their narrative construction.791 
Her examination of France’s politics of memory highlights the prevalence of the Jacobin 
ethos of ‘la république est une et indivisible;’ the republic is one and indivisible in the 
official language used to commemorate the war. The French Republic sees itself as the 
incarnation of universal values of equality. Within the official narrative on the colonial 
period, the French state sought to preserve the ideal of a mission civilisatrice (civilising 
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mission). The concept of civilising mission encapsulates the idea that France is a ‘Great 
Nation’ and as such it has an obligation to carry its revolutionary ideals beyond the 
French borders.792 At the time, the ‘civilising mission’ core to the idea of history as 
progress and directly implied the superiority of French culture. The French politics of 
memory thus also held a nostalgia for the past. The birth of French universalism, 
traditionally associated with the Revolution of 1789, prefaced the creation of the 
Republican state.793 Universalism refers to the civilising mission as the ideology that 
underpinned and inspired the colonial expansion. ‘Civilisation’ was not just a marker of 
material improvement but also a normative judgment about the moral progress of 
society.794
 
The French mission to civilise had sincere humanistic engagement.795 French 
values and institutions were considered to be not only superior to others but also 
universally valid and applicable.  
Under Sarkozy’s presidency, the relationship between memory and political practice is 
all the more present. The rehabilitation of the colonial implementation, as well as 
officers, putschists and members of the OAS, reached a new milestone with the theme of 
‘refusal of a repentance’. 796  Sarkozy based his presidential campaign on patriotism and 
pride of the French people. He clearly stated that France would never apologise for 
French colonialism in Algeria because, as he said, children are not responsible of their 
parents’ actions. He also asserted that an apology and repentance was not good for the 
French national feeling. In a speech given at Mentouri University in Constantine on 
December 5, 2007, Sarkozy explicitly condemned the violence and injustice of the 
colonial system, and conceded that it was a ‘profoundly unjust’ period for the Algerians. 
In his speech, Sarkozy referred to the ‘sincerity’ of many colonisers and to suffering 
shared by both the Algerian and French people. The same year, he addressed the African 
youth  and acknowledged the violent realities of the colonial period, but speaks of Africa 
in terms of ‘mysterious nature’ and exhorted the ‘Africans’ to ‘enter history’. His speech 
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was criticised for being largely drawn upon 19th century colonial stereotypes.797 As he 
declared ‘nobody could ask today’s generation to expiate this crime.’798  During his visit 
in Algeria, he reasserted the same message and added that the friendship treaty is no 
longer a priority.799  
The creation of the Ministry of National Identity in 2007 cemented the link between a 
process of commemoration of the colonial past and French national identity. Hortefeux, 
Minister for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Development 
Solidarity, declared that ‘there is nothing wrong in linking immigration, assimilation and 
identity’. Further, he declared that ‘to hide our identity from those who wish to settle in 
France is to deny the values that forged our history’. 800In March 2009, a letter addressed 
to Eric Besson, Minister in charge of immigration and national identity, defined the 
central task of the minister as the ‘promotion of national identity at the heart of every 
action of the government’. 801 Sarkozy entered the presidential campaign with the desire 
to strengthen French patriotism. Hence gesture of commemoration aimed at remedying 
the Harkis tragedy.  
From 1990, successive governments sought to construct a unifying framework of 
collective identity and the universality of ‘national history’. It required the state to 
intervene in the field of memory. Indeed, France is currently immersed in an era of 
commemoration. 802  However, with the emergence of national identity debate and 
multicultural demands on the part of second-generation migrants, challenges emerged to 
the role of the state as master of memory. This ideal of Frenchness was associated with 
the idea of progress, and to a large extent, this legitimated conquest and created a 
conflict between the ideas of equality and freedom. 
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B. The Official Recognition of the War: the 1999 Law   
The predominant representation of the conflict had complex legal and social 
consequences. The ideological dynamics explored above shaped official discourse on 
the Algerian war.  
On 18 October 1999, the National Assembly voted for a law officially recognising that 
the conflict in Algeria had been a war.803 This ad hoc recognition brought out a most 
striking singularity of the Algerian amnesties, namely that they are based on the notion 
that between 1954 and 1962 France was not at war but merely involved in a ‘policing 
operations’. The notion of the ‘Algerian war’ ‘was already present in the language of 
historians long before the 1999 law. The law was therefore more about officialising a 
terminology already in use than pioneering recognition. The law on the recognition of 
the Algerian war has permitted the re-adjustment of the narrative of the war to the 
‘historical reality’ and the language in common use. Deputy Georges Colombier, Didier 
Quentin and Francois Rochebloine drafted the law with the need for a more accurate 
recognition of the status of the combatants in mind. Throughout the conflict France 
adopted a euphemistic discourse to address the Algerian war. In the late 1990s and after 
it mutated into no less euphemistic terms. The law has a memorial function; it seeks ‘to 
integrate the Algerian war in the collective memory’. 804  However, semantic 
‘readjustment’ to refer to the conflict was not the principal role of the 1999 law.805 
Indeed the drafters sought first and foremost to instate a form of equality for the 
génération du feu.806  
Five articles in the 1999 law deal with the question of veterans’ pensions. It also 
permitted the recognition of the role of the Algerian auxiliaries, the Harkis, as veterans 
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of the war. The law granted a military pension to the 50,000 Muslims Algerians who had 
served in the French Army. According to the statements available on the website of the 
ONACVG (Office nationale des anciens combattants et victims de guerre), Algerians 
who belonged to the following groups are considered to be either former auxiliaries or 
‘assimilated personnel’: 
[Former auxiliaries are those who belonged to] the following units: 
harka, the self-defence groups or maghzen, the mobile security groups, 
gendarmerie auxiliaries, specialist urban administrative section  
The ‘assimilated’ categories [are]: contracted auxiliary police officers, 
casual temporary police, rural police in country areas, intelligence 
officers, military medical auxiliaries, French repatriated from North 
Africa, former soldiers in the regular French forces, participating in 
the operations to maintain order in Algeria but who left the army with 
less than fifteen years’ service, excluding those who completed their 
compulsory military service only in regular units.807 
As a result of the 1999 law, victims of the war have the legal status of ‘Mort pour la 
France’. The term ‘Mort pour la France’ is defined in the code of military pensions, the 
code des pensions militaires d’invalidité et de victims de guerre at Article L.488 to 
L.492 (bis). As it stands, the applicant must be domiciled in France or a member state of 
the European Union, have retained French nationality and have made a declaration 
recognising this nationality before 10 January 1973. The beneficiary has a choice of one 
of the following three options. Firstly, they may receive a quarterly award, the annual 
equivalent of which is €2,800. The second option is that this quarterly award can be 
granted at a rate of €1,857.50 per year and a capital sum of €20,000. The third option 
consists of the payment of a capital sum of €30,000. Under the new scheme of 
indemnification, these measures also apply to surviving repatriated spouses or former 
spouses of former auxiliaries or ‘assimilated personnel’ who have not remarried and are 
aged 60 or over, as well as their children.  
In parallel, historians, human rights activists and journalists rallied around the idea of 
reviving ‘lost memories’. The recognition of the war in 1999 constituted an opportunity 
for this group to raise the interest of the public in France’s involvement in the Algerian 
                                                 
807 http://www.onac-vg.fr/en/missions/measures-assist-harkis-and-widows/  
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operations. Mainstream newspaper Le Monde published the testimony of Louisette 
Ighilariz, a former member of the FLN describing the conditions of her imprisonment. 
Louisette Ighilariz named the officers in attendance during that time. Most notably, she 
named Jacques Massu, head of the 10th division of paratroopers.808  The compelling 
account of her ordeal ignited an unprecedented debate on the absence of recognition of 
victims of torture and whether the State should apologise.809 The controversy grew more 
intense when retired officer Paul Aussaresses published his testimony of the war (as 
discussed in Chapter 5). Aussaresses admitted that torture formed part of a deliberate 
military strategy and, more than that, he described the torture as a legitimate and 
effective means of ending the Algerian nationalists’ terrorism. He further explained his 
actions as a gesture of his patriotic commitment to defend the interests of France:  
 These policemen were neither bourreaux nor monsters but ordinary 
men. People devoted to their country profoundly penetrated by the 
sense of duty and left to exceptional circumstances.810 
Official responses to Aussaresses’ public justifications of the torture were ambiguous. 
Immediately after his confession was published, President Jacques Chirac issued a 
statement expressing his horror at the atrocities revealed to have been carried out in 
Algeria.811 Aussaresses was stripped of his legion d’honneur. Despite President Chirac 
expressing his revulsion at such a practice, he rejected demands from the victims of 
torture for an official apology or reparations. To him it was important not to ‘open old 
wounds and he urged the two countries to continue along the path of reconciliation.812 
                                                 
808 Florence Beaugé, ‘Torturée par l’armée Française en Algérie, « Lila » recherche l’homme qui l’a 
sauvée’, Le Monde (Paris, 20 June 2000); Florence Beaugé, ‘La question d’une femme: Louisette 
Ighilarhiz qui permit de rouvrir le dossier de la torture en Algérie raconte son parcours de militante à Anne 
Nivet’, Le Monde: Le Monde des Livres (Paris, 15 June 2001). Her articles were part of a series of 
articles: ‘Torture en Algérie: l’aveu des généraux’ and Philippe Bernard, ‘Torture en Algérie: deux 
généraux français affrontent leur mémoire’, Le Monde (Paris, 23 November 2000) 1; Jean-Michel Bezat 
and Jean-Louis Saux, ‘Le PCF réclame une commission d’enquête sur la torture pendant la guerre 
d’Algérie’, Le Monde (Paris 24 Novembre 2000) 10; Jean-Michel Bezat and Ariane Chemin, ‘Lionel 
Jospin écarte l’idée d’une commission spéciale sur la guerre d’Algérie’, Le Monde, (Paris, 29 November 
2000); Georgette Elgey, ‘Crimes de la guerre d’Algérie: divulguer pour ne pas répéter’, Le Monde (Paris, 
5 May 2001) 1. 
809  Tramor Quemeneur ‘Le débat sur les tortures dans la guerre d’Algérie’ [2000] 276 Regards sur 
l’actualité 29. 
810 Paul Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux: Algérie 1955–1957 (Paris: Perrin 2001) 30. 
811 ‘Chirac Condemns Torture General’, BBC News (London, 4 May  2001). Available at:  
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/131255 6.stm [last accessed 3 April 2013] 
812 ‘Algeria: Chirac Rejects “Torture Apology”’, BBC News (London 15 December 2000).  Available at: 
http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1071504.stm [last accessed 3 April 2013] 
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This brief sketch of the memory of the Algerian war from the perspective of the 
repatriated colons and veterans sought to highlight the divisive nature and use of 
memories regarding the Algerian war. The amnesty provided a way to avoid discussing 
the issue of the brutality on both sides of the conflict. One can observe the dissociation 
in the narrative explaining the transition from decolonisation to modernisation: 
[It is as if] France’s colonial history was nothing more than an 
‘exterior’ experience that somehow came to an abrupt end, cleanly in 
1962 […] colonialism itself was made to seem like a dusty archaism, 
as though it had not transpired in the twentieth century and in the 
personal histories of many people living today, as though it played 
only a tiny role in France’s national history and no role at all in its 
modern identity.813 
The discrepancy between an official narrative and the history of the Algerian war turns 
the collective memory into an ipseity; the incarnation of a rebuilt past, that characterises 
the French nation. By focusing on stories that reinforce French republican values, the 
colonial past has been made meaningful so as to create a ‘fictitious ethnicity’.814 Despite 
the defence of an ideal of France during the Colonial era, the French politics of memory 
of the Algerian war it took some times before the translation of this narrative in sites of 
memory. 815 Pierre Nora observed that the omnipresence of the theme of memory in 
French politics in the 1980s immersed France in an era of commemoration.816  
II. Attempt to Reunify Fragmented Memories: 2005 Law on the 
Positive Aspects of Colonialism 
Since the 1960s, gestures commemorating the Algerian war in France have evolved in a 
sporadic fashion. The dynamics of construction of a collective narrative acknowledged a 
significant shift as the issue of memory opened up with debates about the French 
national identity and what is means to be French in the post-colonial age. The grant of 
                                                 
813  Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture. 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1995) 9. 
814 Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (London: Verso 2002) 68. See also Luisa Passerini, 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) 200. 
815 Jean Pierre Rioux, ‘La flamme et les bûchers’ in Jean Pierre Rioux (ed), La guerre d’Algérie et les 
Français (Paris: Fayard 1993) 497–508. See also Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli. La mémoire de 
la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: La Découverte 1992). 
816 Nora, ‘L’Ere de la Commemoration’ (n 800) 1007-1008. 
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amnesty that prohibited the prosecution of Algerian nationalists and any French man 
involved in the war curtailed any debate on the war and the legitimacy of the use of 
violence. This section turns to demonstrating that the law’s intervention in narration of 
the memory of the Algerian war in France resulted in a deformed picture of the colonial 
enterprise whereby the colonial enterprise is depicted in a ‘positive light’. 
A. 2005 Law On The Recognition of the Positive Aspect of 
Colonialism  
The Chirac government sought to construct a unifying framework of collective identity 
and the universality of ‘national history’. This required the state to intervene in the field 
of memory. In 2005, Jacques Chirac thought to reconcile the pieds noirs with the new 
promises made to this lobby, which led to the Loi portant reconnaissance de la Nation et 
contribution nationale en faveur des Francais rapatriés,817 commonly known as the 
Mekachera Law, covers the issue of recognition of the contribution of the repatriated 
French. The adoption of the Mekachera law was propelled by the work undertaken by 
the Commission Inter-ministerielles aux rapatriés (the inter-ministry Commissions for 
the Repatriated), initiated by former Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin. The goal of 
this commission was to accomplish a ‘gesture of national solidarity with the repatriated’.  
The primary occasion of the Law of 23 February 2005 was to acknowledge demands for 
recognition, and to create an official legislative response to, injustices suffered by those 
who had been repatriate from French Algeria, in particular both the Harkis and the pieds 
noirs. By way of symbolic recognition, Article 3 created the Fondation pour la Mémoire 
de la Guerre d’Algérie, des Combats du Maroc et de la Tunisie.818 Article 13 dealt 
further with the restoring the pensions of the veterans. It extended the benefits of the 
Courrière law to OAS members who had not contributed to a pension scheme during 
their exile and until the passing of the 1968 amnesty.819 Assimilating all those who 
                                                 
817 Loi no 2005-158 du 23 Février 2005 Portant Reconnaissance de la Nation et Contribution Nationale en 
Faveur des Français Rapatriés, JORF 24 Février 2005 3128. Available at: 
 legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000444898 [last accessed March 2013] 
818 Loi no 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 (n 815). Article 3: ‘Une fondation pour la mémoire de la guerre 
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819  Law no 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 (n 815). Article 13: ‘Peuvent demander le bénéfice d'une 
indemnisation forfaitaire les personnes de nationalité française à la date de la publication de la présente loi 
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au 3 juillet 1962, de condamnations ou de sanctions amnistiées, de mesures administratives d'expulsion, 
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fought ‘on the side of France’, this legislative recognition of repatriated colons and the 
harkis (and the Ias) yielded a narrative representation in which the actions perpetrated to 
preserve a French Algeria could be aligned with the actions of the Resistance against the 
Nazi occupations.  
Following the enactment of the law, many voices objected that this narrative overlooked 
the contradictions of the colonial ideology and the doctrines of assimilation that had 
guided French policy in Algeria. The articulation of the legacy of France’s colonial past 
drew much attention to the acknowledgement of responsibility of the French state for the 
crimes perpetrated by the French army. The Mekachera law was considered an attempt 
to officialise a certain interpretation of the legacy of colonialism, which is recognised as 
‘positive’. The 2005 law also sought to enter France’s pedagogical fabric. Article 4 of 
the Mercherak law provides that ‘university research programmes [shall] give the 
history of the French presence overseas, notably in North Africa, the place it deserves’ 
and requires that elementary and secondary ‘school programmes recognize in particular 
the positive role of the French presence overseas, notably in North Africa, and give the 
history and sacrifices of the French soldiers from these territories ‘the prominent place 
they deserve’.820  
During the debates that followed the Mekachera law, concern was strongly voiced by a 
group of historians who considered that the emphasis placed on the ‘positive aspects’ of 
colonialism reactivated the old paradigm of the ‘colonial history of colonisation’ dating 
from the end of the 19th century. On 25 March 2005 a petition against the law was 
published in Le Monde. Two petitions had been signed by tens of thousands of people 
asking for the repeal of the law.821 800 historians signed one petition, known as ‘l’appel 
des 19 historiens’. 822  Historians like Pascal Blanchard denounced the ‘self-
congratulating view of the Western past’. In particular, it was argued that the view on 
history presented by the Mekachera law overlooked the power relations and violence 
                                                                                                                                                
d'internement ou d'assignation à résidence, ayant de ce fait dû cesser leur activité professionnelle et ne 
figurant pas parmi les bénéficiaires mentionnés à l'article 1er de la loi n° 82-1021 du 3 décembre 1982 
relative au règlement de certaines situations résultant des événements d'Afrique du Nord, de la guerre 
d'Indochine ou de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L'indemnité forfaitaire mentionnée au précédent alinéa n'a 
pas le caractère de revenu pour l'assiette des impôts et taxes recouvrés au profit de l'Etat ou des 
collectivités territoriales. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine le montant de cette indemnité qui tient 
compte notamment de la durée d'inactivité justifiée ainsi que les modalités de versement de cette 
allocation. Cette demande d'indemnité est présentée dans le délai d'un an suivant la publication du décret 
d'application du présent article’. 
820 Loi no 2005-158 du 23 Février 2005 (n 815). Article 4: ‘Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en 
particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord.’ 
821 Petition of 19s. Available at: lph-asso.fr/actualities/42.html [last accessed January 2014] 
822 Petitions of 19s. Available at: lph-asso.fr/actualities/42.html. [last accessed January 2014] 
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inherent to the colonial period. For the petitioners, the law impeded the autonomy of the 
history profession and legalised a kind of ‘national communitarianism’.823 Following 
this petition, the organisation Liberté pour l’histoire, headed by Pierre Nora, was created 
and demanded the repeal of all memory laws. Historians denounced as a form of 
historical revisionism the government’s attempt to conceal the violence of 
colonialism.824 It was the theory of anti-revolutionary warfare developed by the French 
army, and notably the centrality of torture to those practices, that had caused the most 
controversy over the legitimacy of the French military operations in Algeria. For these 
historians, the Mekachera law curtailed the possibility of breaking the policy of silence 
instituted by the amnesties. 
A second concern was about the legitimacy of the state’s interference in the field of 
history. The 2005 law on the legacy of colonialism triggered a vivid debate on the role 
of the state to deem a unitary authorised history, pointing to the conflict between official 
memory and the marginalised memories of colonisation that did not find recognition.  
The 2005 law was commonly considered a ‘memory law’ or loi memorielle i.e. 
legislation related to the memory of a violent past. Before the Mekachera law, France 
had already passed a form of holocaust denial law (Gayssot law),825 and more recently a 
law regulating the memory of slavery (Taubira law) 826  and a law recognising the 
Armenian genocide.827 These laws have two roles. The first is a declarative statute, 
which consists of recognising and defining a set of events. The legislative regulation of 
the memory of past events seeks to give juridical recognition of wrongs and sufferings 
and, thereby legitimacy to a political consensus between opposing parties. Moreover, 
these laws play an important role in the creation and protection of a collective political 
                                                 
823 Claude Liauzu, Gerard Meynier et al, ‘Non à l’enseignement d’une histoire officielle’, Le Monde (Paris 
25 March 2005). 
824 Vincent Duclert, ‘L’Etat et les Historiens’ [2006] 325 Regards sur l’Actualité 5-15 
825 Loi n° 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, antisémite ou xenophobeJORF 14 
juillet 1990 8333. Available at: 
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crime contre l’humanité, JORF 23 mai 2001 8175. Available at: 
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000405369&categorieLien=id [last [last 
accessed March 2013] 
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identity. Hence the second function of these types of laws is to act as laws policing the 
distortion or denial of the events whose facts and classifications they protect.828  
The petition had insisted on the autonomy of history as a scientific discipline. It 
reflected historians’ opposition to the state interference in the codification of history.829 
They emphasized that: history is not religion, history is not moral, history is not the 
slave of current events, history is not memory, and, mi of all, history should not be 
subject to law and jurisdiction.830 The movement considered that history should remain 
independent and not participate in a ‘certain kind of memorial communitarianism’.831 
Historian Jacques Le Goff explained that, in the case of the Algerian conflict, the role of 
the historian is intrinsically linked to national memory of the conflict.832 The historian 
relies on an honest culture of memory. 833  Benjamin Stora commented that the law 
‘emanates from a profoundly reactionary movement’.834 Indeed many of those who had 
advocated the Law of 25 February 2005 in the French parliament belonged to the centre-
right party, Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). Claude Askolovitch had 
argued that the law reflected a generational memory: ‘They [the deputies] are talking 
about themselves when they believe they are discussing the law, when they evoke the 
past they are thinking of the dead’.835  
The debates following the Mekachera law also located the law within a larger debate in 
which Republican universalism was pitched against multiculturalism. Indeed, Betts 
explains that in effect the law presented the colonisation of Algeria as a temporary 
period of political dependency or tutelage necessary in order for the ‘un-civilised’ 
societies to advance to the point where they were capable of upholding liberal 
                                                 
828 Other examples: Loi n° 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, antisémite ou 
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institutions and self-government.836 In any case, the improvements in healthcare and 
agricultural development shadowed an economic programme that was essentially 
oriented towards France.837 Algeria’s agricultural production and vineyards are often 
cited as an economy destined for the French market.838 Furthermore, for many the law 
went beyond putting a positive ‘spin’ on the colonial period: its revisionist character was 
most visible in how it dealt with the harms of the colonial past. France’s violence is 
framed as an exception and as ‘excess’ rather than as inherent to the colonial system in 
which North African migrants were trapped within a binary conversation of inclusion in, 
or exclusion from, the French nation. This is the ‘imagined’ narrative upholding 
France’s construction of identity.839  
In January 2005, the Conseil Constitutionel, France’s supreme administrative court, 
declared that the law had exceeded its domain and President Jacques Chirac issued a 
decree repealing the controversial article (Article 4).840 The Council declared that the 
expression rôle positif (positive role) had only a caractère règlementaire (regulatory 
character) and could thus be eliminated by governmental decree; it further added that 
‘the law should serve to set mandatory duties and rights, not to be an incantation’.841 To 
some extent it could be argued that a legislative protection of memory is necessary and it 
is what makes it possible for the scientific work of historians to be taken to court and 
evaluated ‘in terms of their correspondence and conformity to the contents of memorial 
laws’.842 But the normative aspect of a memory law is incompatible with the strict 
interpretation of the law. Because of this normativity, the law runs the risks of 
establishing a ranking of memory based on a ‘regime of historicity’.843 
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B. The Potential of Sites Of Memory  
The production of norms around historical events works alongside the creation of sites 
of memory. Sites of memory are part of the inscription of crimes and may officially 
acknowledge the victims’ ‘suffering and the trauma of the nation as a whole’. Sites of 
memory ‘mobilize power because they are implacably material’.844 
As France is currently immersed in an ‘era of commemoration’ and, due to the 
increasing identity-related struggles, the state no longer has control over what kind of 
historical narratives enter into, and gain visibility, in the public space. The state’s 
presence and role in memory activity, once that of directing, has become ‘enabling’ or 
‘allowing’, indicating the state’s relegation to the side-lines of contemporary politics of 
memory.845 As a consequence, France has experienced a “transformation of historic 
memory which has been invaded, subverted, and flooded by group memories.” 846 
According to critics, the result is that France has lost herself in the ‘tyranny of the 
present’, in the memory battles and demands for debts and rectification arising out of the 
past.847 
France’s main memorial on the Algerian war is located in near the Quai Branly on the 
riverbank of the Seine in Paris. The Mémorial de la Guerre d'Algérie et des Combats du 
Maroc de la Tunisie, (1952-1962) (Figure 1) pays tribute to the French veterans who 
died during the war of decolonisation in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Instituted on 5 
December 2002 by President Chirac, the memorial is France’s first national memorial to 
commemorate Algerian war. During his inauguration speech, President Chirac declared:  
When the noise from the weapons has been silent for a long time, 
when the wounds are healing slowly, not without leaving deep scars, 
then comes the time for memory and recognition.848 
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The memorial comprises three minimalist concrete pillars and scrolling LED lights. A 
list of the names of the 23,000 soldiers who fought in North Africa during the French 
colonial wars scrolls down the pillars. 
 
Commemoration du 26 mars 1962, Quai Branly, Paris 2013 
 
Chirac’s government sought to provide a communal site where official memory and 
individual memories could co-exist. Nonetheless it has been said that what it does is 
reinforce a discourse of nostalgia about the past and the mythical unity of the French 
nation. President Chirac’s inauguration speech emphasised the role of the soldiers who 
fought alongside the French troops. He addressed the veterans in general without 
distinguishing between the combatants in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.  
In March 2010, Hubert Falco, Secretary of State for Defence and Veterans, re-
inaugurated the Memorial of Quai Branly to include the names of civilian victims of the 
March 26, 1962 ‘massacre’ on the rue d’Isly.  Falco’s gesture was considered a 
‘revisionist move developed by extremist organizations’. In July 2010, the French 
Senate held an emergency session to debate the memorial question in relation to the 
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memory of the victims of the OAS.849 The senate denounced the inclusion of these 
civilian names on the national memorial to the Algerian war, one senator declaring: 
‘Victims of the massacre on 26 March 1962 in Algiers cannot be assimilated to those 
who died for France’.850  The names of the dead that run across the surface of the 
memorial are not distinguished into categories and identified only as those who ‘died for 
France’. The names are thereby emptied of meaning so as to elude controversial 
identification. The 2002 memorial controversy illustrates this confrontation between 
individual memories and official recognition. Falco’s attempt to rehabilitated the OAS 
victims subscribe to a  ‘cult of continuity’ (Pierre Nora’s terminology) of ideals and 
myth around colonialism.851 With regard to the 2002 memorial, the electronic display 
means that names can easily be added or removed.852 This begs the question, on what 
basis can names be removed, and on what basis do they deserve to be added? Who, 
exactly, has the right to say?  
III. The Role of Social Movements  
The process of constructing meanings of the Algerian war is marked by the 
confrontation between memory and history. The analysis of the role of law in the 
construction of a permitted narrative shows areas of tension between different 
understanding and interpretation of the past. As seen above, the historians opposed the 
intervention of the state in the writing of history as it conflates collective meaning of the 
past with the framing of national identity. The official history of the Algerian war seeks 
to affirm a sense of collective belonging and identity rooted in the conflict. In addition, 
to historians, civil society groups criticized the creation of official sites of memory as 
privileging a selective interpretation of the past. This section turns to the role of civil 
society groups. It explores how civil society groups received these state policies of 
memorialization. As these groups’ struggles centres around the recognition of 
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marginalized memory, their goal is not to have a single alternative vision of the past. 
Their efforts subscribe to a process of building and recognizing collective identities. It 
particularly it looks at the contestation of meaning over the commemorations of the 
police repression of 17 October 1961. In 2012, a civil society group, the Raspouteam 
project (examined below) undertook to hold parallel commemoration of the events of 17 
October 1961 to the official ceremony. The approach of the project stemmed from the 
realization of the need to activate and to cultivate alternative narratives to counter the 
forgetting of past events.  
A. Contestation of Meaning   
The emergence of a movement of contention on memory in the 2000s coincided with the 
national disaggregation of the Republican ideal and the grievances of the multi-plurality 
of French national identity. The French State’s attempt to clarify the past sought to 
converge different interpretations of the past towards a single memory was not accepted 
by groups holding the colonial past as a marker of their self-identification.  
The salient question of history was brought back with the debate on the integration of 
youth with a migrant. The Mekachera law was vividly criticized for touching on 
question of integration of immigrants and their children through framing the 
history to be taught. The exclusion of the episodes of oppression by the colonial state 
would result in the erasing of memories held by children of colonialized population from 
their parents’ and grandparents’ telling. In 2005, a group of people called the Indigènes 
de la République (indigenous people of the Republic) sought to push for a post-
coloniality where the legacy of colonialism was yet to be discussed. The Indigènes de la 
République proclaimed the colonial legacy in its moment of entry into the political 
spectrum with a motto proclaiming new sort of identity: Nous sommes les Indigènes de 
la République (we are the Republic’s indigenes). In a manifesto published online, the 
Indigènes de la République denounces the ‘collective amnesia on the past’ and demands 
for redress for the cultural discrimination, economic exploitation and social 
disenfranchisement:  
The Republic of equality does not exist […] Our parents and 
grandparents were reduced to slavery […] We, the daughters and sons 
of colonised peoples and immigrants, are engaged in a struggle against 
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oppression and the discrimination produced by the post-colonial 
Republic.853  
This movement emerged in the background of the opposition to the Mekachera law and 
another law, which had stirred a vivid controversy on banning conspicuous religious 
signs from public schools (mainly targeting Muslim headscarves equates the treatment 
of the immigrants in France with the colonial situation). To the Indigènes de la 
République the non-dits of s colonial period fostered anti-Maghreb racism, which 
manifest itself in legislation restricting the freedom of speech and religion of Muslims in 
France. The Indigènes de la République has continued to link its political activism with 
historical references by commemorating, for example, the anniversary of the massacres 
by French troop in Setif and Guemla.854 In 2009 the government launched a public 
debate hoping to find a new Gallic consciousness. The ministry charged with organising 
the debate, which also happened to be the ministry in charge of immigration, invited 
French citizen to debate on what it means to be French. 
Inevitably interpretation of the past leads to confrontation between different actors and 
understandings. The emergence of groups like the Indigènes de la République seek to 
challenge the racism towards immigrants in present-day France by linking contemporary 
discrimination to colonial practices. The necessarily incomplete process of forging 
French national identity provoked a form of resistance from minority groups and French 
citizen with colonial descent.  
This post-colonial scepticism towards meta-narratives and teleological notions of history 
lead authors like Pierre Nora to argues that France has undergone a ‘crisis of memory’ 
whereby memory has been replaced by history. 855  As observed by Elizabeth Jelin, 
contestations of meaning over sites of memory are attempts to ‘reaffirm a feeling of 
collective belonging and an identity’. 856  The decision as to which date a shall be 
commemorated and whose ‘stories should be represented comes to deciding who is the 
master of this memory.857  
After the Einaudi affair, Betrand Delanoe, Mayor of Paris, offered a symbolic 
recognition to the victims of 17 October 1961. In October 2002 a commemorative 
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plaque marking the tragic event was placed on the Pont Saint Michel on which can be 
read: ‘In memory of the Algerians, victims of the blood-stained repression of a peaceful 
demonstration.’  
 
 
 Commemorative Plaque, Victims of 17 October 1961, Pont Saint Michel Paris 2013 
 
The Indigènes de la République critiqued the significance of this ad hoc recognition for 
survivors and family victims. Indeed, as Houria Boutedlja, explains the fact that the 
plaque does not acknowledge the responsibility of French agents and does not name 
Maurice Papon nor that additional official acknowledgements were made weakens its 
impact. The police repression of 17 October 1961 has a remarkable symbolic 
significance. She further explains that the function of commemorative gestures is to 
‘understand what happened and making sure that it will not be reproduced; a 
commemoration without acknowledgement of accountability is a weak way for the 
French government to avoid facing up to its responsibility and it is unfair to those who 
suffered and still live this pain as an open wound’.858  
The exclusion of colonialism among the cultural markers of identification reinforced the 
sense of exclusion of ethnic minorities. Hence these markers constitute as much 
requirement enabling to determine and strengthen the boundary between “us” and 
“them”. The movement of the Indigènes de la République seeks to be a rallying call for 
French citizens who share counter-memories of colonialism. For them, the question of 
the legacy of the colonial past needs to be framed in terms of rights of the victims and 
obligations of the French state to recognise its responsibility. For those reasons, n 
parallel to a state-sponsored public event marking the 50th anniversary of the brutal 
police repression of 17 October 1961, the Indigènes de République initiated its own 
                                                 
858 Research interview, January 2013. 
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commemorative event, paying tribute to the victims. The procession starts at the Pont 
Neuf and then moves on to the Pont Saint Michel where the massacre occurred. One of 
the members of the group took a mic and recounts the facts, acknowledging that many of 
the victims were thrown into the Seine making it impossible to know how many people 
died. At some point, one of the participants addressed the young people in the crowd 
directly about their duty to ensure that justice would be done. The commemoration 
follows with naming one by one the registered victims. The tribute mixes emotion and 
anger. Many of the participants denounced the injustices of the colonial state and link 
past violence to contemporary police abuses. As such other civil society movement such 
the group Stop aux control au Facies (stop racial profiling) was represented and joined 
in the celebration.859 
B. The Raspouteam Project  
With the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Algerian war, the commemoration of the 
war carried a lot of symbolism. For counter memory groups, this anniversary and the 
interest of the public provided an opportunity to get a wider audience interested in their 
attempt to push for the recognition of marginalised stories. In 2012, two web designers 
and a historian who founded the group Raspouteam were at the origins of a subversive 
act-up to commemorate the protests of 17 October 1961. It is a web documentary 
consisting of a series of testimonies from Algerian labourers, FLN activists and French 
police officers. The documentary was made available online and is accessible at the time 
this thesis is written. The website incorporates newspaper articles, interviews with 
contemporary historians such as Mohammed Harbi and Neil Macmaster. The project 
started on 17 October 2011; the documentaries were made accessible via the scanning of 
QR codes placed in seven different locations in Paris: Pont de Clichy, Pont de Neuilly, 
Palais des Sports, Etoile, Grands Boulevards, Saint Michel and Montreuil.  
 
                                                 
859 Commemoration of 17 October 1961 Paris 2012. 
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The project presents a series of interventions in what it considers to be the key places to 
understand the experience of the events of 17 October 1961. QR codes were printed on 
ceramic tiles and glued to the wall in each location. Images related to the event were 
pasted on the walls and an accompanying QR (quick response) code links us to the 
website where the history of the event is presented. Notably it displayed the famous 
graffiti ‘ici on noie les Algeriens’ (here they drown Algerians) drawn the day after the 
police repression.  
 
Quai de Conti, Paris October 17, 2012. 
Today the Raspouteam project is an interactive online map linked to these archival 
documents.860 Somewhere between street art and an educational project, Raspouteam 
offered a new and alternative way to engage and interact with France’s past and the 
cover-up of the Algerian war. The originality of Raspouteam’s initiative is to question 
the remembrance of the past by ‘placing the onus on each individual to act upon their 
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curiosity’.861 Engaging with the past, therefore, becomes an act of civic responsibility. 
However, unlike museums or memorials, Hollis explains, spontaneous public 
engagements are restricted to the medium it utilises (in this case the ‘quick response’ 
technology.862 
The participation of civil society groups in the commemoration of past events is a way 
for victims to reclaim the space and narrative of those events. As argued by Jenny 
Edkins, the ‘force of non-violent protest against state power can be amplified when they 
take place in the very locations that memorialize violent traumas of the past’.863 As such 
the Raspouteam project has permitted to challenge the State dominance over the writing 
of history by rendering the past more accessible.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to explore the paradigmatic issues emerging from authorisation 
of the history of the Algerian war. It examined how historical meaning endorsed by the 
amnesties affected the official remembering of the conflict. Three different areas are at 
stake: the relation between history and memory, sites of memory, and memory laws. 
From the 2000s, France politics of memory was marked by an important and deep 
transformation. 864  It certainly was not before 2002 that France had a proper 
commemoration the Algerian war. 865  However, as this process focused on the 
recognition of the contribution of the repatriated colons, it also overlooked the other face 
of colonialism, marked by violence. 
These debates about the memory of the Algerian war emphasize the diachronic effects of 
amnesty laws on the construction of a narrative of the Algerian war and its effect on 
different groups of French society. Over time, the amnesty law evolved in a narrative 
where past crimes were silenced and victims ignored. The assumption is that the law is a 
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more powerful source of recognition than the memory preserved by individuals. This is 
for two principal reasons. Resorting to law to ‘fix’ historical meaning can reflect the 
state’s attempt to shape the memory of past events. Law validates the official language 
used to commemorate the past. Secondly, law’s authoritative function ensures the 
receptivity of a collective message. The amnesty laws and subsequent legislation 
enacted regarding the Algerian war support a historiography that emphasized the French 
experience of colonialism and erased the colonized subjects from colonial history, an 
aspect of critique which remains at the heart of post-colonial demands.866 These reforms 
relied on the ‘subjectification’ of the colonised people and at the same time denied them 
the political rights afforded to native citizens. 867  
However social movements can challenge these authorised narratives. Social movement 
intervention, in the language of commemoration, can challenge the set of patterns used 
to give meaning to the symbolic language. Counter memory groups such as the 
Indigenes de la République and the Raspouteam collective entered the arena of memory 
by initiating their own process of commemoration and intervening in the ‘making of 
traditions’. To counter the authorised and mythical representations of the past, civil 
society groups sought to reactivate the marginal memories carved out of testimony of 
wrongs and injustices perpetrated by the French army. The construction of a historical 
narrative is both an imagined and negotiated process. It reflects the opposition of 
individual demands for recognition with their universal application. 
 
 
  
                                                 
866 Éric Savarese, Algérie, la guerre des mémoires (Paris: Non Lieu 2007) 140-142. 
867 Nicolas Bancel and Pascal Blanchard, ‘Le colonialisme, un “anneau dans le nez de la République”’  
[2000] 1228 Revue hommes et migrations. 
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Chapter 8 : Conclusion 
 
France has a ‘duty of truth on violence, injustice, massacres and torture. 
President Francois Hollande December 20, 2012 
 
At the commencement of this project, there was an attempt to conduct a conclusive 
study on the role of amnesty laws in post-conflict society. The selection of the French 
case was first chosen from the desire to provide an original case from which to reflect on 
the significance of amnesty laws in societies undergoing a revision of their past. This 
thesis has shown that in order to understand patterns of continuities and discontinuities 
of a transitional process, it is necessary to expand the conceptual framework of analysis 
of the amnesty. This framework has been applied to the case of amnesty following the 
War on the Independence of Algeria. 
The seven chapters explored the relationship between the three levels of contestation of 
the amnesty laws: amnesty - criminal accountability, amnesty - right of society to 
information and amnesty - recognition of past crimes. Issues discussed include the 
application of amnesty laws by domestic Courts; commemoration as institutions of 
informal justice; the role of social movements to in transformative justice. This chapter 
concludes this research project: it discusses the value of the research and proceeds to 
reflect on the findings and makes suggestions for future research. It presents the major 
conclusions for each issue before drawing thematic and theoretical conclusions.  
I.  Value of research  
The selective exploration of the archives undertaken in this thesis has enabled to trace 
the evolution of the amnesty from 1962 to 2012. Using both primary and secondary 
sources it sought to observe the process through which amnesty affect the prospect of 
justice and interfere in the process of construction of legacies of the Algerian conflict. 
The interviews conducted throughout this research, has enabled to complement the 
textual analysis undertaken and has covered the issue of amnesty on both a factual and 
meaning level. This combined approach was useful in order to understand the ‘story’ 
behind the implementation of the law. In order to remain as open and adaptable as 
possible to the interviewee’s position, interest and priorities, there were no 
predetermined questions asked (annexe 1). Nevertheless a standardized, open-ended 
interview questionnaire was established to facilitate faster interviews (see annexe 2). 
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Telephone interviews enable a researcher to gather information rapidly. Like personal 
interviews, they allow for some personal contact between the interviewer and the 
respondent. 
 
This thesis has focus its attention on domestic legal trials and legislations. From this axis 
it sought to study the role played by the courts as opposed to civil society or the 
executive branch in the transition. The historical exploration of the Algerian war 
undertaken in Chapter 3, backgrounds the discussion on the opportunity of individuals to 
use courts to revise the narratives of the past. 
II.  Main findings  
A. Transition and Continuities of past injustices  
The historico-legal analysis developed in this thesis sought to explore the enduring 
effects of injustice resulting from the Algerian war. Transitional justice enables to 
address the harm in its temporality as well as defining a justice model. The development 
of this justice model in the context of colonial settlers injustice extended the field of 
inquiry beyond conventional dichotomies. As such, understanding post-conflict 
resolution in terms of a ‘continuum’ between past, present, and future, the question of 
justice enables to address how structural injustices. Transitional justice institutions 
inevitably engage with ‘inherited traditions and centres of power’. 868  Among these 
traditions, the legacy of wars of decolonisation remains unclear.869  Post-colonial theorist 
strived to denounce the resilience of colonial practices and how it shapes relations and 
political aspirations. 870  The resolution of war for the independence of Algeria is a 
foundation moment in the political transformation of France. The war has marked 
France by its brutality and also because it revealed the contradictions of the colonial 
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regime. Since the independence of Algeria, France has struggled to legitimate its action 
ain Algeria and the effort engaged to preserve France colonial governance.871 
 
This research started by tracing the transformation of the debate about the amnesty. It 
was suggested that three phases could be discerned. The first phase (1962-1968), 
analysed in Chapter 4, corresponds to the concern to secure peace with the different 
actors of the conflict. The period immediately following the end of the conflict generally 
remained politically tense and state efforts focused on achieving the process of 
rehabilitation of the French soldiers. The amnesty were incorporated in the peace 
agreements, to facilitate the transition from violence and secured the application of rule 
of law. Indeed it was argued that the grant of amnesty was necessary to entice the FLN 
in the peace negotiation and as a bargain with the OAS fighters. Subsequent 
governments’ continued De Gaulle’s policy by rehabilitating the OAS members and 
compensating the repatriated pieds noirs. In the second phase (1972-1981) the amnesties 
were used as a political tool to support the political reconstruction of French society. 
The scope of the amnesty was extended so as to rehabilitate the veterans and address the 
need for recognition of the repatriated colons. The third phase (1999 to 2012) shows that 
the amnesty are being integrated within the construction of a narrative of 
commemoration of the Algerian war. In France, the legal debates that have taken place 
determined the trajectory undertaken by collective historical narrative. The increase 
interest of the French public towards the legacy of its colonial history required 
developing a trans-generational veneer of commemoration.  
 
This historically rooted analysis permitted to establish three important observations. The 
first one is that the amnesties following the Algerian War are at the nexus for 
contestation over the legitimacy of French military operations in Algeria and the 
recognition of victims of human rights violation. Next, the apparent fragmentation of 
memories on the Algerian War in France ensuing to the end of the war accuse of the 
infiltration of the Algerian War in identity politics. Finally, the growth of a social 
movement of contestation in France rallying victims, journalists and historians 
highlights the trans-generational nature of claims of recognition.  
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C. Judicial capacity in the post-transitional phase   
The exploration of the judicial capacity of courts to revise the narrative of past event 
sought to reveal the streams of receptivity between demands for recognition and 
demands for accountability. This thesis found that once society is less concerned by the 
immediate need to end violence, the issue of accountability involves two keystone 
elements: access to information on what happened and a justification.872   
1. Judges Interpretative Function  
The construction of a narrative about the past draws meaning from the ‘master 
narrative’, that is the conceptual framework for historical interpretation. As such, this 
conceptual framework determines the receptivity between criminal accountability and 
public recognition.  
 
This interpretative function of the law and the facts results in the production of a 
particular narrative and meaning given to an event. Subsequently, law’s function in the 
construction of meaning about what took place in the past point to role of law in 
memory transmitting, and community strengthening. 873  The deconstruction of the 
process of adjudication highlighted judges’ commitment to a narrative coherence. On 
domestic level, it is the ‘story element’ that seemed to have drive the judges 
interpretation of the law.  
 
The success of post-World War II prosecutions is to be attributed to three factors that 
have been missing in the case of the legacy of the Algerian war. First, the re-
establishment of the rule of law was framed through the enforcement of the law. 
Legalism provided a  ‘measured process of fixing guilt, which in each case was ‘a 
unique alternative to vengeance.874 Creative legalism as a doctrine of interpretation of 
the law aims at generating a consensus in order to protest against specific forms of state-
                                                 
872 Andreas Schedler, ‘A. Conceptualizing Accountability’, in Andreas Schedler Larry J. Diamond, and 
Marc F. Plattner (eds.) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, 
(Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 23. 
873 For literature about law, memory and dealing with the past, see for instance: Sarat  Trauma and 
Memory (n 85); Joerges and  Ghaleigh  Darker Legacies of Law (n 85) ; Felman, Juridical Unconscious 
(n 85) ; Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred (n 86); Sarat and Kearns, History, Memory and the Law 
(n 85); Christodoulidis and Veitch, Lethe’s Law (n 13); Douglas, Memory of Judgment (n 85); Osiel, 
Mass Atrocity (n 85). 
874 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism Cambridge, (Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964) 158. 
 227 
sponsored violence. 875  Shklar also based the success of legalism on the model it 
proposed. Through a process that was flawed, a ‘decent model of a trial’ was on display.  
However the French courts’ interpretation of criminal law in relation to the Algerian war 
reflected the use of the logic of legalism as a vehicle to mask state-sponsored abuse. The 
amnesty affected the memory politics by excluding the atrocities perpetrated during the 
Algerian war from the scope of application of crimes against humanity. Under such 
examination, the value of amnesty within the juridical hierarchy was revealed as one of  
‘didactic constraint’ (my term). 
The exploration of defamation cases undertaken in Chapter 6 pointed to the conditions 
that have lead to the recognition of the use of torture as a historical fact. However this 
success needs to be mitigated in light of the contextual and meta-textual meaning of this 
recognition. At a meta-textual level, it is important to highlight that defamation 
proceedings involve lesser stakes than criminal trials. The success of defamation 
proceedings to disclose the ‘truth, needs to be mitigated by the proceeding itself. Indeed 
the truth revealed about Papon’s past was not based on the verification of the fact but on 
the recognition of the ‘good faith’ of Jean Luc Einaudi as such, the salience of 
defamation proceedings resumes in the fact that it is a legal venue that allows for the 
creation of ‘stories’ to take place. Furthermore, despite recognising the responsibility of 
Maurice Papon in the police repression it did not resulted in his condemnation. In 
addition, defamation proceedings outcome needs to be situated within a particular 
context. Trials on historical injustices hold an expectation of truth for the general public. 
The very idea of reaching an unambiguous ‘truth’ through defamation proceedings is 
mistaken and overall an unrealistic goal. By its very nature the legal process is a 
selective process whereby evidences are being examined within a limited scope. It 
would be therefore, inaccurate to consider the story that unfolds in front of judges as 
universal and absolute. 
2. Limitations to Judicial Capacity 
When crimes perpetrated by an individual are part of a wider political criminality, there 
is a risk of turning a trial into a ‘show trial’. As Klaus Gunther expresses it ‘legal 
attribution focuses on the individual person and abstracts from the circumstances of the 
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situation, especially if these are seen as rather remote from the concrete illegal act in 
question’. 876    
A major challenge for courts in the process of revision of the past relates to finding the 
balance between opposing forces and competing political interests. 877
 
Kimberly 
Lanegran highlights that political interests are ever-present in the courtroom. 878 In our 
case, the opening of legal proceedings was disturbing the transitional bargain 
represented by the amnesty. Victims of torture’s plea for recognition are in contradiction with 
the policy of forgetting adopted at the end of the conflict.  
As such, the Algerian trials related more to an issue of memory than of the judging of 
crimes themselves. Central to the Algerian affair, courts became a space to debate the 
protection of memory of past crimes. Judges have a function role in ensuring the 
transmission and the protection of the memory of the past. It participates in efforts to 
ensure that past crimes are not reiterated. The question therefore does not centre on 
whether trials may participate in the writing of an official history but rather asks how it 
can do so responsibly. Debating the past indeed involve a public interest dimension. It 
opens for a confrontation between those who call for remembrance and those who 
consider that forgetting about past crimes may disrupt the transitional process. In the 
Orban and others decision of the ECtH, while the court recognised the French judges 
‘legitimate goal’ in sanctioning Aussaresses’ memoirs879 it ruled that the French court 
response was disproportionate and that it was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’.880 
During the debates, the publishers had argued that the book contributed to establishing 
the ‘historical truth’ regarding a traumatising page of French history. However for the 
ECtH, its role if not about that but it is to protect a public space for a society to debate 
on controversial issues of a country’s past. The legal proceedings against Paul 
Aussaresses and his publisher did not aim at establishing his individual accountability. 
However the debate on the use of torture was taken out of the courtroom put a moral 
condemnation on the methods used by the French army, the state at large for endorsing 
them. 
                                                 
 
877 Leila Sadat Wexler, ‗Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against 
Humanity in France‘, [1995] 20 (1) Law & Social Inquiry, 215. 
878 Kimberly Lanegran, Truth Commissions, Human Rights Trials, and the Politics of Memory. [2005] 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 113-119. 
879 Emmanuel Derieux ‘Nouvelle condamnation de la France pour atteinte à la liberté d’expression’ [25 
February 2009] La Semaine Juridique. 
880 Orban and others (n 670) para 42, 44. 
 229 
 
III.  The Construction of a Collective Narrative on Past Events  
 
By deconstructing the process formation of a collective narrative of the Algerian events, 
this thesis illuminated on of remembrance and meaning about the past. The historical 
endurance of transitional issues transcends the individuals directly involved in the 
conflict to reach the collective and help construct a collective political identity.881 
The rendition of justice is charged with the task of actively re-imposing norms into 
spaces in which rule-based legality has been either radically evacuated or perverted.882 
The very process of trials open a forum to investigate and verify narratives located at the 
margins or even outside collective memory. A sustainable nation- building discourse 
resulting from the amnesty should aim at homogenising the disparate memories of the 
war. 883  
 
This thesis illuminated on the influence that Amnesty played on the judges interpretation 
of criminal law. Acting as a constraining norm, the meaning of the past endorsed by 
amnesty dived in the creation of a collective narrative on the rehabilitation of the French 
soldiers and the attribution of guilt. The amnesty laws and subsequent legislation 
enacted regarding the Algerian war support a historiography that emphasized the French 
experience of colonialism and erased the colonized subjects from colonial history, an 
aspect of critique which remains at the heart of post-colonial demands. 
Chapter 7 explored the impact of the amnesty law on construction of a national 
narrative. More precisely it assessed the likelihood for counter memory accounts 
established in legal proceedings to be recognised officially. It identified that two 
different areas are at prone to transformation: sites of memory, and memory laws. This 
impact manifests principally through the production various symbolic messages.  The 
Raspouteam example provides interesting insights as the how the success of a social 
movement can be measured. Firstly, social movements need to be able to balance the 
                                                 
881 Teitel, Transitional Justice ( n 7), 102 
882 Lawrence Douglas, ‘The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom’ [2006] 
European Review, 14, 513-522. See Lawrence Douglas (2001) The Memory of Judgment: Making Law 
and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press 2001).  
883 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations. Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore, MD 
2000), xxiii, pp.308-49. 
 230 
expectation of the audience while producing resonant frames. The judicial trial that 
preceded the Raspouteam action to commemorate the events of 17 October 1961 
enabled to facilitate an effective communication. The ‘other’ Papon trial which 
displayed the inaccuracies of the official narratives created a ‘momentum’ to press the 
government to welcome these initiatives and open the access to the archives 
documenting the police repressions of 17 October 1961. This case revealed the centrality 
of access to archives to advance historical records and victims’ recognition. The judicial 
recognition of a right to access information about past events that has managed to 
bridges the gap between constructed narratives on the past and historical facts. It has 
enabled the Raspouteam movement to integrate its action within project of re adjustment 
of the historical narrative of the past and effectively address the historical gap. 
Secondly, it situates the role of historians within such attempt of transformative justice. 
 
IV.  Evaluating Continuities of Colonial Settlers Harm 
The justification for an amnesty in the aftermath of a conflict is generally framed in 
terms of the role of amnesty to secure peace. Yet, as the examination of France political 
re-construction demonstrates, in the long term, amnesty may create grievance of social 
nature. Indeed amnesty by itself does not protect from the past to prone to political 
reclamation. As such, this leads to the question: to what extent do amnesties participate 
in the preservation of Law? And if so, which Law? The use of amnesty following the 
Algerian war reflects the idea of a conflation between the rehabilitation of veterans and 
the forgetting of the crimes.  
A. Measuring the Impact of Colonial Settlers Injustices  
The introduction of amnesty laws and their subsequent extensions was a foundational 
moment in the political reconstruction of France. The ensuing Commemoration 
promotes society’s commitment to a particular reading of the past by producing symbols 
of its values and aspiration. The various material manifestations of the past such as 
museums, monuments, archives, festivals or anniversaries can be created so as to 
enshrine a collective understanding of the past and work as a mnemonic process. The 
role of these markers is inter-generational and they have the function of revitalising the 
social history of a represented group.   
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Yet France contemporary struggle in defining neutral and inclusive cultural legacies 
with regard to French colonial history brings up critical questions on the continuities of 
historical injustices. The examination of judges’ attitude towards the application of 
French criminal provisions and international law on acts of torture was one way to 
explore this continuity.  
 
The formation of civil society group coincided with the creation of physical markers of 
the past such as plaques and commemorative inscriptions, museums or memorials to 
commemorate the past. Yet it is profoundly difficult to pinpoint how past binaries of 
exclusion may effect on the construction of a political future. Further research is 
required to suggest platforms of reparation that rectify colonial settlers harm yet 
maintain society’s cohesion. The French national narrative on the Algerian war has been 
constructed according to a combination of memorial policies that can be traced back to 
the beginning of the Third Republic. A construction akin to the ‘binaries’ that 
underpinned and legitimised the spread of international law from the 16th to the 19th 
centuries during the process of colonisation. 884 Where the ‘civilised’ once opposed the 
‘barbarian’, one may see in the discourse of ‘othering’ of the North African immigrant 
population how colonial opposing binaries may still be in operation today. In France, the 
limited inclusion of the colonial experience in France collective memory was used by 
the government to shift from addressing comprehensively questions of integration of 
migrants. One could take further this inquiry so as to whether it can be connected to the 
concern held by many about the nature of Europe and the development of European 
citizenship.   
By building continuity with the past, memory does the work of laying the foundations 
for identity, on an individual and a cultural level. Noting the interconnection between 
colonial racism and the veneer used to address the question integration of North African 
immigrants it would be necessary explore if identity a key feature of the dispute over 
France self-image.  
B.  Impact of Civil Society’s in Transformative Justice  
The strength of grassroots movements is assessed in terms of ability to invoke the past 
and make it accessible in order to produce and reproduce the past in the present. The 
                                                 
884 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2007),  
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agency of grass-roots action, such as the one of the Raspouteam Project to interfere in 
the sphere of collective memory initiatives highlight that, the law is not the only 
recipient for a project of transformative justice. Chapter 7 analysed the engagement of 
civil society in their capacity to create alternative commemoration. While this chapter 
explored these initiatives within the construction of a historical narrative and in the 
construction of an alternative system of referential markers of identification of 
communities further research is needed to assess how these initiatives impact on the 
shaping of a group identity. A follow-up study on the sustainability of these grassroots 
actions is necessary. 
Conclusion 
This thesis sought to develop a comprehensive study of the enduring effect of past 
injustices. The examination of the enduring effects of amnesty in French post-colonial 
settlers settings highlighted the centrality of memory as a field of contention and 
appropriation. This has highlighted the role played by collective narratives and official 
recognition in a symbolic form of reparation.  
The question of colonial legacy sits at the heart of the debate on structural injustices. In 
the present second generation of migrants born in France remain sensitive to the 
recognition of their individual experience of colonialism. Yet at the official level, France 
is still reluctant to integrate these experiences in the collective narrative of the past and 
embrace grass root activities of commemoration.  Framing France politics of memory 
through the transitional justice discourse enable to recognise how past harms features 
into structural injustices. The study of amnesty within the prism of collective memory 
has highlighted that a transitional historical production’ alongside justice mechanisms is 
critical. Transitional history necessitates negotiating between contested accounts and is 
deployed within a broader narrative and state history. The politics of memory on past 
conflict presumes a degree of consensus and dialogue between individual subjectivities, 
and societal or collective sense of belonging. As such, demands for the transformation of 
memory imply a decisive shift from the historical to the psychological, from the social 
to the individual, from the objective message to its subjective reception. The challenge is 
to place guilt and repentance at the centre of a reconstituted collective memory in such a 
way as to keep the memory alive as the justification of prospective relief.  
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Recourse to law to ‘fix’ history is not unusual. In many cases, post-conflict societies 
have coupled legislative reforms with the re-envisioning of past crimes. In a public 
lecture, Justice Richard Goldstone stressed the role of the legal institution in the South 
African Truth and the Reconciliation Commission in terms of an official 
acknowledgement.  ‘If it were not for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, people 
who today are saying that they did not know about apartheid would be saying that it did 
not happen. This is a fact and it cannot be underestimated’.885 Such intervention by the 
law may occur decades after the end of violations and represent a break with the past 
consensus. Struggles over memories and competition over the recognition of particular 
versions of the past refer to the active role of participants in the making of a historical 
meaning. The role of the state is highly significant in the untangling of competing 
narratives by adopting measures and institutionalising mechanisms to deal with the 
past.886 On the other hand, the remembrance of the past plays an important role in the 
redefinition of the nation and the reconstruction of broken relationships.  Law’s function 
as a narrative has to do with its functions and the expectation structures of the society.887 
Because the law offers a canonical language of recognition, it plays a central role in the 
construction of symbols and a ritual of passage for recognition. ‘Truth’ is undoubtedly 
‘one of the most elusive concepts that can be used to address what happened during a 
conflict’.888  
 
A third way out of this imbroglio may be found in the investment of a French-Algerian 
cooperation in the like of the Franco-German reconciliation process. Indeed by investing 
in the memory of the past, French people overcame the image of German as an external 
enemy, and instead centred this criticism on the Vichy regime. Therefore settling the 
Algerian question would require adopting ‘a new set of lenses through which we do not 
primarily see the setting and the people in it as the problem and the outsider as the 
answer. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and 
building on people and resources within the setting’.889 The state should complement the 
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decision to not prosecute and incorporate mechanisms to understand the roots of 
violence.890 
 
Elazar Barkan suggests that restitution at best encourages a political dialogue among 
cultures and contributes to establishing international cooperation and standards of 
morality that can further encourage future agreements. In restitution schemas, ‘the West 
is in a dialogue with the rest of the world and is shaped by the encounter with other 
cultures. The dialogue of restitution brings new pluralistic perspectives of the national 
historic and current identity into public view and thus redefines the nation and its 
historical narrative’. 891
 
Restitution schemes can enable multiple group identities to 
influence and contribute to a new kind of historical narrative.  ‘It is a testimony to a 
global morality that envelops pluralism and multiculturalism while maintaining the 
nation-state as the sovereign unit’. 892  As Ricoeur writes ‘[t]he duty to remember 
consists not only in having a deep concern for the past but in transmitting the meaning of 
the past to the next generation.893 Memory groups today denounce the difficulty of 
finding an appropriate space to discuss and commemorate the state sponsored violence 
that was perpetrated during the conflict. 894 The acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural 
diversity not only depends on the symbolical meaning attached to it but also on a 
practical dimension. The recognition of the right to self-government and the recognition 
of their differences are trapped within the dichotomy between the universalism concept 
of justice and the particularism of their claims. 895 Therefore addressing past crimes is a 
matter of ‘human rights’ is an ethically loaded project. But it also offers opportunities to 
re-inscribe the responsibility of the state towards their indigenous populations, 
empowering vulnerable communities.  
 
The real challenge of post-transitional anticolonial movement is today to deal with the 
legacy of the Algerian war is to turn the colonial narrative imposed by the powerful into 
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a cohesive and inclusive language. In the legal realm, the challenge is to overcome the 
selective process steered by the law on a collective memory, directly and selectively. 
Attempts to reconstruct the dialectics that direct the discourse on historical justice 
requires developing strategies of international law while at the same time serving as a 
basis for reconciliation.  The ideal of a cosmopolitan justice turns the acknowledgement 
of past responsibilities towards the recognition of the ‘other’ as vulnerable.
 
This way, it 
is suggested that the memories of different nations could open up towards each other, 
and they could begin to form a ‘community of history’, itself an element of a moral 
community. It is suggested that this could be a cornerstone of a post-national European 
identity.896 However, this can only be executed if individuals, communities, and memory 
groups are considered as full participants in the official project of the social 
reconstruction of the nation.  
  
                                                 
896 Jean-Marc Ferry, La Question de l’État Européen (2000) p. 160. 
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Annexe 1 : List of Participants 
 
State & intermediate actors Contact person Activity 
ONACVG Abderrhaman 
Moumen 
The French National Office for Veterans and 
Victims of War (ONACV) task whose task 
is to compensate the persons affected by 
war.  Abderahmen Moumen is the head of 
the départements of the National Office for 
Veterans and Victims of War (ONACVG) 
responsible for the application of measures 
adopted by the government for the 
repatriation of former members and their 
surviving spouses of auxiliary and 
assimilated units that served in Algeria. 
Secretary of State for Defence 
and Veterans 
Benoit LeMaire French Secretary of State for War Veterans 
and Memory is in charge of organizing the 
commemorative activities and sites of 
memory 
Historian Sylvie Thenault Expert on the colonial Judicial system 
Historian Raphaelle Branche Specialist in colonial violence and colonial 
wars, focusing on Algeria. Her doctoral 
thesis published in 2001 was the first 
scientific study on the use of torture by the 
French army 
Direct actors Name Story 
Historian/ Party at the 
Defamation trial versus 
Maurice Papon 
 
Jean Luc Einaudi Historian specialized in the events of 17 
October 1961. He was able to prove in court 
that it Maurice Papon directed the police 
repression in October 1961. 
Lawyer Jacques Vergès A prominent and outspoken lawyer known 
for his activism in the anti-colonial cause 
and famed attacking French torture in 
Algeria and defending Nazi criminal Klaus 
Barbie for divisive legal tactics, including 
Journalist Florence Beaugé Journalist at Le Monde was one of the first 
French journalists who revealed the policy 
of systematic torture, rape and deportation in 
Paris by the French army and police. 
Son of a victim of torture Mohammed Garne M.Garne was born after his mother was 
gang-raped by French soldiers and tortured 
by soldiers who tried to provoke a 
miscarriage on learning that she was 
pregnant. 
Wife of a disappeared 
detainees 
Josette Audin She is the widow of Maurice Audin, an 
Algerian Communist professor who was 
arrested by French paratroopers, tortured and 
executed in secret. 
Victim of Torture Louisette Ighilahriz As a young woman, Mme Ighilahriz, joined 
the Algerian national liberation movement 
after her father was seized by French 
colonial authorities in the 1950s. Arrested in 
1957, she was tortured for three months by 
the French soldiers. She would not have 
survived from her ordeal if it was not for a 
French doctor who helped her being 
transferred 
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Annexe 2 : interviews 
 
Type of data collection: Interview: Face-to-face (email or via telephone) 
Ethics guideline of the interview: 
● My name and role was given. I explained that I was doing data collection for a research 
project called forgetting the unforgivable: the use of amnesty following the Algerian 
war. 
● I explained to the interviewee that I would like to find out about his/her view and 
experience regarding the amnesty laws and France attitude towards the Algerian wat. 
● I explain that it will take minimum approximately 30 minutes. 
List of interviewees  
 
General Information.  
Date:   
Location:   
Type of interview: 
(telephone, Skype, face-to-
face) 
  
Title:    
Organization:   
Name of interviewer:    
Date :    
 
 Section 1: General questions 
1. What do you think about the Algerian war? 
 
  
2. Are you familiar with the amnesty laws enacted after the end of the war? 
  
3.  Have you been personally affected by the war? if yes how? 
  
  
Section 2: background history (direct actors ) 
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4. Could you explain me how the war has impacted on you?  
 
  
5. Do you think that the resolution of the conflict was satisfying 
  
6. have you attempted to seek reparations? 
 
7. what are the major obstacles to your attempt? 
  
8. Do you find your efforts supported by civil society? 
  
  
Section 3: Lawyers  
14.   Do you consider that the amnesty related to the Algerian war is lawful? 
  
15.   how would you define the attitude of the judges towards the Algerian war?  
  
16.  Are you aware of any action in order to come to terms with this issue? Do you have any 
suggestion to solve this problem? 
  
17.   Are you familiar with any local NGOs who represent victims?  
  
  
Section 3: Historians 
18. What kind of role do the amnesty play in the historiography of the conflict? 
  
19. How would you define the role of the historian in relation to the Algerian war? 
 
20. What recommendations could you provide to improve the commemoration of the war   
 239 
  
21.what is the role of commemoration? 
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